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Apart from mourning the attack on the Nova music festival on October 7, 2023, which felt like it happened while U2 was onstage at Sphere Las Vegas, I have generally tried to stay out of the politics of the Middle East … this was not humility, more uncertainty in the face of obvious complexity. In recent months, I have written about the war in Gaza in The Atlantic and spoken about it in The Observer, but I circled the subject.

As a co-founder of the ONE Campaign, which tackles AIDS and extreme poverty in Africa, I felt my experience should be focused on the catastrophes facing that work and that part of the world. The hemorrhaging of human life in Sudan or Ethiopia hardly makes the news. The civil war in Sudan alone is beyond comprehension, leaving 150,000 dead and 2 million people facing famine

And that was before the dismantling of USAID in March and the gutting of PEPFAR, lifesaving programs for the poorest of the poor that ONE has fought for decades to protect. Those cuts will likely lead to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of children over the next few years.

But there is no hierarchy to such things.

The images of starving children in the Gaza Strip brought me back to a working trip that my wife, Ali, and I made 40 years ago next month to a food station in Ethiopia following U2’s participation in Live Aid 1985, amid another man-made famine.  To witness chronic malnutrition up close would make it personal for any family, especially as it affects children. When the loss of noncombatant life en masse appears so calculated—especially the deaths of children—then evil is not a hyperbolic adjective. In the sacred text of Jew, Christian, and Muslim, it is an evil that must be resisted.

The rape, murder, and abduction of Israelis at the Nova music festival and elsewhere in southern Israel was evil. On the awful Saturday night and Sunday morning of October 7–8, I wasn’t thinking about politics. Onstage in the Nevada desert, I just couldn’t help but express the pain everyone in the room was feeling and is still feeling for other music lovers and fans like us—hiding under a stage in Kibbutz Re’im then butchered to set a diabolical trap for Israel and to get a war going that might just redraw the map from the river to the sea. Hamas’s leadership was willing to gamble with the lives of 2 million Palestinians. It wanted to sow the seeds for a global intifada of the sort that U2 had glimpsed at work in Paris during the Bataclan attack in 2015, but it could succeed only if Israel’s leaders fell into the trap that Hamas set for them.

Yahya Sinwar didn’t mind if he lost the battle or even the war if he could destroy Israel as a moral as well as an economic force. Over the months that followed, as Israel’s revenge for the Hamas attack appeared more and more disproportionate and disinterested in the equally innocent civilian lives in Gaza … I felt as nauseous as anyone, but reminded myself that Hamas had deliberately positioned itself under civilian targets, having tunneled its way from school to mosque to hospital. When did a just war to defend the country turn into an unjust land grab? I hoped Israel would return to reason. I was making excuses for a people seared and shaped by the experience of Holocaust, who understood the threat of extermination not simply as a fear but as a fact. I reread Hamas’s charter of 1988; it’s an evil read. (Article Seven!)

But I also understood that Hamas is not the Palestinian people. Palestinians have for decades endured and continue to endure marginalization, oppression, occupation, and the systematic stealing of the land that is rightfully theirs. Given our own historic experience of oppression and occupation in Ireland, it’s little wonder so many here have campaigned for decades for justice for the Palestinian people.

We know Hamas is using starvation as a weapon in the war, but now so too is Israel, and I feel revulsion for that moral failure. The government of Israel is not the nation of Israel, but the government of Israel, led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu today, deserves our categorical and unequivocal condemnation. There is no justification for the brutality he and his far-right government have inflicted on the Palestinian people, in Gaza or in the West Bank. And not just since October 7; well before it too—though the level of depravity and lawlessness we are seeing now feels like uncharted territory.

Curiously, those who say these reports are not true are not demanding access to Gaza for journalists, and they seem deaf to the revealing rhetoric. Examples that sharpen my pen include: Israel’s heritage minister claiming that the government “is racing ahead for Gaza to be wiped out”; its defense minister and security minister arguing that no aid should be let into the territory; its finance minister vowing that “not even a grain of wheat will enter the Strip.” And now Netanyahu has announced a military takeover of Gaza City, which most informed commentators understand as a euphemism for the colonization of Gaza. We know the rest of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank are next. What century are we in?

Is the world not done with this far, far-right thinking? We know where it ends … world war, millenarianism … Might the world deserve to know where this once promising, bright-minded, flawed, but only democratic nation in the region, is headed unless there is a dramatic change of course? Is what was once an oasis of innovation and freethinking now in hock to a fundamentalism as blunt as a machete? Are Israelis really ready to let Benjamin Netanyahu do to Israel what its enemies failed to achieve over the past 77 years, and disappear it from membership in a community of nations built around even a flawed decency?

As someone who has long believed in Israel’s right to exist and supported a two-state solution, I want to make clear to anyone who cares to listen our band’s condemnation of Netanyahu’s immoral actions and to join all who have called for a cessation of hostilities on both sides.

If you will not listen to Irish voices, then please, please, please stop and listen to Jewish ones—from the high-mindedness of Rabbi Sharon Brous, to the tearful comedy of the Grody-Patinkin family—who fear the damage to Judaism, as well as to Israel’s neighbors. Listen to the more than 100,000 Israelis who protested in Tel Aviv this week for an end to the war. Listen to the hundreds of retired Israeli generals and intelligence leaders who say that Netanyahu has gone too far.

Our band stands in solidarity with the people of Palestine who truly seek a path to peace and coexistence with Israel and with their rightful and legitimate demand for statehood. We stand in solidarity with the remaining Israeli hostages and plead that someone rational negotiate their release—maybe someone like the imprisoned Marwan Barghouti, whom a former head of the Mossad, Efraim Halevy, described as “probably the most sane and the most qualified person” to lead the Palestinians

Our band is pledged to contribute our support by donating to Medical Aid for Palestinians. We urge Israelis, the majority of whom did not vote for Netanyahu, to demand unfettered access by professionals to deliver the crucial care needed throughout Gaza and the West Bank that they best know how to distribute, and to let enough trucks through. It will take more than 100 trucks a day to seriously address the need—more like 600—but the flooding of humanitarian aid will also undercut the black marketeering that has benefited Hamas.

Wiser heads than mine will have a view of how best to accomplish this, but surely the hostages and Gazans alike deserve a different approach—and quick.


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A not-insignificant number of TikToks aim to convince the viewer that beef-tallow moisturizer will not make your face smell like cow. The beauty influencers who tend to appear in these videos—usually clear-skinned women rubbing tallow into their face as they detail their previous dermatological woes—describe the scent as “buttery” or “earthy” or grass-like. Many of them come to the same conclusion: Okay, even if the tallow does smell a little bit, the smooth skin it leaves behind is well worth it.

Beef tallow (as both a moisturizer and an alternative to seed oils) is one of many cow-based products that have crowded the wellness market in the past five or so years. Beef-bone broth is a grocery-store staple. Demand for raw milk has grown, despite numerous cases of illness and warnings from public-health officials that drinking it can be fatal. In certain circles, raw cow organs—heart, liver, kidney—are prized superfoods. Target and Walmart sell supplements containing bovine collagen (a protein found in cowhide and bone) and colostrum (the rich liquid that mammals produce for their newborn offspring); they promise healthier skin, a happier gut, and stronger immunity, and come in flavors such as watermelon lime, lemon sorbet, and “valiant grape.” You can buy cow-placenta pills for postpartum healing, or powdered bull testicle for testosterone support. The slightest interaction with clean-beauty Instagram can fill your feed with ads for beef-tallow lip balms, cleansing creams, sunscreen, and deodorants. (One brand even offers creamsicle-flavored beef-tallow personal lubricant, which is currently out of stock online.) Influencers praise tallow for clearing their acne and eczema—and offer discount codes so you can experience the same.

Even the government’s recent public-health messaging has veered toward the bovine. During his tenure as health secretary, Robert F. Kennedy Jr. has championed cooking in beef tallow (which he says is healthier than seed oils) and drinking raw milk (one of many items that he claims are suppressed by the FDA). Casey Means, President Donald Trump’s nominee for surgeon general, also supports raw milk; she has suggested that Americans can decide whether a given bottle is safe to drink by looking the dairy farmer in the eye and petting his cow. Means and Kennedy have largely avoided engaging with the many public-health experts who reject their views. But in May, after months of such critiques, Kennedy took shots of raw milk at the White House to celebrate the release of the “Make America Healthy Again” report.

Woo-woo, it seems, is becoming moo-moo. America has entered its cowmaxxing era.

Like most wellness offerings, cow products are marketed with vague health claims that are virtually impossible to confirm or deny, such as “deeply nourishes and supports the skin barrier,” “activate cellular health,” and “supports memory.” One of the many promises of the Ancestral Supplements Starter Pack of organ-based capsules is simply “vitality.” (The company also includes a disclaimer that the FDA has not reviewed said vitality benefits.) Advocates of these goods tend to be more specific in their praise. Raw-milk enthusiasts claim that unpasteurized milk contains bioactive chemicals that improve human health. In one video, a woman drinks raw milk that’s been in the fridge for more than a month; she claims it is safer to consume than store-bought pizza or salad and that it reduces rates of eczema, fevers, and respiratory infections. One smooth-skinned influencer, who says she hasn’t washed her face in two years, claims that beef tallow is “bioidentical” to the sebum produced by human skin. (It’s not, because it’s from cows.)

[Read: The real appeal of raw milk]

Some of these products are more likely to provide benefits than others. Bone broth is indeed rich in collagen (which, when produced by the human body, strengthens hair and skin). Whey powder, made from leftover cheese water, does contain protein. But very few studies support the idea that eating more collagen strengthens hair and skin. Whey protein can help build lean muscle, but the body can only absorb so much at a time. Some dermatologists say tallow can strengthen and hydrate the skin; others say it clogs pores and should be avoided. Other products can be downright dangerous: Just this week, Florida officials announced that 21 people fell sick after consuming contaminated raw milk.

At least part of the appeal of cowmaxxing is the cows themselves: The products evoke the pastoral ideal of a cow grazing freely in the plains, milked lovingly by human hands. It’s an image that’s been embedded in American culture for centuries. Consider how Laura Ingalls Wilder, who was no stranger to the harsh reality of farm life, described cow-raising in Little Town on the Prairie: “Warm and sweet, the scent of new milk came up from the streams hissing into the rising foam, and it mixed with the scents of springtime.” It’s enough to persuade a microbiologist to drink raw milk.

In 21st-century America, cows still summon images of fields and clover and wide blue sky, enough to trigger the human tendency to believe that what’s natural is “fundamentally good,” Courtney Lappas, a biology professor at Lebanon Valley College, told me. Her research has shown that some Americans prefer natural over man-made products even when the former is described as objectively worse—a phenomenon her colleague Brian Meier has called the “naturalness bias.” This tendency, which is prevalent across cultures, likely leads people to assume that unprocessed cow-based products are safe and healthy, she said. Tallow, some skin-care enthusiasts claim, is a healthier, safer alternative to conventional moisturizers, which supposedly contain toxic chemicals. The branding of such products, too, leans into the notion that natural is best: Fat Cow Skincare markets its tallow cosmetics as “pure skincare, powered by nature”; Heart and Soil sells capsules of “nature’s superfood” (that is, organ meats). Other brands invoke nature through the prehistoric, with names such as Primal Harvest, Primal Kitchen, Primal FX, Primal Being, and Primal Queen. Ancestral Supplements’ ad copy reads: “Putting Back In What the Modern World Left Out.”

[Read: How organ meat got into smoothies]

America’s current health landscape is the perfect setting for cowmaxxing to thrive. The naturalness bias is deeply ingrained in Kennedy’s MAHA campaign, which aims to improve public health by returning to a more natural lifestyle. In Kennedy’s view, beef tallow is superior to seed oil because it’s less processed (some people even render it at home). The carnivore and tradwife movements embody a similar message, promoting the consumption of raw cow organs and making butter from scratch. You may not know what’s in store-bought products, the thinking goes, but you do know what’s in tallow: pure, unadulterated cow fat.

And yet most modern cows live in a decidedly unnatural environment. The majority of U.S. cattle are fed genetically modified crops, and some genetically modified cows are allowed to be sold as food. Many cow-based wellness products bear the label “grass-fed,” which suggests cows that were raised on pastures rather than feedlots. But the label is not strictly enforced, and it doesn’t necessarily prohibit.) farmers from giving cows antibiotics or hormones. There’s no guarantee that a cow whose colostrum is harvested to be sold by a tradwife on Instagram had a happy, bucolic existence. Not to mention that colostrum, whey, and placenta do not come out of the cow in the form of powders or pills.

The spread of science misinformation, along with legitimate concerns about the state of public health in the United States, have left many Americans understandably confused about whether conventional science and Western medicine can be trusted in 2025. Getting to the bottom of, say, the seed-oil controversy requires engaging with thorny scientific debates that reference inscrutable research papers; embracing the natural and ancestral by opting for tallow is an attractively simple-seeming alternative. “It brings with it a sense of purity or wholesomeness that is desirable right now,” Marianne Clark, a sociologist at Acadia University who studies wellness trends, told me. In this sense, cowmaxxing is not so much a health endeavor as it is a spiritual one, its promise downright biblical: Cowliness is next to godliness.


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As a mom, my news feed is flooded with cautionary tales about all the ways technology will ruin my kids—and all the ways I must protect them. Social-media bans. Screen-time limits. The “Wait Until 8th” pledge. Analog technology. Read their texts. But wait, give them privacy! Add in the eye-roll-inducing reminder that “every kid is different,” and the guidance will suck the joy out of parenting faster than your kid can download TikTok.

My children are young, but already I see the way my toddler signs more after watching an episode of Ms. Rachel, and the eager look in my 5-year-old’s eyes when he asks for my phone to watch videos of komodo dragons. At this stage, their digital curiosity feels mostly harmless. But I know that soon we’ll be debating whether they can download Snapchat and Instagram, not whether they can watch another episode of Wild Kratts on PBS Kids, and I dread the thought of having to navigate the thicket of advice.

So I listened up when the psychologist Jonathan Haidt, the author of The Anxious Generation, told me during a recent interview that there’s one tech rule he “really” regrets not following with his kids: no screens in the bedroom, ever. Immediately, I was drawn to the simplicity. There were no apps to download, no timers to set, nothing to buy. And I was comforted by how widely endorsed the guidance is. The psychologist Lisa Damour, who specializes in adolescent development, has told parents that if they implement only one tech rule, this should be it. Michael Rich, a pediatrician and the founder of Boston Children’s Hospital’s Digital Wellness Lab, told me that he “strongly” recommends the same. It seemed like a holy grail—the rule to follow if you can follow only one rule.

[Read: The underlying messages that screen-time recommendations send parents]

Some of the reasons for the guidance are obvious. For years, experts, including those at the American Academy of Pediatrics, have urged parents to wrestle kids’ screens out of their room in the evening. As many people well know, using screens at night delays bedtime, shortens sleep duration, and worsens sleep quality; phones can disrupt rest just by being in the same room, Lauren Hale, a professor studying sleep at Stony Brook Medicine, told me. The impacts of insufficient sleep can be wide ranging, including poor cognitive performance, worse academic outcomes, and lowered immune function. And crucially, “anything that undermines sleep is going to undermine adolescent mental health,” Damour told me. Not getting enough sleep is a significant risk factor for suicidal thoughts and self-harm.

The promise of protecting my kids’ mental health would have been enough to convince me to declare their bedrooms screen-free zones. But, experts told me, the benefits extend even further. For one, unlike so many other rules, keeping screens out of bedrooms doesn’t just impose temporary restrictions that kids will likely ignore as soon as they get an ounce of freedom. It can also help them develop a healthy relationship with technology—one that they’ll carry with them as they get older. Rich called this “future-proofing” your kid.

To some extent, Damour told me, adults will naturally become more responsible with technology as they get older and develop better impulse control. But before that time comes, this rule can keep teens from doing things online they may regret.When kids can use their devices only in communal areas such as the kitchen and the living room, there’s the obvious plus that parents can keep an eye on what they’re doing. Kristina Wright, a mom and writer who lives near Richmond, Virginia, told me that when her teenage son live-games with friends in common areas while she works from home, she can easily ask him about any unfamiliar voices. But a more profound mental shift happens in kids’ brains, Damour said. In such a public space, it’s a lot harder to forget that anything they do on their computer or phone can become, well, public. Compare that with how many tend to make choices alone in the middle of the night, when “their impulses are strong and their brakes are weak,” Damour said, and the difference is striking.

In addition to facilitating better decision making, using screens around family can be a reminder that many of the best uses of these devices are the most social ones. Scrolling next to Mom and Dad on the couch, kids might feel more inclined to invite parents into their digital life, which, for many kids, is no different from their real life. Rich said that kids often tell him they want their parents to pay more attention to them. They might actually enjoy showing off the TikTok dance they learned, or explaining what rizz means (even if they cringe when their parents try to say it). Conversations like these can create richer family relationships and help counteract smartphones’ isolating nature. Along the way, parents might learn about what their kids are into and the world they’re growing up in. And at the very least, Damour said, kids won’t get a chance to develop the habit of holing up in their bedroom with their phone and never coming out.

[Read: The dumbest phone is parenting genius]

No other solution to the kids-and-tech conundrum that I’ve heard of seems likely to be nearly this effective. The “Wait Until 8th” pledge is great—until phones come and risk tanking kids’ sleep and judgment just as they’re starting high school. Wi-Fi shutoffs, parental controls, social-media bans, and other restrictions can help fill the gap, but many kids will figure out ways to flout the rules. If your kid uses their phone alone in their room at night, would you even know about their secret finsta? Although it’s true that they could break the no-tech-in-bedrooms rule by sneaking their phone in when parents aren’t looking, that type of rule-breaking is easier to guard against by keeping devices in parents’ rooms or even in lockboxes. Sure, forbidding screens entirely or reverting to ’90s tech might promise to solve all our worries, but in a society that’s growing more reliant on technology, not everyone wants to limit their kid in that way. And if kids don’t have experience using tech, they won’t have any opportunities to practice using it responsibly.

Parents ready to ban phones from the bedroom would do well to first invest in an old-fashioned alarm clock or radio to make sure their kids don’t miss those functions on their phone. Even more important, parents may want to consider following the rule themselves too, Andrea Davis, a mom in Hood River, Oregon, who coaches families on how to navigate technology, told me. Leading by example is much easier. Otherwise, putting the rule into practice is simple. Davis has a charging station in her home office; her kids are responsible for plugging their devices in before bedtime. Hale told me it doesn’t matter where you stash your screens, so long as you “routinize it to make it part of the family plan.”

Over time, if kids prove themselves responsible, parents might consider exceptions. Sometimes it’s easier for teens to do their homework on a laptop in their bedroom. As kids get older (or in moments when dueling FaceTimes in the living room grow too chaotic), parents might let their children take calls with trusted friends alone in their bedroom. But it is crucial to establish a firm boundary from the start—preferably right when devices are doled out. That’s when, as Damour told me, kids are so excited “that they will very happily agree to all sorts of parameters.”

To be clear, I’m not suggesting that parents who opt in to this rule forget about all the others. I certainly won’t. Still, for those who don’t know where to start, this may be a good first step. I’m sure my sons will grumble about it. But I’m holding on to hope that later on, maybe, just maybe, they’ll thank me.

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Julia, a Muppet on Sesame Street, is a 4-year-old girl with bright-orange hair who likes singing, painting, and playing with her stuffed bunny, “Fluffster.” She’s also autistic—which means, as the show made clear during the character’s TV debut, in 2017, that Julia expresses herself in a manner some might not understand. When Big Bird worries that Julia’s silence means she doesn’t like him, his fellow Muppet Abby explains that Julia does things “in a Julia sort of way.” By the end of the episode, Big Bird and Julia are friends, even harmonizing in song.

Neurodivergence is rarely portrayed authentically on-screen, let alone in a way children can grasp. But Julia, who went on to become a regular presence on the show, is the result of a collaboration between Sesame Workshop, the nonprofit company behind Sesame Street, and a team of researchers who study child development and autism. And her introduction did more than demonstrate what neurodivergence can look like; the show emphasized that she has an identity of her own and is as worthy of friendship as anyone else. Those are complex concepts, carefully constructed for young viewers to comprehend.

In the years ahead, such meticulous work may be harder to accomplish. In May, President Donald Trump’s executive order pulling federal dollars from public networks such as PBS and PBS Kids led to the abrupt termination of Ready to Learn, a grant designed in part to financially provide for the development of children’s shows. Last month, Congress approved the Trump administration’s rescission package, revoking $1.1 billion previously allocated to public radio and television. Canceling such funding, PBS Kids’ senior vice president and general manager Sara DeWitt told me recently, “really puts a lot of our future planning in jeopardy”—planning that involves ensuring that their children’s shows are in line with the “high quality” educational TV established by Sesame Street.Not helping matters is the fact that, despite being arguably the most consequential children’s show in history, Sesame Street has spent this past year being passed around like a hot potato by different streaming partners.

The series’ turbulent journey to stay on the air reflects, in some ways, how precarious and expansive the children’s-TV landscape has become. Before the streaming boom, parents could depend on a handful of publicly funded or dedicated networks for well-curated, enriching children’s programming. But as newer media platforms have become more prevalent, kids’ television has become more sprawling—and more difficult for families to navigate. Streamers such as Netflix now offer kids’ programming, with their own siloed-off sections and parental controls; YouTube, too, is packed with content creators making children’s videos. Koyalee Chanda, a creative executive at Lion Forge Entertainment, a production company geared toward family-friendly projects, describes the current multiplatform landscape as “preschool Tinder,” a realm in which young viewers can swipe endlessly through videos, seeking a match without always knowing the difference between one show’s intentions and another’s—and in which it’s harder for show creators to make their work stand out. “Essentially,” Chanda told me, “you only are as valuable as your thumbnail.”

As such, children’s television has become a diffuse field. Linda Simensky, a former executive for Cartoon Network and Nickelodeon who helped create shows such as Dexter’s Laboratory and The Powerpuff Girls, told me she fears that the genre has ballooned out of control. The industry’s changing priorities and shaky quality assurance have left her disenchanted by the business. “I spent more than 30 years building this industry,” she said, “and I feel like it’s just all falling apart now.”

Think of a beloved character from your childhood—a Teletubby, maybe, or Thomas the Tank Engine. What comes to mind? Nostalgia, probably. But according to a study by UCLA’s Center for Scholars & Storytellers that was published earlier this year, a toddler’s favorite characters can also promote the development of lifelong behaviors and skills. Take Daniel Tiger’s Neighborhood, the animated spin-off of Mister Rogers’ Neighborhood that began airing in 2012. The show has consulted childhood-development experts to ensure that the 4-year-old Daniel behaves like many of the preschoolers who watch him: If he gets mad, he expresses his anger; if he is disappointed, he makes that clear. Afterward, he sings a “strategy song,” teaching his audience social-emotional skills while simultaneously relating to them. The UCLA survey reported that 21 percent of teenagers who had grown up watching Daniel were still making use of the skills they’d learned years earlier.

The goal for many of those working in children’s entertainment, DeWitt explained, is to make shows that help viewers retain a variety of skills, emotional and otherwise. That’s certainly the approach behind Sesame Street: “Our guiding principle has been to center the preschooler in our storytelling, always,” Halcyon Person, the head writer for the show’s upcoming season, told me over email. She explained that by observing kids’ needs, “we know not only that we’re making something that will teach them, but something that will stick with them as they grow.” Doing this has become harder, however, as the industry becomes more fragmented. In the past, child-development experts were often included in the making of kids’ television, DeWitt said, but now “a lot of the new content that’s being created for kids is being created by anyone and is uploaded into a space that isn’t heavily regulated and also doesn’t have curation tied to it.” Plus, children themselves have become content creators, even small-screen stars. A preschooler can learn their ABCs from Elmo in one video, then watch another made by someone their own age, encouraging them to like and subscribe.

The proportion of self-produced work to network-commissioned programming started to change as soon as YouTube became a significant player in the entertainment industry, in the 2010s. The company is reportedly on track to outpace even Disney in revenue, as a majority of younger consumers find creator-driven, social-media efforts more relevant than traditional media. “There are stars, characters, and IP on YouTube that have bigger and deeper fan bases than what we’re seeing on linear television,” Chris Williams, the founder and CEO of PocketWatch, a studio that harnesses the popularity of internet-driven talent, told me. His company partners with channels and creators that have major followings, such as Ryan Kaji, the now-teenage host of Ryan’s World, and builds upon the content they’ve already developed. “We kind of curate it, enrich it, package it,” Williams said of PocketWatch’s aim. “We basically turn it into TV.”

That strategy is similar to what’s deployed at Moonbug, the company that acquired and distributes Blippi and CoComelon. The latter show—a juggernaut on YouTube, attracting billions of views with its bobble-headed animated characters and earworm-y nursery songs—often came up as an example for, as one parent put it to me, the “brain rot” their family encounters on YouTube. When I told Moonbug’s chief creative officer Richard Hickey that some parents are wary of CoComelon, he sounded dismayed.He told me that Moonbug is a “creative first” company, cultivating its shows with what he refers to as a “story trust” that’s concerned with finding storytelling elements that will resonate with their audience.“Of course, yes, we are a business,” he said. “We’re looking for successful properties that we can then build on and try and create franchises from—but really, at the heart of it, how does that content connect with our viewers?”

Williams pointed out that, in some ways, companies such as PocketWatch are simply trying to expand the reach of content that’s already popular and considered good for kids, therefore streamlining the painstaking process of choosing what to watch. “Parents have been media-shamed about YouTube for a really long time, like, Everything on YouTube’s bad, right?” Williams said. “99.99 percent of everything on YouTube for kids is bad, but we’re mining for the .01 percent.”

Making sure that children’s videos on YouTube are better than the majority of what’s available is a task that Katie Kurtz, the managing director and global head of youth and learning at YouTube, tackles for a living. She told me that when a creator marks a video or channel as age-appropriate on the YouTube platform, an algorithm—fine-tuned by machine learning and, at times, by human moderators—studies whether it follows the company’s “quality principles,” which educators and developmental psychologists helped establish in 2021. (Not all content labeled this way ends up on YouTube Kids. YouTube occasionally marks videos as “Made for kids” based on its own algorithmic findings, although creators can appeal the label if they believe it's inaccurate.) The platform then recommends videos that promote the outlined principles, such as self-care, learning, and creativity, while burying submissions that don’t meet these standards. YouTube also invites experts to host workshops that train creators on how to refine their videos in accordance with quality expectations. “For us, it’s really not enough to be a safe experience,” Kurtz said. “We want it to be an enriching experience as well.”

One of those experts is Yalda Uhls, the founder and CEO of the Center of Scholars & Storytellers at UCLA. Although she helps shape the direction of YouTube’s content standards and has praised their impact, she has doubts about whether what’s being produced will always enrich children. “Companies are focused on money and engagement and the most eyeballs,” she told me. “To continuously try to come up with a mechanism to get them to want to work with you on supporting their audience’s well-being, it’s just hard.” She recalled a meeting years ago in which a YouTube executive in charge of a former division making children’s content asked experts which programs creators should draw inspiration from—only to bristle when they suggested Mister Rogers. (YouTube declined to comment.) “‘I would never make a show like that, because it’s too slow,’” she recalled the executive saying. “And we were all like, What?!

Of course, the children’s-television genre today isn’t devoid of series like Mister Rogers; Uhls herself pointed to Ms. Rachel, the popular YouTuber who specializes in toddler-friendly music,as a worthy successor. Yet young viewers have fewer sources directing them toward shows of this nature. The defunding of public networks has made the decentralization of kids’ TV more stark, while individual companies and studios differ on what’s considered worthwhile programming. “We’re trying to make the most nourishing content we can,” Hickey, the Moonbug executive, said. But in the end, caregivers should take charge, he argued: “I don’t think there’s any shortcut.”

Even creating guidelines for a single household, though, can get complicated quickly. Tetyana Korchynskyy, one of the parents I spoke with, told me that when her son began watching television just before his first birthday, she set ground rules for what he could view. There’d be no horror, no violence, and nothing meant for grown-ups. Screen time would not happen first thing in the morning or right before bed. She’d aim to allow up to three hours of daily viewing while also making sure he played outside, ideally with other kids.

Korchynskyy’s son is now 3, and maintaining those guardrails has often felt like a job in and of itself. Even though she tries to control the apps he can access and monitor which shows leave him glued to the screen, his media consumption can be “very difficult to really control,” she told me. His preferences, too, can complicate the task; after liking Ms. Rachel for a while, he suddenly began rejecting her videos.

This abandonment of Ms. Rachel—poor Ms. Rachel!—reminded me of something Simensky, who helped develop series such as The Ren & Stimpy Show and Rocko’s Modern Life, observed about her work as a former creative executive. She’d know something was resonating if she saw children playing pretend with the characters. She called it “the yard platform”—as in, were the kids putting the show on in the yard? If so, that meant they were passionate enough about what they were watching to become active participants rather than just passive viewers.

In other words, children’s interests and tastes can help greatly in the design of kids’ shows—if not in the studio, then in focus groups and research studies. Chanda, the Lion Forge executive, recalled her early days of directing Blue’s Clues, when she learned that the show followed a specific rhythm—one that could feel slow for adults. Children, studies indicate, seem to struggle to perform tasks after watching fast-paced content. Conventional wisdom may dictate that not much is required to hold a preschooler’s attention—“There’s always been an attitude of ‘Kids will watch whatever you give them,’” Simensky said—but Blue’s Clues aimed to also enrich its young viewers’ minds.

The history of the genre is one of constant disruption: Kids grow up quickly, the tech industry innovates rapidly, financial support fluctuates often, and societal norms are always changing. Lately, the combined disruption has become more acute—the funding more sharply slashed, the landscape more difficult to navigate—which, in turn, is threatening the quality control that children’s programming needs. But key to finding a way forward through the uncertainty, Chanda pointed out, is understanding that a clear constant exists amid all the shakiness. “Everyone who works in kids’ TV knows who their boss really is,” she said. “Their boss is that kid.”

*Illustration by Jonelle Afurong / The Atlantic. Source: subjug / Getty; Mark Perlstein / Getty; Frank Micelotta / ImageDirect / Getty; Fotos International / Getty; Nathan Congleton / NBC / Getty; mirzamlk / Getty; Ludo Studio / Disney; Archives du 7e Art / BBC / Ragdoll productions / Alamy; Pictorial Press / Alamy; Shiiko Alexander / Alamy; Netflix


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Is America a democracy? Reactionaries, such as the activist Charlie Kirk and Senator Mike Lee of Utah, say it is not, never was, and shouldn’t be. They justify the antidemocratic features of the Constitution and contemporary politics—the Electoral College, the gerrymander—with the label republican, meaning a representative system with guardrails that protect political minorities (and happen to keep their side in power). Some progressives agree that the United States has never been a true democracy, but they would very much like to change that. They trace the country’s ills to this original failure and imagine the fulfillment of America’s promise in a democratic rebirth that puts real power in the hands of the people.

This is the thesis of The Right of the People: Democracy and the Case for a New American Founding, a new book by Osita Nwanevu, a writer for The New Republic and The Guardian. Nwanevu wants more collective decision making, more equality and freedom, for ordinary American voters and workers. Almost 250 years after the Declaration of Independence, he argues that genuine American democracy would be a good thing, but that creating it would require “the transformation not only of our political institutions but of our economy.”

Nwanevu wields journalism as a cutting tool that’s well oiled with contempt (I’ve been on its receiving end)—a style refined in the social-media polemics of the past decade’s progressive orthodoxy. After Kamala Harris’s defeat in last year’s election, Nwanevu wrote in an X post: “Yep, time to break from the left. Next time, Dems should try saying they’ll do more to crack down on immigration than Republicans. Instead of ‘Defund the Police,’ run a prosecutor. Talk about having a gun and wanting a strong military instead of your identity. Just some ideas.” Habitual sarcasm toward fools who can’t see why you’re right is usually a sign of political weakness, suggesting that you have no hope or intention of convincing the unpersuaded of anything. Contempt is a style of proud and perpetual defeat.

In The Right of the People, Nwanevu subdues his own journalistic reflexes long enough to construct a sweeping argument out of history and political theory. He says at the outset that he’s “dog-tired, already, of the habits of mind that shape American political journalism” and jaded by all the talk about threats to “our democracy” from pundits who don’t know or care what it really is. Democracy in America doesn’t just need to be defended, Nwanevu believes—it needs to be articulated, affirmed, and built: “Democracy has become a specious and suspicious platitude, equally useful to marketers and would-be dictators—a hollow idea for a hollow, unserious time.”

The Right of the People is his ambitious response. Nwanevu describes democracy as collective self-government by equals in which decisions are made by majority rule; explains why this, of all systems, is the one most worth pursuing; answers democracy’s critics, beginning with Plato; argues that democracy has been betrayed in the United States since the country’s founding; and proposes ideas and policies to make democracy an American reality. A subject on this scale doesn’t lend itself to savage takedowns. In the slower, more demanding form of a well-researched, carefully reasoned book, especially in its first half, Nwanevu takes democracy’s opponents and its own vulnerabilities seriously.

[George Packer: The end of Democratic delusions]

And yet, despite the ringing title and subtitle, little in Nwanevu’s “new American founding” is new. The thesis that the Founders drafted an antidemocratic Constitution to protect their own political and economic interests dates back to the groundbreaking work of the Progressive historian Charles Beard, first published more than a century ago and contested ever since. (Nwanevu’s version relies heavily on Michael J. Klarman’s 2016 book, The Framers’ Coup, also much debated.) When Nwanevu leaves theory and history for current politics and policy, he moves onto even more familiar ground. Yes, the Senate is grotesquely unrepresentative, and unless its structure is radically changed (a Constitutional near-impossibility), the people of Washington, D.C., and Puerto Rico deserve senators of their own. The filibuster exaggerates the Senate’s anti-majoritarianism, giving each resident of Wyoming a far louder voice than a Californian. The unelected, life-tenured Supreme Court upholds laws that take power from common people and give it to corporations. Inequality is at Gilded Age levels, and some CEOs make several hundred times more than their employees. Amazon’s destructive effect on workers’ wages, bodies, and communities has been well documented—the journalist Alec MacGillis wrote an excellent book about it. Far too much power is concentrated in far too few hands. If you don’t think so, you haven’t been following the career of Elon Musk.

Nwanevu’s proposals for a new founding amount to a progressive wish list: End the Senate filibuster, expand the House of Representatives, oblige the states to abide by the national popular vote, impose Supreme Court term limits, raise taxes on wealth, break up monopolies, remove obstacles to unionizing, give workers more say in the running of companies, etc. I’m for most of it. None of it is very original.

What’s the point of saying we need more equality and more democracy? The question is how to get them, beyond simply laying out an agenda. Other progressives, such as the legal scholar Jedediah Purdy, want a second Constitutional Convention; some of them would scrap the 1787 text as hopelessly flawed and start anew. Nwanevu doesn’t place much faith in this constitutional Hail Mary. The idea of a new convention first gained traction more than a decade ago among conservatives, and Nwanevu rightly realizes that they’re better positioned than liberals to determine the outcome. “We are still perhaps generations away from a truly democratic Constitution,” he acknowledges. “But the work toward it—and the work to build a more democratic country—must begin now.” In other words, there’s no escape from politics—from “decades of political persuasion and organization.” Exactly what that effort would look like, Nwanevu leaves to others, noting that “there are details here that political professionals and organizers are going to have to work out.”

But this is where his aspirations run up against the shortcomings of his politics. Though most of the book is a nonpartisan brief for democracy as a good in itself, in the end Nwanevu leaves no doubt that a more democratic America will be a more left-wing one. “Our frustrations with our false democracy have corroded faith in the ideal to the benefit of antidemocratic figures on the right,” he concludes. “Beyond being worthwhile on their own merits, the political and economic reforms we’ve examined constitute a democratic agenda that stands a better chance of defeating the right than the flimsy and predictable rhetoric their opponents have offered up so far.” These “opponents” are left vague, but they seem to be mainstream Democrats who are too timorous to embrace his agenda and take the fight to the right-wing adversary. According to Nwanevu, giving more power to the people will eventually bring the country around to his worldview.

This belief—that ordinary Americans are closer to New Republic and Guardian readers than most of us realize—is a besetting vice of the left, an undisturbable illusion from inside the bubble that forms around political isolation and defeat. It’s based on assumptions about what goes on in the minds of ordinary people Nwanevu shows no sign of having talked to. And it’s belied by election after election, including last year’s.

[Adrienne LaFrance: A ticking clock on American freedom]

In The Right of the People, Donald Trump is barely a minor character. Nwanevu has almost nothing to say about right-wing populism—the strongest current in electoral politics around the world. He can’t explain (and doesn’t try to) why working-class Americans of all ethnicities currently seem to feel more strongly about stricter immigration enforcement than paid family and medical leave. He can’t account for the fact that those Americans who were so alienated from our fake democracy that they didn’t bother voting last year would have been likelier to have gone for Trump than for Harris.

Now that Republican populism, in complete control of government, is showing itself to be a defender of plutocracy, Democrats have a chance to earn the trust of voters as the party that represents the interests and values of the majority. But to do so, Democrats have to know what country they’re living in. Nwanevu’s analysis of the original Constitutional Convention, in which conservative elites thwarted the democratic will of ordinary people for their own selfish ends, remains his vision of our America. It’s a satisfying story, but it doesn’t explain important aspects of 1787—for example, that populists in small states secured the grossly unequal structure of the Senate against the egalitarian arguments of large-state nationalists. And it gets American politics today, with a left-leaning party supported by professional elites (such as Nwanevu and me) and a right-wing party supported by less educated wage workers, nearly backwards. Persuading and organizing your fellow citizens begins with trying to understand how they think. But this is just what Nwanevu’s approach to politics never does.

For Nwanevu, democracy is ultimately about the distribution of power. Distribute it more equally, and the result will be more and better democracy. He has almost no time for Alexis de Tocqueville, who understood self-government as not just collective power to be used but a difficult art to be practiced, mastered, and easily lost. The illiberal atmosphere of the past decade, with a political culture of hostile mobs and mass delusions, doesn’t seem to trouble Nwanevu, as if it has nothing to do with democracy. He likes to quote Walt Whitman and John Dewey, but his own language never conveys their sense that democracy is a spirit, a mode of life—the only form of government that allows human beings to realize their full potential.

Nwanevu is right that democracy’s advocates have to do more than earnestly ring an alarm bell about authoritarianism. They also have to diagnose and fix what’s wrong with an American system that most Americans think has failed them. Majorities of both Democrats and Republicans have recently expressed the view that democracy is under threat and that self-government isn’t working. But if half the country thinks that Trump is the reason for those problems and the other half thinks that he’s the solution, arguing that more democracy will change America for the better isn’t convincing. You first have to put away sentimentality about “the people.” We’re as capable of hating one another and believing lies and making terrible decisions and using power to take away one another’s rights as we are of governing ourselves with clarity and wisdom. “We know more than the Founders did,” Nwanevu asserts in his last pages. “We are more practiced at governance. We are more moral, more just.” At a time of widespread indifference to the destruction of the most basic values that deserve to be called democratic, I’d hesitate to flatter Americans with these claims.


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Illustration by Michael Houtz

The euthanasia conference was held at a Sheraton. Some 300 Canadian professionals, most of them clinicians, had arrived for the annual event. There were lunch buffets and complimentary tote bags; attendees could look forward to a Friday-night social outing, with a DJ, at an event space above Par-Tee Putt in downtown Vancouver. “The most important thing,” one doctor told me, “is the networking.”

Which is to say that it might have been any other convention in Canada. Over the past decade, practitioners of euthanasia have become as familiar as orthodontists or plastic surgeons are with the mundane rituals of lanyards and drink tickets and It’s been so longs outside the ballroom of a four-star hotel. The difference is that, 10 years ago, what many of the attendees here do for work would have been considered homicide.

When Canada’s Parliament in 2016 legalized the practice of euthanasia—Medical Assistance in Dying, or MAID, as it’s formally called—it launched an open-ended medical experiment. One day, administering a lethal injection to a patient was against the law; the next, it was as legitimate as a tonsillectomy, but often with less of a wait. MAID now accounts for about one in 20 deaths in Canada—more than Alzheimer’s and diabetes combined—surpassing countries where assisted dying has been legal for far longer.

It is too soon to call euthanasia a lifestyle option in Canada, but from the outset it has proved a case study in momentum. MAID began as a practice limited to gravely ill patients who were already at the end of life. The law was then expanded to include people who were suffering from serious medical conditions but not facing imminent death. In two years, MAID will be made available to those suffering only from mental illness. Parliament has also recommended granting access to minors.

At the center of the world’s fastest-growing euthanasia regime is the concept of patient autonomy. Honoring a patient’s wishes is of course a core value in medicine. But here it has become paramount, allowing Canada’s MAID advocates to push for expansion in terms that brook no argument, refracted through the language of equality, access, and compassion. As Canada contends with ever-evolving claims on the right to die, the demand for euthanasia has begun to outstrip the capacity of clinicians to provide it.

There have been unintended consequences: Some Canadians who cannot afford to manage their illness have sought doctors to end their life. In certain situations, clinicians have faced impossible ethical dilemmas. At the same time, medical professionals who decided early on to reorient their career toward assisted death no longer feel compelled to tiptoe around the full, energetic extent of their devotion to MAID. Some clinicians in Canada have euthanized hundreds of patients.

The two-day conference in Vancouver was sponsored by a professional group called the Canadian Association of MAiD Assessors and Providers. Stefanie Green, a physician on Vancouver Island and one of the organization’s founders, told me how her decades as a maternity doctor had helped equip her for this new chapter in her career. In both fields, she explained, she was guiding a patient through an “essentially natural event”—the emotional and medical choreography “of the most important days in their life.” She continued the analogy: “I thought, Well, one is like delivering life into the world, and the other feels like transitioning and delivering life out.” And so Green does not refer to her MAID deaths only as “provisions”—the term for euthanasia that most clinicians have adopted. She also calls them “deliveries.”

Gord Gubitz, a neurologist from Nova Scotia, told me that people often ask him about the “stress” and “trauma” and “strife” of his work as a MAID provider. Isn’t it so emotionally draining? In fact, for him it is just the opposite. He finds euthanasia to be “energizing”—the “most meaningful work” of his career. “It’s a happy sad, right?” he explained. “It’s really sad that you were in so much pain. It is sad that your family is racked with grief. But we’re so happy you got what you wanted.”

[From the June 2023 issue: David Brooks on how Canada’s assisted-suicide law went wrong]

Has Canada itself gotten what it wanted? Nine years after the legalization of assisted death, Canada’s leaders seem to regard MAID from a strange, almost anthropological remove: as if the future of euthanasia is no more within their control than the laws of physics; as if continued expansion is not a reality the government is choosing so much as conceding. This is the story of an ideology in motion, of what happens when a nation enshrines a right before reckoning with the totality of its logic. If autonomy in death is sacrosanct, is there anyone who shouldn’t be helped to die?

Rishad Usmani remembers the first patient he killed. She was 77 years old and a former Ice Capades skater, and she had severe spinal stenosis. Usmani, the woman’s family physician on Vancouver Island, had tried to talk her out of the decision to die. He would always do that, he told me, when patients first asked about medically assisted death, because often what he found was that people simply wanted to be comfortable, to have their pain controlled; that when they reckoned, really reckoned, with the finality of it all, they realized they didn’t actually want euthanasia. But this patient was sure: She was suffering, not just from the pain but from the pain medication too. She wanted to die.

On December 13, 2018, Usmani arrived at the woman’s home in the town of Comox, British Columbia. He was joined by a more senior physician, who would supervise the procedure, and a nurse, who would start the intravenous line. The patient lay in a hospital bed, her sister next to her, holding her hand. Usmani asked her a final time if she was sure; she said she was. He administered 10 milligrams of midazolam, a fast-acting sedative, then 40 milligrams of lidocaine to numb the vein in preparation for the 1,000 milligrams of propofol, which would induce a deep coma. Finally he injected 200 milligrams of a paralytic agent called rocuronium, which would bring an end to breathing, ultimately causing the heart to stop.

Usmani drew his stethoscope to the woman’s chest and listened. To his quiet alarm, he could hear the heart still beating. In fact, as the seconds passed, it seemed to be quickening. He glanced at his supervisor. Where had he messed up? But as soon as they locked eyes, he understood: He was listening to his own heartbeat.

Many clinicians in Canada who have provided medical assistance in dying have a story like this, about the tangle of nerves and uncertainties that attended their first case. Death itself is something every clinician knows intimately, the grief and pallor and paperwork of it. To work in medicine is to step each day into the worst days of other people’s lives. But approaching death as a procedure, as something to be scheduled over Outlook, took some getting used to. In Canada, it is no longer a novel and remarkable event. As of 2023, the last year for which data are available, some 60,300 Canadians had been legally helped to their death by clinicians. In Quebec, more than 7 percent of all deaths are by euthanasia—the highest rate of any jurisdiction in the world. “I have two or three provisions every week now, and it’s continuing to go up every year,” Claude Rivard, a family doctor in suburban Montreal, told me.

Rivard has thus far provided for more than 600 patients and helps train clinicians new to MAID. This spring, I watched from the back of a small classroom in a Vancouver hospital as Rivard led a workshop on intraosseous infusion—administering drugs directly into the bone marrow, a useful skill for MAID clinicians, Rivard explained, in the event of IV failure. Arranged on absorbent pads across the back row of tables were eight pig knuckles, bulbous and pink. After a PowerPoint presentation, the dozen or so attendees took turns with different injection devices, from the primitive (manual needles) to the modern (bone-injection guns). Hands cramped around hollow steel needles as the workshop attendees struggled to twist and drive the tools home. This was the last thing, the clinicians later agreed, that patients would want to see as they lay trying to die. Practitioners needed to learn. “Every detail matters,” Rivard told the class; he preferred the bone-injection gun himself.

photo of balding man wearing glasses and black v-neck shirtJohnny C. Y. Lam for The AtlanticClaude Rivard at his home near Montreal

The details of the assisted-death experience have become a preoccupation of Canadian life. Patients meticulously orchestrate their final moments, planning celebrations around them: weekend house parties before a Sunday-night euthanasia in the garden; a Catholic priest to deliver last rites; extended-family renditions of “Auld Lang Syne” at the bedside. For $10.99, you can design your MAID experience with the help of the Be Ceremonial app; suggested rituals include a story altar, a forgiveness ceremony, and the collecting of tears from witnesses. On the Disrupting Death podcast, hosted by an educator and a social worker in Ontario, guests share ideas on subjects such as normalizing the MAID process for children facing the death of an adult in their life—a pajama party at a funeral home; painting a coffin in a schoolyard.

Autonomy, choice, control: These are the values that found purchase with the great majority of Canadians in February 2015, when, in a case spearheaded by the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, the supreme court of Canada unanimously overturned the country’s criminal ban on medically assisted death. For advocates, the victory had been decades in the making—the culmination of a campaign that had grown in fervor since the 1990s, when Canada’s high court narrowly ruled against physician-assisted death in a case brought by a patient with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, or ALS. “We’re talking about a competent person making a choice about their death,” one longtime right-to-die activist said while celebrating the new ruling. “Don’t access this choice if you don’t want—but stay away from my death bed.” A year later, in June 2016, Parliament passed the first legislation officially permitting medical assistance in dying for eligible adults, placing Canada among the handful of countries (including Belgium, Switzerland, and the Netherlands) and U.S. states (Oregon, Vermont, and California, among others) that already allowed some version of the practice.

[Read: How do I make sense of my mother’s decision to die?]

The new law approved medical assistance in dying for adults who had a “grievous and irremediable medical condition” causing them “intolerable suffering,” and who faced a “reasonably foreseeable” natural death. To qualify, patients needed two clinicians to sign off on their application, and the law required a 10-day “reflection period” before the procedure could take place. Patients could choose to die either by euthanasia—having a clinician administer the drugs directly—or, alternatively, by assisted suicide, in which a patient self-administers a lethal prescription orally. (Virtually all MAID deaths in Canada have been by euthanasia.) When the procedure was set to begin, patients were required to give final consent.

The law, in other words, was premised on the concept of patient autonomy, but within narrow boundaries. Rather than force someone with, say, late-stage cancer to suffer to the very end, MAID would allow patients to depart on their own terms: to experience a “dignified death,” as proponents called it. That the threshold of eligibility for MAID would be high—and stringent—was presented to the public as self-evident, although the criteria themselves were vague when you looked closely. For instance, what constituted “reasonably foreseeable”? Two months? Two years? Canada’s Department of Justice suggested only “a period of time that is not too remote.”

Provincial health authorities were left to fill in the blanks. Following the law’s passage, doctors, nurse practitioners, pharmacists, and lawyers scrambled to draw up the regulatory fine print for a procedure that until then had been legally classified as culpable homicide. How should the assessment process work? What drugs should be used? Particularly vexing was the question of whether it should be clinicians or patients who initiated conversations about assisted death. Some argued that doctors and nurses had a professional obligation to broach the subject of MAID with potentially eligible patients, just as they would any other “treatment option.” Others feared that patients could interpret this as a recommendation—indeed, feared that talking about assisted death as a medical treatment, like Lasik surgery or a hip replacement, was dangerous in itself.

Early on, a number of health-care professionals refused to engage in any way with MAID—some because of religious beliefs, and others because, in their view, it violated a medical duty to “do no harm.” For many clinicians, the ethical and logistical challenges of MAID only compounded the stress of working within Canada’s public-health-care system, beset by years of funding cuts and staffing shortages. The median wait time for general surgery is about 22 weeks. For orthopedic surgery, it’s more than a year. For some kinds of mental-health services, the wait time can be longer.

As the first assessment requests trickled in, even many clinicians who believed strongly in the right to an assisted death were reluctant to do the actual assisting. Some told me they agreed to take on patients only after realizing that no one else—in their hospital or even their region—was willing to go first. Matt Kutcher, a physician on Prince Edward Island, was more open to MAID than others, but acknowledged the challenge of building the practice of assisted death virtually from scratch. “The reality,” he said, “is that we were all just kind of making it up as we went along, very cautiously.”

photo of locked tall gray medical cabinetphoto of same tall gray medical cabinet open to reveal bins and boxes stored insideJohnny C. Y. Lam for The AtlanticReady-to-use MAID kits in a hospital vault

On a rainy spring evening in 2017, Kutcher drove to a farmhouse by the sea to administer the first state-sanctioned act of euthanasia in his province. The patient, Paul Couvrette, had learned about MAID from his wife, Liana Brittain, in 2015, soon after the supreme-court decision. He had just been diagnosed with lung cancer, and while processing this fact in the parking lot of the clinic had turned to his wife and announced: “I’m not going to have cancer. I’m going to kill myself.” Brittain told her husband this was a bit dramatic. “You know, dear, you don’t have to do that,” she recalls responding. “The government will do it for you, and they’ll do it for free.” Couvrette had marveled at the news, because although he was open to surgery, he had no interest in chemotherapy or radiation. MAID, Brittain told me, gave her husband the relief of a “back door.” By early 2017, the cancer had spread to Couvrette’s brain; the 72-year-old became largely bedridden. He set his MAID procedure for May 10—the couple’s wedding anniversary.

Kutcher and a nurse had agreed to come early and join the extended family—children, a granddaughter—for Couvrette’s final dinner: seafood chowder and gluten-free biscuits. Only Brittain would eventually join Couvrette in the downstairs bedroom; the rest of the family and the couple’s two dogs would wait outside on the beach. There was a shared understanding, Kutcher recalled, that “this was something none of us had experienced before, and we didn’t really know what we were in for.” What followed was a “beautiful death”—that was what the local newspaper called it, Brittain told me. Couvrette’s last words to his wife came from their wedding vows: I’ll love you forever, plus three days.

Kutcher wrestled at first with the sheer strangeness of the experience—how quickly it was over, packing up his equipment at the side of a dead man who just 10 minutes earlier had been talking with him, very much alive. But he went home believing he had done the right thing for his patient.

For proponents, Couvrette epitomized the ideal MAID candidate, motivated not by an impulsive death wish but by a considered desire to reclaim control of his fate from a terminal disease. The lobbying group Dying With Dignity Canada celebrated Couvrette’s “empowering choice and journey” as part of a showcase on its website of “good deaths” made possible by the new law. There was also the surgeon in Nova Scotia with Parkinson’s who “died the same way he lived—on his own terms.” And there were the Toronto couple in their 90s who, in a “dream ending to their storybook romance,” underwent MAID together.

Such heartfelt accounts tended to center on the white, educated, financially stable patients who represented the typical MAID recipient. The stories did not precisely capture what many clinicians were discovering also to be true: that if dying by MAID was dying with dignity, some deaths felt considerably more dignified than others. Not everyone has coastal homes or children and grandchildren who can gather in love and solidarity. This was made clear to Sandy Buchman, a palliative-care physician in Toronto, during one of his early MAID cases, when a patient, “all alone,” gave final consent from a mattress on the floor of a rental apartment. Buchman recalls having to kneel next to the mattress in the otherwise empty space to administer the drugs. “It was horrible,” he told me. “You can see how challenging, how awful, things can be.”

In 2018, Buchman co-founded a nonprofit organization called MAiDHouse. The aim was to create a “third place” of sorts for people who want to die somewhere other than a hospital or at home. Finding a location proved difficult; many landlords were resistant. But by 2022, MAiDHouse had leased the space in Toronto from which it operates today. (For security reasons, the location is not public.) Tekla Hendrickson, the executive director of MAiDHouse, told me the space was designed to feel warm and familiar but also adaptable to the wishes of the person using it: furniture light enough to rearrange, bare surfaces for flowers or photos or any other personal items. “Sometimes they have champagne, sometimes they come in limos, sometimes they wear ball gowns,” Hendrickson said. The act of euthanasia itself takes place in a La-Z-Boy-like recliner, with adjacent rooms available for family and friends who may prefer not to witness the procedure. According to the MAiDHouse website, the body is then transferred to a funeral home by attendants who arrive in unmarked cars and depart “discreetly.”

Since its founding, MAiDHouse has provided space and support for more than 100 deaths. The group’s homepage displays a photograph of dandelion seeds scattering in a gentle wind. A second MAiDHouse location recently opened in Victoria, British Columbia. In the organization’s 2023 annual report, the chair of the board noted that MAiDHouse’s followers on LinkedIn had increased by 85 percent; its new Instagram profile was gaining followers too. More to the point, the number of provisions performed at MAiDHouse had doubled over the previous year—“astounding progress for such a young organization.”

In the early days of MAID, some clinicians found themselves at once surprised and conflicted by the fulfillment they experienced in helping people die. A few months after the law’s passage, Stefanie Green, whom I’d met at the conference in Vancouver, acknowledged to herself how “upbeat” she’d felt following a recent provision—“a little hyped up on adrenaline,” as she later put it in a memoir about her first year providing medical assistance in death. Green realized it was gratification she was feeling: A patient had come to her in immense pain, and she had been in a position to offer relief. In the end, she believed, she had “given a gift to a dying man.”

Green had at first been reluctant to reveal her feelings to anyone, afraid that she might be viewed, she recalled, as a “psychopath.” But she did eventually confide in a small group of fellow MAID practitioners. Green and several colleagues realized that there was a need for a formal community of professionals. In 2017, they officially launched the group whose meeting I attended.

There was a time when Madeline Li would have felt perfectly at home among the other clinicians who convened that weekend at the Sheraton. In the early years of MAID, few physicians exerted more influence over the new regime than Li. The Toronto-based cancer psychiatrist led the development of the MAID program at the University Health Network, the largest teaching-hospital system in Canada, and in 2017 saw her framework published in The New England Journal of Medicine.

photo of woman with glasses and dark hair wearing black medical scrubs and standing near wooden desk by windowTony Luong for The AtlanticMadeline Li at her office in Toronto

It was not long into her practice, however, that Li’s confidence in the direction of her country’s MAID program began to falter. For all of her expertise, not even Li was sure what to do about a patient in his 30s whom she encountered in 2018.

The man had gone to the emergency room complaining of excruciating pain and was eventually diagnosed with cancer. The prognosis was good, a surgeon assured him, with a 65 percent chance of a cure. But the man said he didn’t want treatment; he wanted MAID. Startled, the surgeon referred him to a medical oncologist to discuss chemo; perhaps the man just didn’t want surgery. The patient proceeded to tell the medical oncologist that he didn’t want treatment of any kind; he wanted MAID. He said the same thing to a radiation oncologist, a palliative-care physician, and a psychiatrist, before finally complaining to the patient-relations department that the hospital was barring his access to MAID. Li arranged to meet with him.

Canada’s MAID law defines a “grievous and irremediable medical condition” in part as a “serious and incurable illness, disease, or disability.” As for what constitutes incurability, however, the law says nothing—and of the various textual ambiguities that caused anxiety for clinicians early on, this one ranked near the top. Did “incurable” mean a lack of any available treatment? Did it mean the likelihood of an available treatment not working? Prominent MAID advocates put forth what soon became the predominant interpretation: A medical condition was incurable if it could not be cured by means acceptable to the patient.

This had made sense to Li. If an elderly woman with chronic myelogenous leukemia had no wish to endure a highly toxic course of chemo and radiation, why should she be compelled to? But here was a young man with a likely curable cancer who nevertheless was adamant about dying. “I mean, he was so, so clear,” Li told me. “I talked to him about What if you had a 100 percent chance? Would you want treatment? And he said no.” He didn’t want to suffer through the treatment or the side effects, he explained; just having a colonoscopy had traumatized him. When Li assured the man that they could treat the side effects, he said she wasn’t understanding him: Yes, they could give him medication for the pain, but then he would have to first experience the pain. He didn’t want to experience the pain.

What was Li left with? According to prevailing standards, the man’s refusal to attempt treatment rendered his disease incurable and his natural death was reasonably foreseeable. He met the eligibility criteria as Li understood them. But the whole thing seemed wrong to her. Seeking advice, she described the basics of the case in a private email group for MAID practitioners under the heading “Eligible, but Reasonable?” “And what was very clear to me from the replies I got,” Li told me, “is that many people have no ethical or clinical qualms about this—that it’s all about a patient’s autonomy, and if a patient wants this, it’s not up to us to judge. We should provide.”

And so she did. She regretted her decision almost as soon as the man’s heart stopped beating. “What I’ve learned since is: Eligible doesn’t mean you should provide MAID,” Li told me. “You can be eligible because the law is so full of holes, but that doesn’t mean it clinically makes sense.” Li no longer interprets “incurable” as at the sole discretion of the patient. The problem, she feels, is that the law permits such a wide spectrum of interpretations to begin with. Many decisions about life and death turn on the personal values of practitioners and patients rather than on any objective medical criteria.

By 2020, Li had overseen hundreds of MAID cases, about 95 percent of which were “very straightforward,” she said. They involved people who had terminal conditions and wanted the same control in death as they’d enjoyed in life. It was the 5 percent that worried her—not just the young man, but vulnerable people more generally, whom the safeguards had possibly failed. Patients whose only “terminal condition,” really, was age. Li recalled an especially divisive early case for her team involving an elderly woman who’d fractured her hip. She understood that the rest of her life would mean becoming only weaker and enduring more falls, and she “just wasn’t going to have it.” The woman was approved for MAID on the basis of frailty.

Li had tried to understand the assessor’s reasoning. According to an actuarial table, the woman, given her age and medical circumstances, had a life expectancy of five or six more years. But what if the woman had been slightly younger and the number was closer to eight years—would the clinician have approved her then? “And they said, well, they weren’t sure, and that’s my point,” Li explained. “There’s no standard here; it’s just kind of up to you.” The concept of a “completed life, or being tired of life,” as sufficient for MAID is “controversial in Europe and theoretically not legal in Canada,” Li said. “But the truth is, it is legal in Canada. It always has been, and it’s happening in these frailty cases.”

Li supports medical assistance in dying when appropriate. What troubles her is the federal government’s deferring of responsibility in managing it—establishing principles, setting standards, enforcing boundaries. She believes most physicians in Canada share her “muddy middle” position. But that position, she said, is also “the most silent.”

In 2014, when the question of medically assisted death had come before Canada’s supreme court, Etienne Montero, a civil-law professor and at the time the president of the European Institute of Bioethics, warned in testimony that the practice of euthanasia, once legal, was impossible to control. Montero had been retained by the attorney general of Canada to discuss the experience of assisted death in Belgium—how a regime that had begun with “extremely strict” criteria had steadily evolved, through loose interpretations and lax enforcement, to accommodate many of the very patients it had once pledged to protect. When a patient’s autonomy is paramount, Montero argued, expansion is inevitable: “Sooner or later, a patient’s repeated wish will take precedence over strict statutory conditions.” In the end, the Canadian justices were unmoved; Belgium’s “permissive” system, they contended, was the “product of a very different medico-legal culture” and therefore offered “little insight into how a Canadian regime might operate.” In a sense, this was correct: It took Belgium more than 20 years to reach an assisted-death rate of 3 percent. Canada needed only five.

In retrospect, the expansion of MAID would seem to have been inevitable; Justin Trudeau, then Canada’s prime minister, said as much back in 2016, when he called his country’s newly passed MAID law “a big first step” in what would be an “evolution.” Five years later, in March 2021, the government enacted a new two-track system of eligibility, relaxing existing safeguards and extending MAID to a broader swath of Canadians. Patients approved for an assisted death under Track 1, as it was now called—meaning the original end-of-life context—were no longer required to wait 10 days before receiving MAID; they could die on the day of approval. Track 2, meanwhile, legalized MAID for adults whose deaths were not reasonably foreseeable—people suffering from chronic pain, for example, or from certain neurological disorders. Although cost savings have never been mentioned as an explicit rationale for expansion, the parliamentary budget office anticipated annual savings in health-care costs of nearly $150 million as a result of the expanded MAID regime.

The 2021 law did provide for additional safeguards unique to Track 2. Assessors had to ensure that applicants gave “serious consideration”—a phrase left undefined—to “reasonable and available means” to alleviate their suffering. In addition, they had to affirm that the patients had been directed toward such options. Track 2 assessments were also required to span at least 90 days. For any MAID assessment, clinicians must be satisfied not only that a patient’s suffering is enduring and intolerable, but that it is a function of a physical medical condition rather than mental illness, say, or financial instability. Suffering is never perfectly reducible, of course—a crisp study in cause and effect. But when a patient is already dying, the role of physical disease isn’t usually a mystery, either.

photo of a row of 5 various-sized labeled syringes lying on table next to caseJohnny C. Y. Lam for The AtlanticDepleted syringes after a MAID provision

Track 2 introduced a web of moral complexities and clinical demands. For many practitioners, one major new factor was the sheer amount of time required to understand why the person before them—not terminally ill—was asking, at that particular moment, to die. Clinicians would have to untangle the physical experience of chronic illness and disability from the structural inequities and mental-health struggles that often attend it. In a system where access to social supports and medical services varies so widely, this was no small challenge, and many clinicians ultimately chose not to expand their practice to include Track 2 patients.

There is no clear official data on how many clinicians are willing to take on Track 2 cases. The government’s most recent information indicates that, in 2023, out of 2,200 MAID practitioners overall, a mere 89 were responsible for about 30 percent of all Track 2 provisions. Jonathan Reggler, a family physician on Vancouver Island, is among that small group. He openly acknowledges the challenges involved in assessing Track 2 patients, as well as the basic “discomfort” that comes with ending the life of someone who is not in fact dying. “I can think of cases that I’ve dealt with where you’re really asking yourself, Why?” he told me. “Why now? Why is it that this cluster of problems is causing you such distress where another person wouldn’t be distressed?

Yet Reggler feels duty bound to move beyond his personal discomfort. As he explained it, “Once you accept that people ought to have autonomy—once you accept that life is not sacred and something that can only be taken by God, a being I don’t believe in—then, if you’re in that work, some of us have to go forward and say, ‘We’ll do it.’ ”

For some MAID practitioners, however, it took encountering an eligible patient for them to realize the true extent of their unease with Track 2. One physician, who requested anonymity because he was not authorized by his hospital to speak publicly, recalled assessing a patient in their 30s with nerve damage. The pain was such that they couldn’t go outside; even the touch of a breeze would inflame it. “They had seen every kind of specialist,” he said. The patient had tried nontraditional therapies too—acupuncture, Reiki, “everything.” As the physician saw it, the patient’s condition was serious and incurable, it was causing intolerable suffering, and the suffering could not seem to be relieved. “I went through all of the tick boxes, and by the letter of the law, they clearly met the criteria for all of these things, right? That said, I felt a little bit queasy.” The patient was young, with a condition that is not terminal and is usually treatable. But “I didn’t feel it was my place to tell them no.”

He was not comfortable doing the procedure himself, however. He recalled telling the MAID office in his region, “Look, I did the assessment. The patient meets the criteria. But I just can’t—I can’t do this.” Another clinician stepped in.

In 2023, Track 2 accounted for 622 MAID deaths in Canada—just over 4 percent of cases, up from 3.5 percent in 2022. Whether the proportion continues to rise is anyone’s guess. Some argue that primary-care providers are best positioned to negotiate the complexities of Track 2 cases, given their familiarity with the patient making the request—their family situation, medical history, social circumstances. This is how assisted death is typically approached in other countries, including Belgium and the Netherlands. But in Canada, the system largely developed around the MAID coordination centers assembled in the provinces, complete with 1-800 numbers for self-referrals. The result is that MAID assessors generally have no preexisting relationship with the patients they’re assessing.

How do you navigate, then, the hidden corridors of a stranger’s suffering? Claude Rivard told me about a Track 2 patient who had called to cancel his scheduled euthanasia. As a result of a motorcycle accident, the man could not walk; now blind, he was living in a long-term-care facility and rarely had visitors; he had been persistent in his request for MAID. But when his family learned that he’d applied and been approved, they started visiting him again. “And it changed everything,” Rivard said. He was in contact with his children again. He was in contact with his ex-wife again. “He decided, ‘No, I still have pleasure in life, because the family, the kids are coming; even if I can’t see them, I can touch them, and I can talk to them, so I’m changing my mind.’ ”

I asked Rivard whether this turn of events—the apparent plasticity of the man’s desire to die—had given him pause about approving the patient for MAID in the first place. Not at all, he said. “I had no control on what the family was going to do.”

Some of the opposition to MAID in Canada is religious in character. The Catholic Church condemns euthanasia, though Church influence in Canada, as elsewhere, has waned dramatically, particularly where it was once strongest, in Quebec. But from the outset there were other concerns, chief among them the worry that assisted death, originally authorized for one class of patient, would eventually become legal for a great many others too. National disability-rights groups warned that Canadians with physical and intellectual disabilities—people whose lives were already undervalued in society, and of whom 17 percent live in poverty—would be at particular risk. As assisted death became “sanitized,” one group argued, “more and more will be encouraged to choose this option, further entrenching the ‘better off dead’ message in public consciousness.”

photo of person wearing protective medical gear and sitting at brightly lit desk in darkened room holding syringeJohnny C. Y. Lam for The AtlanticAt a hospital in Quebec, a pharmacist prepares the drugs used in euthanasia.

For these critics, the “reasonably foreseeable” death requirement had been the solitary consolation in an otherwise lost constitutional battle. The elimination of that protection with the creation of Track 2 reinforced their conviction that MAID would result in Canada’s most marginalized citizens being subtly coerced into premature death. Canadian officials acknowledged these concerns—“We know that in some places in our country, it’s easier to access MAID than it is to get a wheelchair,” Carla Qualtrough, the disability-inclusion minister, admitted in 2020—but reiterated that socioeconomic suffering was not a legal basis for MAID. Justin Trudeau took pains to assure the public that patients were not being backed into assisted death because of their inability to afford proper housing, say, or get timely access to medical care. It “simply isn’t something that ends up happening,” he said.

Sathya Dhara Kovac, of Winnipeg, knew otherwise. Before dying by MAID in 2022, at the age of 44, Kovac wrote her own obituary. She explained that life with ALS had “not been easy”; it was, as far as illnesses went, a “shitty” one. But the illness itself was not the reason she wanted to die. Kovac told the local press prior to being euthanized that she had fought unsuccessfully to get adequate home-care services; she needed more than the 55 hours a week covered by the province, couldn’t afford the cost of a private agency to take care of the balance, and didn’t want to be relegated to a long-term-care facility. “Ultimately it was not a genetic disease that took me out, it was a system,” Kovac wrote. “I could have had more time if I had more help.”

Earlier this spring, I met in Vancouver with Marcia Doherty; she was approved for Track 2 MAID shortly after it was legalized, four years ago. The 57-year-old has suffered for most of her life from complex chronic illnesses, including myalgic encephalomyelitis, fibromyalgia, and Epstein-Barr virus. Her daily experience of pain is so total that it is best captured in terms of what doesn’t hurt (the tips of her ears; sometimes the tip of her nose) as opposed to all the places that do. Yet at the core of her suffering is not only the pain itself, Doherty told me; it’s that, as the years go by, she can’t afford the cost of managing it. Only a fraction of the treatments she relies on are covered by her province’s health-care plan, and with monthly disability assistance her only consistent income, she is overwhelmed with medical debt. Doherty understands that someday, the pressure may simply become too much. “I didn’t apply for MAID because I want to be dead,” she told me. “I applied for MAID on ruthless practicality.”

It is difficult to understand MAID in such circumstances as a triumphant act of autonomy—as if the state, by facilitating death where it has failed to provide adequate resources to live, has somehow given its most vulnerable citizens the dignity of choice. In January 2024, a quadriplegic man named Normand Meunier entered a Quebec hospital with a respiratory infection; after four days confined to an emergency-room stretcher, unable to secure a proper mattress despite his partner’s pleas, he developed a painful bedsore that led him to apply for MAID. “I don’t want to be a burden,” he told Radio-Canada the day before he was euthanized, that March.

[Read: Brittany Maynard and the challenge of dying with dignity]

Nearly half of all Canadians who have died by MAID viewed themselves as a burden on family and friends. For some disabled citizens, the availability of assisted death has sowed doubt about how the medical establishment itself sees them—about whether their lives are in fact considered worthy of saving. In the fall of 2022, a 49-year-old Nova Scotia woman who is physically disabled and had recently been diagnosed with breast cancer was readying for a lifesaving mastectomy when a member of her surgical team began working through a list of pre-op questions about her medications and the last time she ate—and was she familiar with medical assistance in dying? The woman told me she felt suddenly and acutely aware of her body, the tissue-thin gown that wouldn’t close. “It left me feeling like maybe I should be second-guessing my decision,” she recalled. “It was the thing I was thinking about as I went under; when I woke up, it was the first thought in my head.” Fifteen months later, when the woman returned for a second mastectomy, she was again asked if she was aware of MAID. Today she still wonders if, were she not disabled, the question would even have been asked. Gus Grant, the registrar and CEO of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Nova Scotia, has said that the timing of the queries to this woman was “clearly inappropriate and insensitive,” but he also emphasized that “there’s a difference between raising the topic of discussing awareness about MAID, and possible eligibility, from offering MAID.”

And yet there is also a reason why, in some countries, clinicians are either expressly prohibited or generally discouraged from initiating conversations about assisted death. However sensitively the subject is broached, death never presents itself neutrally; to regard the line between an “offer” and a simple recitation of information as somehow self-evident is to ignore this fact, as well as the power imbalance that freights a health professional’s every gesture with profound meaning. Perhaps the now-suspended Veterans Affairs caseworker who, in 2022, was found by the department to have “inappropriately raised” MAID with several service members had meant no harm. But according to testimony, one combat veteran was so shaken by the exchange—he had called seeking support for his ailments and was not suicidal, but was told that MAID was preferable to “blowing your brains out”—that he left the country.

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From The Atlantic via this RSS feed

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As of last month, there is no one left in the White House whose sole job is to keep the nation safe from biological threats. The leader of the National Security Council’s biosecurity directorate recently resigned. His staff had been pushed out, and his unit is now defunct. The Office of Pandemic Preparedness and Response Policy, established by Congress in 2022, has dwindled from a staff of about 20 under President Joe Biden to a staff of zero.

The Trump administration has said that it’s just reorganizing the bureaucracy and is prepared to handle biothreats. But our experience suggests otherwise. Without a leader from the NSC embedded in the White House and ready to coordinate other agencies, more people—including Americans—will get sick and die.

We have spent years helping lead the U.S. government’s efforts to contain the deadliest biological threats. One of us, Beth Cameron, helped found the NSC’s biosecurity office, in 2016—created as a response to a deadly Ebola outbreak in West Africa that had begun a couple of years earlier. Ebola is a gruesome, highly contagious disease that causes its victims’ organs, blood vessels, and immune cells to fail. The average lethality rate is about 50 percent. That outbreak killed more than 11,000 people across West Africa and cost the U.S. government billions of dollars to help contain. Despite our government’s best efforts, 11 cases ultimately reached the U.S., and two were fatal.

President Donald Trump terminated the NSC’s biosecurity office during his first term, but Biden reestablished it—and just in time. In early February 2021, an ominous email came to the White House from federal health officials: reports of Ebola outbreaks in Guinea and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The cases were close to the borders of Uganda and Rwanda, major travel hubs for the region.

The White House was already managing the coronavirus pandemic and resulting economic crisis. But leaving Guinea and Congo to handle the Ebola outbreaks on their own was risky. So we activated a system developed through hard-learned lessons from past deadly outbreaks, designed to help contain them at their sources and to prepare for the worst at home.

We sent public-health professionals to advise the affected countries. We took inventory of vaccines and other supplies so we would be ready to deploy them. We relied on a painstaking system of testing, vaccinations, and predeparture screenings in Congo and Guinea. We ensured that anyone who had been to an affected country and was seeking to come to the United States was funneled to one of a handful of American airports. The CDC and the Department of Homeland Security activated a program for tracing and contacting passengers after their arrival. One of us, Jon Finer—the principal deputy national security adviser at the time—led a team of senior health and national-security officials from across the government; it met every day to coordinate all of the moving parts, and to keep the president and other senior officials informed.

It worked. The disease was entirely contained within the two source countries—no cases reached the U.S.—and 18 people died, a number that could have been exponentially higher.

To strengthen our responses to future pandemics, lawmakers soon established the position of a U.S. coordinator for global health security; one of us, Stephanie Psaki, was the first person to hold that job. They also created the Office of Pandemic Preparedness and Response Policy in the White House. The Trump administration, tasked with upholding the law, is supposed to be staffing these offices. Not only has it failed to do that, but in just six months, it also has dismantled many of the early-warning-and-response systems that were built over decades.

In Trump’s second term, his team has fired thousands of public-health experts at the CDC, the FDA, and other agencies. It has canceled investments in safeguards against pandemic influenza, undermined confidence in vaccines, and cut funding for potential future outbreaks. It killed USAID and is scaling down the CDC’s global role, canceling many of the programs that maintained ties to countries where disease outbreaks occur. It has withdrawn the U.S. from the World Health Organization. And it has created confusion about who in the U.S. government is in charge of the system for tracking deadly biothreats, whether naturally occurring, accidental, or deliberate.

Put another way: The second Trump administration inherited a playbook, and then pushed out the people who knew how to run the plays.

The United States is dealing with many biological threats at home and abroad, such as the bird flu and measles—with the latter, America is already facing the worst outbreak in decades. Scientists estimate about a 50–50 chance of another pandemic as severe as the coronavirus occurring in the next 25 years. The probability is even higher for smaller-scale threats, such as periodic Ebola outbreaks. Deadly biothreats are more and more likely to emerge for a range of reasons, including increased interaction between humans and animals, labs without sufficient biosecurity systems, easier public access to the information and technology needed to create or manipulate a bioagent, and continued concerns about the development of biological weapons by nefarious actors. The risk of death and economic disruption is only growing.

America rebuilt the system of disease detection and response after the first Trump administration damaged it. That will be harder to do this time around. Far more officials have left the government. Will they be willing to come back, given the degree to which their work has been disparaged and their job security eviscerated?

Stopping deadly diseases from reaching the United States is challenging at the best of times. Absent trusting relationships and, truth be told, a fair amount of pressure, affected countries aren’t always forthcoming with information. (We dealt with one case that required resorting to threats to withhold U.S. support if the other government didn’t share more data about an emerging outbreak.) Health imperatives can collide with political ones, such as when a country has to consider restricting travel. Questions can arise about how much of a vaccine or treatment should be shared with other countries, and how much should be kept at home (if a vaccine or treatment exists at all).

But these are all reasonable policy debates that assume the system is basically functioning. In a worst-case scenario, we might not even know about a disease until it has started spreading in a major city with an international airport. With no warning, we will have less ability to stop the disease at its source, and less power, if it reaches our shores, to save American lives. The odds of us facing that scenario have now gone way up. This would be a terrible tragedy, and all the more so because it would be self-inflicted.


From The Atlantic via this RSS feed

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The leaders of America’s elite universities are required, by the borderline-masochistic, semi-impossible nature of their job, to be skilled in the art of performative comity. So it was a bit of a shock when, at the end of an April panel discussion, Princeton President Christopher Eisgruber turned on the chancellors of Vanderbilt and Washington University in St. Louis, all but accusing them of carrying water for the Trump administration.

Eisgruber argued that higher education was facing a politically motivated attack, and that the two men were inadvertently making matters worse by agreeing with President Donald Trump, against the evidence, that the sector had grown illiberal and out of touch with mainstream America. The chancellors, taken aback by the public confrontation, countered that the struggles of a handful of Ivy League schools were dragging down the reputation of America’s heavyweight research institutions. Perhaps, they suggested, it was time for the Ivies’ leaders to step back and let new figures—such as themselves—represent the country’s top universities.

The argument, which took place at a Washington, D.C., meeting of the Association of American Universities, which Eisgruber chairs, went on for about 15 minutes, according to multiple people in attendance. The tone was civil, but awkward. The three public-university presidents unlucky enough to also be on the panel sat in bewildered silence. Meanwhile, many in the audience of assembled presidents shifted in their chairs and stared at their phones. When time finally ran out, some thanked a higher power.

The stated topic that day was the public’s decreasing trust in higher education. Inevitably, the conversation turned to “institutional neutrality,” the idea that universities, in order to protect their reputation for unbiased scholarship, should not take positions on matters unrelated to higher education. Some schools, most notably the University of Chicago, have embraced neutrality for generations. Others have become newly enamored of the idea, for two reasons: University presidents—at least those with even the slightest instinct for self-preservation—do not want their schools weighing in on matters related to war in the Middle East. And they understand that the Trump administration, which, by the evidence, seems to loathe elite higher education generally and the Ivy League specifically, is on the hunt for proof that these schools are irretrievably “woke,” diversity-obsessed, anti-Republican, and anti-Semitic.

Trump’s preoccupation with the Ivy League has been expensive for at least two of its members. Columbia recently agreed to pay more than $200 million to get the government off its back. Harvard is still fighting the Trump administration in court, and is at risk of losing $1 billion over the next year. Princeton has largely escaped the president’s wrath, even though Eisgruber has become a leader of what you might call the academic resistance: a group of university leaders who believe that Trump’s criticisms of the sector are a pretext for eliminating academic freedom. And, in part because Eisgruber is one of the longest-serving Ivy League presidents and has a supportive board behind him, he has become vocally, if diplomatically, critical of other university presidents who he believes go too far to meet Trump’s demands.

Those other university officials—led by Washington University’s Andrew Martin and Vanderbilt’s Daniel Diermeier, the chancellors who sparred with Eisgruber on the panel—make up the reformist camp. They accept some of Trump’s complaints and believe that the best path forward for higher education is to publicly commit to a kind of voluntary, modified de-wokeification. They argue that some campuses (in, say, Cambridge and Morningside Heights) and departments (much of the humanities) have leaned too far into leftist ideology and allowed anti-Semitism to fester under the guise of protesting Israeli policies. They want the American public to know that they are different from the Ivies. And they think that higher education needs new representation if it’s going to regain the country’s trust.

[Ian Bogost: A new kind of crisis for American universities]

Both factions insist that they respect the other side and are merely acting in the best interest of their institutions. But the question of who will lead higher education into the future is necessarily personal. Eisgruber’s position as AAU chair and Princeton’s stature among American universities make him a natural spokesperson. But many higher-ed leaders suspect that Martin and Diermeier are trying to topple the Ivies. “Among the establishment—the celebrity institutions and the association heads—there is a sense that Vanderbilt and Wash U have been trying to break out of the muddy middle of reasonably sized research institutions, and they see this as an opportunistic moment to take ground from all the people who have snubbed them in the past,” Ted Mitchell, the president of the American Council on Education, the largest higher-education trade group, told me. (Diermeier said he spoke up because he felt that it was important for people to hear his message; the boon to Vanderbilt’s public profile was incidental. Martin said it’s his job to advocate for his institution.)

These arguments are happening mainly behind closed doors, but the level of privately expressed annoyance is high. I’ve heard of presidents labeling one another cowardly, naive, delusional, and irrelevant. The threat posed by out-of-control protesters on the left and by the Trump administration on the right could have united these institutions. Instead, these threats have left them frustrated, embittered, and paralyzed by disagreement.

The reformists believed that higher education had a problem even before Trump was reelected. They watched as conservative speakers were shouted down or disinvited from campuses. They saw professional organizations publicly commit themselves to positions that sounded more like activism than scholarship. (The academics who make up the American Anthropological Association, to cite one example, announced in 2020 that their “research, scholarship, and practice” should be placed “in service of dismantling institutions of colonization and helping to redress histories of oppression and exploitation.”) After the Hamas invasion of southern Israel on October 7, 2023, the reformists watched as anti-Israel protesters on other campuses occupied buildings, erected encampments, and, in some cases, engaged in overt anti-Semitism. “You can’t look at what happened on many university campuses last academic year and conclude that everything is just fine,” Martin told me.

Early last year, Martin and Diermeier began working on a Statement of Principles for higher education. “If research universities are to pursue the truth wherever it lies, they cannot have a political ideology or pursue a particular vision of social change,” they wrote. Their university boards adopted the principles as official policy in the fall of 2024, before the presidential election. “Our view was, we have to proactively work on the reform of education, which meant most importantly to be firmly committed to knowledge creation and transmission,” Diermeier, who previously served as provost of the University of Chicago, told me.

Trump’s second term gave the chancellors reason to push for the reforms they believed were long overdue. They urged other university leaders to adopt the principles and argued that higher education must show that it is receptive to conservative concerns. Vocal resistance would be naive, they warned—and futile. “It’s not about fighting. It’s about winning,” Diermeier told me. “We need to have the twin messages of reaffirming the greatness of American research with a commitment to reforming.”

In late March, Martin and Diermeier assembled several dozen like-minded college presidents, board chairs, and think-tank leaders in Dallas to launch a coalition of institutions that are focused on reform. They’ve held conversations with more than 20 colleges, among them Dartmouth—the lone Ivy League member of the reformist camp—and Rice University. Now they’re trying to get presidents to commit to the principles they’ve put forward and join the invite-only group, called Universities for America’s Future. The chancellors say that they started the organization because existing trade groups were divided over whether to reform, making it impossible to consider specific changes. But the splinter group is broadly viewed as an effort to supplant the AAU. Its argument has begun to catch on more widely. Many top schools have pledged to stay neutral on issues that don’t affect their academic mission, rather than issue predictably progressive statements on the political controversy du jour. And this spring, when students at Yale began building a tent encampment and students at Columbia occupied part of a library building, the universities took a hard-line approach. Yale quickly disciplined students, and Columbia called in the police. (Both earned praise from the Trump administration for their response.)

On the other side is Eisgruber, who declined to be interviewed for this article. Although he does not criticize Trump directly, he has urged presidents to stand up for universities’ legal rights and speak out against the government’s attacks on higher education, rather than cede even more ground to its detractors by making a big show of self-criticism. After the administration yanked $400 million in funding from Columbia, much of it for biomedical research—and demanded that the university make a number of concessions to get the money back—Eisgruber published an essay in this magazine defending higher education’s record. “The United States is home to the best collection of research universities in the world,” he wrote. “Those universities have contributed tremendously to America’s prosperity, health, and security.”

[Christopher L. Eisgruber: The cost of the government’s attack on Columbia]

In subsequent interviews, Eisgruber argued that American higher education was in better shape than ever before. He rejected the right-wing narrative that universities indoctrinate students in leftist ideology, as well as the notion that they should attempt to achieve an ideological balance that matches the country’s. And although he acknowledged that disturbing and “unacceptable” instances of anti-Semitism had taken place on campuses, he pushed back on the idea that it’s a pervasive problem that universities aren’t addressing. Princeton’s Jewish students, for example, report the highest feelings of belonging on campus, Eisgruber said.

Michael Roth, the president of Wesleyan University, in Connecticut, has also emerged as an important resistance figure. Although Wesleyan is not as large as many of the other institutions engaged in this argument (and is generally seen as even more left-leaning than Columbia and Harvard), Roth is, by the standards of university presidents today, unusually sharp-elbowed and bellicose. He takes a withering view of “institutional neutrality,” which he sees as a form of cowardice. Accordingly, he has taken public positions on issues as varied as the kidnapping of schoolgirls in Nigeria, transgender rights, and the war in Ukraine. “It’s really important for people who have the ability to speak out against this overreach by the government to do so,” he told me. “The policy at Wesleyan is that our president shouldn’t say stupid shit.” Otherwise, let it rip.

Roth was gratified when, in April, the American Association of Colleges and Universities, a higher-education trade group, published an open letter that he had pushed for and that called out the “unprecedented government overreach and political interference now endangering American higher education.” Nearly 700 college presidents have signed on—though, notably, not Martin and Diermeier.

The resistance camp has accused the reformers of scapegoating their fellow universities in order to win favor with Trump. They point to the fact that Vanderbilt hired a lobbyist who has ties to the president’s circle. “It’s just so they can ingratiate themselves with the executive branch right now,” Roth told me. “I think it’s shameful.” (Several Ivy League leaders have also tapped lobbyists and lawyers with Trump connections to represent their institutions.)

Many elite-university presidents find themselves somewhere between the two extremes. Harvard, for example, enjoyed a round of adulation from liberal America when it sued the Trump administration for pulling its funding without an investigation. But it has also given in to a number of the government’s demands. It dismissed the faculty leaders of its Center for Middle Eastern Studies, which had been criticized for programming alleged to be anti-Semitic, and replaced its diversity office with one ostensibly focused on community building. It is now considering a financial settlement with the Trump administration.

Some college presidents just wish the fighting would stop. One said that Martin and Diermeier, on the one side, and Roth and Eisgruber, on the other, seem to be thumping their chests and competing for their peers’ attention. Debates among them derail meetings and waste time, that president (who spoke anonymously to divulge details of private discussions) told me. When Wesleyan battles against Washington University, or Vanderbilt against Princeton, other attendees around the table surreptitiously roll their eyes. Most presidents I spoke with believe that, despite their posturing, the leaders of the resistance and reform groups are more aligned than they think. “They’re both right,” Mitchell, the American Council on Education president, told me. “The challenge is how we can push for change while at the same time defending the absolute critical importance of higher education to America.”

Even so, the divide has had real effects. One particular sticking point was how to resist Republican efforts to raise taxes on universities’ endowment-investment income. Congress first imposed a 1.4 percent tax on the net investment income from the largest endowments in 2017, during Trump’s first term. This year, representatives considered proposals for a tax rate as high as 21 percent. Harvard’s president, Alan Garber, once called the endowment tax the “threat that keeps me up at night.”

[Franklin Foer: Can Alan Garber save Harvard?]

Eisgruber helped assemble about two dozen of the richest universities to lobby against the tax. They proposed that schools spend more of their endowment income, and spend it specifically on financial aid, as well as teaching, in exchange for being spared the higher tax rate. But the group made no mention of other reforms. Republican representatives, meanwhile, had been telling university presidents that they wouldn’t give them a tax break to go on indoctrinating students. Vanderbilt and Washington University therefore decided to lobby separately rather than be associated with a group that wouldn’t accept blame for higher ed’s problems. They pushed for new tax credits for universities that use their endowments to improve student access, instead of arguing against the tax itself. In the end, Congress included an 8 percent tax on the richest universities in its One Big Beautiful Bill Act. Whether that figure would have been lower had the universities found a way to put up a united front is impossible to say. But the infighting probably didn’t help.

The divide between the reformer and resistance camps is not merely about strategy; it’s about the nature of the threat to higher education. Members of the resistance group conceive of Trump as a unique—and ultimately passing—problem: If they can survive his presidency, they’ll be safe. This seems to have led them to resist making deep, lasting changes. At Princeton, Eisgruber has earned praise for maintaining the university’s DEI initiatives while other schools scrub their websites. He has retained the university’s policy of divesting its endowment from some fossil-fuel companies. And he has defended his policy of institutional restraint, rather than neutrality, saying that the university can’t avoid taking a stand on some issues.

Roth told me that universities have room to improve on some fronts, including increasing viewpoint diversity among faculty. But he believes that they can address that on their own time once Trump is out of office. “To be worried about that right now seems to me like people in Ukraine worrying about corruption in the mining industry,” Roth told me. “It’s the Russians that are the problem.”

The reformers think the resistance presidents are delusional for believing that their problems will go away when Trump does. They see the president’s attacks as symptomatic of a larger issue. Polling shows that confidence in American higher education has cratered in recent years, especially among Republicans. “The fundamental fact here is that we have never been in worse shape in my lifetime,” Diermeier told me. The reformer presidents, who tend to be in red or purple states, think the resistance leaders are trapped in liberal echo chambers. “It’s clear that the bipartisan support has eroded,” Martin told me. “It’s really misguided to think that what’s happening in higher education is a blip and that we’re going to return to where we were before.”

He and his allies believe that universities should have started cleaning up their act years ago. Now they’re playing catch-up, and can’t expect to stop just because Trump will someday leave office. “Once you’ve been portrayed as the villain, that creates a job description for the hero,” Diermeier told me. “Many people want that job.” He was speaking about politicians attacking universities to raise their own profile. But I got the sense that it characterized higher-education leaders’ thinking too.

*Photo-illustration by The Atlantic. Sources: Efren Landaos / Sipa USA / Reuters; Reynolds Stefani / CNP / ABACA / Reuters; USA Today Network / Reuters; James Byard / Washington University (CC-BY-SA-4.0).


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When gunfire pelted the Atlanta-based headquarters of the CDC yesterday, hundreds of employees were inside the campus’s buildings. The experience was terrifying. But some of the employees were not particularly shocked. “I’m actually surprised it didn’t happen sooner,” a nearly 20-year veteran of the agency told me. (She, like others I spoke with for this article, requested anonymity out of fear of losing her job.)

This was, in one sense, the first attack of its kind on the CDC. The shooter, whom law-enforcement officials have identified as Patrick Joseph White, a 30-year-old resident of an Atlanta suburb, was reportedly fixated on the idea that the COVID-19 vaccine had made him depressed and suicidal. No employees were injured by the bullets that entered the buildings, according to a CDC representative. But an Atlanta police officer named David Rose was shot and later died from his injuries. White, too, was found dead—fatally shot—at the scene. (It is not yet clear if his wound was self-inflicted or if he was killed by police.) When he took aim at the agency on Friday afternoon, he was near a corner where a lone man stands holding anti-vaccine signs nearly every day, several CDC staffers told me.

In another sense, public-health workers have been facing escalating hostility since the early days of the coronavirus pandemic. In 2020, armed protesters gathered on the Ohio Health Department director’s front lawn, and the chief health officer of Orange County, California, was met with death threats after issuing a mask mandate. She had to hire extra security and was eventually driven to resign. Anthony Fauci, who served as the director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases during the country’s initial COVID response, has faced regular death threats since 2020. Nearly a third of state, local, and tribal public-health workers reported facing some sort of workplace violence in a 2021 survey.

Last year, Fauci told CNN’s Kaitlan Collins that threats of violence to public-health workers correlate with verbal attacks from high-profile politicians and media personalities. “It’s like clockwork,” he said. In the second Trump administration, those attacks have become commonplace—the very selling points, even, that have helped a number of President Donald Trump’s health appointees gain their positions. In 2024, when announcing his own pick for CDC director, Trump maligned the CDC and other federal health agencies, accusing them of having “engaged in censorship, data manipulation, and misinformation.” Robert F. Kennedy Jr. was already a longtime anti-vaccine activist when he took the mantle as America’s health secretary; he has compared vaccinating children to the abuses of the Catholic church. During his own 2024 presidential run, he promised to “clean up the cesspool of corruption at CDC.”

“Normally, threats to public servants aren’t inspired from leadership of their own organization,” another CDC staffer said in a group chat among current and former employees. According to an MSNBC report, during an all-hands meeting today, CDC staff blamed the shooting at least partly on Kennedy’s combative attitude toward the agency. “We need them to stop fanning the flames of hatred against us, stop spreading misinformation,” one employee wrote in the meeting chat, naming Kennedy in the same comment. “We will not be safe until they stop their attacks against us.”

The shooter appears to have brought five guns to the scene, and at least four federal buildings were struck by dozens of bullets overall. In the hours immediately after the shooting, while many CDC employees remained barricaded in offices and marooned in conference rooms, they heard nothing from Kennedy or Trump. Last night, Susan Monarez, the newly confirmed CDC director, issued a short statement reiterating the basic facts of the shooting. “We at CDC are heartbroken by today’s attack on our Roybal Campus,” she wrote. “Our top priority is the safety and well-being of everyone at CDC.” Late this morning, Kennedy sent an email to the entire staff of the Department of Health and Human Services offering support and prayers. In a post on X at about the same time, he wrote, “No one should face violence while working to protect the health of others.”

This evening, Monarez sent a more substantial email pledging to support the CDC during its recovery and noting its resilience. “We have faced adversity before, and we will do so again, drawing strength from our shared commitment to public health,” she wrote. The president has not yet made a statement about the attack. (The White House and HHS did not respond to requests for comment.)

To the CDC employees I spoke with, the sluggish response is the latest episode in the administration’s escalating abandonment of the agency. Since January, the Trump administration has hit the CDC with massive layoffs, proposed halving its budget, and forced changes to internal policies governing the fundamentals of its scientific work. Earlier this year, Kennedy purged the committee that advises the CDC on vaccine recommendations. Just this week, he canceled nearly $500 million in federally funded research on mRNA vaccines—widely considered among CDC employees and public-health experts to be the greatest domestic triumph of the U.S. pandemic response—stating incorrectly that they cause more risk than benefit against the flu and COVID.

For CDC staff, the wider threat does not seem to have passed. This evening, a group of CDC employees were trading tips on peeling off their old parking decals after the agency’s security office reportedly asked staff to remove them from their cars. One person suggested covering them with other stickers; another recommended loosening them with cooking oil.

Even people who have volunteered for risky missions in their public-health work are still getting used to the idea that the danger has arrived at the home front. “I’ve put my life on the line for this agency, responding to outbreaks in some of the most dangerous parts of the world,” a 13-year veteran of the agency told me. “I didn’t expect to face the same risks at the Atlanta campus as I faced in South Sudan.”


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If still-life painting is the art of arresting decay, then it makes a lot of sense that Rachel Ruysch grew up to become one of the greatest still-life painters in the history of art. In the 17th century, Frederik Ruysch, her father, was an internationally famous embalmer. His job was to make a natural object seem permanently alive and pleasing to the eye. He could transform the corpse of a bullet-pierced admiral into the “fresh carcase of an infant,” Samuel Johnson once said. He could turn dead children into the serenest version of themselves—their faces so full of life that people wanted to kiss them, as Peter the Great once did.

The house where Rachel grew up, near the town hall in Amsterdam, had an annex for her father’s skeletons, organ jars, and severed limbs, which he collected along with a growing stockpile of dead insects, amphibians, and flowers. It was a rich soil in which to live and work if you were an ambitious Enlightenment-era man of science, as Frederik was. To be a child in that environment, though, would have been incredibly weird. Imagine your father coming home day after day smelling of organ meat, his clothes speckled with blood and vague fluids. He keeps trying to show you his newest cow’s heart or amputated foot, or a skink shipped in from one of the colonies. What’s that under the chair? Ah, yes—a piece of lung. The barrier between life and death starts to seem thinner, more porous. Your sense of beauty dilates and shifts.

Rachel Ruysch (1664 –1750) did not spend her time dissecting stray dogs or making fake fiddles out of human thigh bones, as her father did. Instead she devoted herself to the most conventionally beautiful object in nature: the flower. In fact, she became one of the top flower painters in Europe. Even though Ruysch is now a footnote in art history, she was more famous in her own lifetime than Rembrandt and Vermeer.

The first major show devoted to Ruysch, which arrived at the Museum of Fine Arts Boston in August (after opening in the United States at the Toledo Museum of Art, in Ohio, in the spring), is one of the most intelligently curated and sensory-rich shows a museumgoer could ask for. It includes boxes perfumed with the scents of Ruysch’s flowers, jars of pickled toads and lizards that feature in her paintings, cases of beetles and botanical illustrations, new translations of Dutch primary sources, and a sorely needed crop of research on her work.

The only sticking point, really, is Ruysch’s paintings. They are easy to like but harder to love—at least for viewers marooned in the 21st century. Over the course of her nearly 70-year career, Ruysch shunned radical innovation and experimentation, and opted for the subtlest of variations on a theme. No grand gestures or avant-garde maneuvers. Just refinement, focus, and perfection. Flowers and fruit.

In the gilded arena of Dutch stilleven, or “still life,” there are banquet pieces, with wine-filled goblets and oysters and corkscrews of lemon peel, and breakfast spreads, with everyday nibbles, such as cheese and nuts. Pronk, or “show,” paintings display piles of gold vessels and jewels and silk. Vanitas pieces depict items such as skulls and pocket watches, reminding you that you’re going to die soon. What might be considered the lowest subgenre today is bloemstilleven, or “flower still life.” A seemingly decorative object (a flower) is represented in another decorative object (a painting), which rates as an even lesser decorative object—a flower painting.

To anyone who has spent more than a few minutes with a flower piece by Ruysch or her predecessors Ambrosius Bosschaert or Jan Davidsz de Heem, this ranking will seem mostly pea-brained. Start with the fact that flower paintings are the most visually sumptuous portraits of nature’s most freakish and colorful sex organs. You are staring at a highly evolved specimen whose entire appearance is predicated on seducing living creatures—yourself included—to propagate its existence.

Unlike some pollinators, we’re not in the business of sticking our proboscis into flowers, but we do eat them, collect them, place them on coffins, give them to prom dates, throw them at weddings, decorate our homes with their odor and shape. Flowers have consoled people, driven them to obsession and despair, and sent them into the pit of legal turmoil and financial ruin. They’ve also made people extravagantly rich. Before the tulip speculation bubble burst in 1637, about 30 years prior to Ruysch’s birth, Semper Augustus bulbs were being sold for as much as 5,000 guilders—a single tulip cost more than 10 times the annual salary of a highly skilled artisan.

The genius of a flower still life is that it converts a perishable commodity into a stable one. It can also yoke together blooms from different seasons and continents to create as many retinal fireworks per square inch as possible. The savviest artists pick “the downy peach, the finely dusted plum, the smooth apple, the burnished cherry, the dazzling rose, the manifold pink, the variegated tulip,” all in their maximum ripeness, as Johann Wolfgang von Goethe wrote, and apply an understanding of botany “from the root up.” More than imitating nature, the flower painter elevates it. One artist whose masterpieces dared to accomplish this “impossible” task, Goethe said, was Rachel Ruysch.

still life oil painting of ornate pile of flowers and fruit with insects, lizard, bird's nest, butterflies Still Life With Fruits and Insects (1710) (Johnny Van Haeften / Bridgeman Images)

When we first meet Ruysch in the exhibition, she’s already a teenage prodigy. Her first known work, Swag of Flowers and Fruit Suspended in Front of a Niche (1681), is a dangling bouquet loaded with irises, hollyhocks, marigolds, grapes, and wild berries. Around the age of 15, she was apprenticed by her father to the renowned flower painter Willem van Aelst (reportedly a difficult man). The twisting vines and mint-green leaves in the piece are very Van Aelstian, but the general setup, with flowers strung together and nailed upside down, is likely borrowed from de Heem. Even though Ruysch’s style and method will evolve in the coming years—new cultivars and pigments dropping in (Prussian blue), more bustling compositions and tighter brushwork—the main ingredients of her mature output are already here: the spare background and the glowing flowers and fruit, raked by natural light but seemingly lit from within. My favorite touch is the mini-bramble of pale-gold lines in the bottom right that yields the words Rachel Ruysch. It’s less a signature than a wink. We’re looking at the hand of a highly precocious teen who knows she’s very good and isn’t afraid to boast.

By the time Ruysch was in her 20s, poems were already being written about her. She was hailed as a “floral goddess,” better than Maria van Oosterwijck (a celebrated flower painter in Amsterdam). In her 30s, Ruysch became the first woman admitted to the Confrerie Pictura, the painters’ guild in The Hague. In her 40s, she was handpicked to be a court painter for Johann Wilhelm, a prince-elector of the Holy Roman Empire and a high-ranking German duke. In her 50s, Ruysch won the lottery—literally won the lottery, to the tune of 75,000 guilders. (For comparison: The townhouse her father bought on the Bloemgracht—“flower canal”—in an upscale Amsterdam neighborhood cost 8,000 guilders.)

This kind of good fortune is difficult to interpret. The “obstacle race” long faced by women artists, to borrow from the title of Germaine Greer’s pathbreaking 1979 work of feminist art history, often looks more like a gravy train with Ruysch: one stroke of predestined luck after another. She grew up in a wealthy and well-connected family. Her great-uncle was a painter, her cousins were painters, and the whole town was swimming in painters, artist-botanists, and horticulturalists.

But her life was not frictionless. Barred from Latin schools, universities, and professional guilds in Amsterdam, Ruysch couldn’t have pursued any genre of painting that spoke to her. She was likely steered toward flower still lifes by her father, as a suitable subject for someone of her gender. She then had to fight her way into a fiercely competitive art market—in a city, country, and century more obsessed with flowers than any other—all while giving birth to 10 children, only six of whom survived into adulthood. After Ruysch won the lottery, she stopped painting almost entirely for 15 years.

What set Ruysch apart throughout her career was a trademark style and subject: big, blossomy bouquets set against a dark, velvety background; high-wattage light that’s coming from somewhere over your left shoulder; tons of insects and crawling creatures; a simple stone or marble ledge to support the vase; and a dizzying variety of cultivars and blooms. While other flower painters were building bouquets from cut flowers widely available in Western Europe, Ruysch had a direct line, through her father, to exotic blooms in the Amsterdam botanical gardens. A single arrangement of Ruysch’s from a 1700 painting has more than 22 species in it: devil’s trumpets, passionflower, coral honeysuckle, an African pumpkin, a cheeky-looking pineapple (rare in Dutch still life). Another, from about 1735, has flowers from every single continent except Antarctica.

You could get your hands on anything in a port city in an aquatic empire, whether it was Brazilian sugar or Indonesian pepper. From 1602, when the Dutch East India Company was chartered, to the 1660s, when Ruysch was born, the Dutch Republic boomed. Colonies and outposts sprouted up everywhere from New Amsterdam (now New York City) to Nagasaki. Dutch fluyts crisscrossed the globe, carrying all manner of cargo (Baltic grain, Caribbean salt), as well as hundreds of thousands of human beings bought and sold as chattel—the Dutch transported approximately 600,000 enslaved people across the Atlantic from the 17th to the 19th centuries. Wealth flowed into the coffers of merchants and regents back home, and turned consumption into a national pastime. A well-fed mercantile class with lots of money, and time to spend it, created the perfect conditions for a popular art market and a new stand-alone genre: “still life.”

What is the best way to interpret a painting of motionless stuff? Theories abound. In Ruysch’s case, one can apply several different lenses, viewing each piece as an aesthetic object, a scientific illustration, and a moral message. Take a pair of paintings from 1710: Still Life of Flowers in a Glass Vase on a Marble Ledge is a monumental bouquet; Still Life With Fruits and Insects is a large spillage of fruit on a forest floor—both commissioned by a Leiden textile merchant for a whopping 1,300 guilders total. What we have are two pieces of eye candy. Every rose and grape is clamoring for your attention. Even the dark background is colluding with the waxy petals and fruit to pop toward you. It’s a mouthwatering visual buffet. (Arthur Schopenhauer once argued that Dutch still life was a low form of art because it made you want to eat the bouquet, Edible Arrangements–style, instead of contemplate it, grinding your aesthetic faculties to a halt with hunger. I can see what he means.)

When the initial dazzlement wears off, your focus sharpens. What’s that—a katydid? A sand lizard? Even if your eye is glued to the painting, your brain is elsewhere. The flame tulip sends you to Turkey, the common sunflower to North America, the butterflies and insects to the entomologist’s corkboard. It’s an informational trove for the science-minded viewer (and indeed, the patron, Pieter de la Court van der Voort, was a crafty horticulturist with a flair for new hothouse techniques).

Then, suddenly, something changes. At first, the insects seem to be having a little fiesta with the fruit—ants, wasps, and spiders nibbling at a peach or scurrying toward a chestnut. Now you notice that the sand lizard’s forked tongue is just milliseconds away from snatching a butterfly. Another lizard in the corner has just infiltrated a bird’s nest filled with fresh eggs and seems to be emitting a barbaric yawp. The painting starts to flex under the pressure of death. The spongy forest floor looks fungal; the pomegranate teems with its own seeds; the corn kernels become warts; the grapes are fish eggs. The entire composition is slithering and crawling with itself. It is, in a word, monstrous.

As a viewer, you can xylophone your way up and down these notes—the aesthetic pleasure; the scientific stimulation; the cruelty of nature as moral warning—or play them in your head all at once. Sometimes it just depends on how close you’re standing to the painting.

still life oil painting of flowers including large tulip on marble table Posy of Flowers, With a Tulip and a Melon, on a Stone Ledge (1748) (Bridgeman Images)

For decades, scholars have wrung their hands over how the Dutch saw their still lifes. Was a grape just a grape? Or was it a reminder of the Eucharist? Perhaps every pineapple was a portal to a colony keeping the empire afloat. Or maybe a still life was a stimulus for consumption, its decorative slickness training your eyes to move on to the next thing you wanted to buy or sell. By the late 1700s, the genre had been marinating in its own juices for too long—some of its tropes were now 150 years old. The golden age of Dutch art was over (whether its painters were aware or not), and many viewers must have felt bored by the grape rather than inspired or rebuked by it.

Ruysch finished her last piece when she was 83 years old. Posy of Flowers, With a Tulip and a Melon, on a Stone Ledge (1748) is a small miracle of a painting. About the size of a floor tile, it has more feeling and tenderness than all of the trumpeting bouquets and whirlpools of color. A little striped tulip, its petals barely open, seems as if it’s trying to lift itself out of bed. A shy melon sits behind it, with wildflowers huddled around. The signature is lightly painted and barely there. Even the veins of the stone table are daubed on like afterthoughts, as if the world of hard surfaces and sharp edges has less meaning here, in the domain of flowers. Ruysch’s work can do that: turn a flower into the most important thing in the world, at the moment it’s being painted and seen. What more could a flower want?

This article appears in the September 2025 print edition with the headline “The Forgotten Still-Life Prodigy.”


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We are about to find out, in real time, whether the Federal Bureau of Investigation remains a neutral law-enforcement agency or whether it has been transformed into an instrument of Republican power. Will the FBI help the Republican Party force through a partisan redistricting plan in Texas, or not? The answer to that question is of vital importance to sustaining American democracy.

Republican state legislative leaders want to redraw Texas’s congressional districts to give their party as many as five more seats in next year’s midterm elections. Dozens of Democratic state lawmakers have fled Texas in an effort to prevent the legislature from reaching a quorum and passing the law. The lawmakers who left are now staying in Illinois, Massachusetts, and other locations. To force the legislators to return, Republicans have voted to issue civil warrants, which authorize Texas law-enforcement officers to find the missing lawmakers and forcibly return them to the statehouse, in Austin.

But neither the civil warrants nor the powers of Texas police extend outside the state’s borders. No Texas sheriff can go to Chicago, find the missing legislators, and drag them home. And, naturally, the law enforcement in Illinois and the other Democratic states to which the Texas representatives have fled are offering no assistance. Indeed, blue-state political leaders are promising to resist any such effort and are practically salivating at the prospect of a confrontation.

[Elaine Godfrey: How the Texas standoff will (probably) end]

This is where the federal government might step in. Senator John Cornyn of Texas has asked the FBI to help his state track down the missing legislators. He has publicly claimed that FBI Director Kash Patel has agreed to assist state and local law enforcement in the effort. So far, the FBI has declined to comment on the matter. But if the agency actively assists Texas police in locating and detaining the missing legislators, then it will be acting in an utterly lawless manner—and that will be of even graver concern than the underlying redistricting effort.

Granted, the location of many Texas legislators is so well known that the St. Charles, Illinois, hotel where some are staying was the subject of a bomb threat. If the FBI does nothing more than provide Texas officials with information that is already publicly available, then its activities are hardly worth the worry. But the agency isn’t an arm of the Republican Party and should studiously avoid getting drawn into the political fight in Texas.

Congress created the FBI, which by statute is authorized “to detect and prosecute crimes against the United States.” In other words, the FBI may investigate and prosecute federal crimes, not state-law-based criminal charges. That limitation has a few small exceptions. For example, the FBI is authorized to investigate the murder of state and local law-enforcement officers even if those murders involve crimes only under state law. But the existence of explicit statutory exceptions serves only to reinforce the general rule. The jurisdiction of the FBI, as the first word in the agency’s name suggests, is limited to federal crimes.

Americans’ historical aversion to the FBI’s engagement in state and local issues is a reaction to the excesses of the J. Edgar Hoover era. Today, that general rule of limitation is so strong that the FBI’s own internal guidelines, outlined in the Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide, require identification of a predicate federal crime before the FBI may even open an investigation, much less conduct intrusive investigative activities. Likewise, the FBI can typically assist state and local investigations only when they involve possible violations of federal law. (The exceptions involve extreme, rare circumstances such as mass killings or serial murders.)

Nothing about the Texas redistricting dispute would plausibly justify the FBI’s active engagement. For one thing, the Texas lawmakers’ flight from the state isn’t even criminal under Texas law. The warrants issued are merely common-law civil instruments to compel presence, much like a civil subpoena to testify. For the FBI to become involved in the enforcement of civil law would be an extraordinary expansion of its authority. Proving a negative is hard, but I am unaware of any other circumstance in which FBI authorities have been engaged in a civil matter.

Second, the Texas state matter is—well, a state matter. Even if it did involve some criminal allegations, those would relate to Texas’s criminal law—and thus be outside the bounds of the FBI’s federal jurisdiction. No one can credibly argue that the Democrats’ effort to defeat a quorum has anything in common with the mass killings or serial murders that may trigger FBI involvement in state crimes.

To avoid these rather obvious issues, Cornyn almost half-heartedly suggested that the missing Democrats are “potentially in violation of the law.” He maintained that “legislators who solicited or accepted funds to aid in their efforts to avoid their legislative duties may be guilty of bribery or other public corruption offenses.” But this claim was a transparent attempt to manufacture a federal “hook” for the FBI, given that he offered no evidence that the legislators had solicited money as an inducement for their actions. Indeed, manifestly, they aren’t seeking self-enrichment in fleeing their homes. Moreover, as the Supreme Court held just last year, contributions for already-completed acts (such as leaving Texas) can never be considered violations of the federal anti-gratuity statute. No doubt Cornyn, a former judge, knows all this. But he appears to have concluded that political necessity required some pretext, however frivolous, for a federal investigation.

[Tom Nichols: Tinker tailor soldier MAGA]

In short, if the FBI provides Texas Republicans with substantive assistance in bringing their Democratic counterparts back to Austin, that will be utterly unmoored from the FBI’s statutory authority and completely outside the bounds of its existing domestic-operations guidelines. Americans now face transgressions of settled legal norms every day, it seems. But the particular norm under threat in Texas—the need to prevent the party in power from using federal law-enforcement officers to implement its own political ends—is especially important because of the coercive authority that police carry with them.

One hopes that the FBI will step back from the brink of legal chaos. But if the FBI jumps off the cliff and does the Republican Party’s bidding on a manifestly political question, it will be a dark day for American democracy. Enlisting the FBI as the enforcement arm of a political party is a step toward a literal police state.


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Surface Support (www.theatlantic.com)
submitted 19 hours ago by paywall@ibbit.at to c/theatlantic@ibbit.at
 
 

For the man getting home late to the line. He calls calling with a miniaturist’s awareness (cold to touch), though somewhere still on fire. He couldn’t write to save the monsoon in his eye. Twinkling cities in competing moats. Louchely entering together the lesser gulf as it hammers down like fibers

in a cut card mill before the shower.

Meniscus augur & hour of errors as the mercury rag spills its rings from his last good pore, his teeth shaped in greenhouse suet or little expectant pots of orchid balm in snow. Once showed the erection tricks in his spam, the gulf's hourglass of vertebrae returned to sand, the script. Running just running after the warm.

We gnawed our brackets straight through the bee man’s boy.


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The novelist Muriel Spark died almost 20 years ago, but she still regularly appears on lists of top comic novelists to read on this subject or that. Crave more *White Lotus–*level skewering of the ridiculous rich? Try Memento Mori, The New York Times suggests. An acerbic take on boring dinner parties? Symposium. Interested in “the fun and funny aspects of being a teacher”? Read The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie—also good for learning how to be a highly inappropriate teacher, if you want to know that too.

Obscured by her reputation as a wit is the fact that Spark was a religious writer—indeed, one of the most important religious writers in modern British literature. She embraced Roman Catholicism in 1954, at age 36, and joined the cohort of renowned literary Catholic converts such as T. S. Eliot, Evelyn Waugh, and Graham Greene. The most consistent influence on her work is the Bible, especially the Old Testament. She began reading it as a girl in her Presbyterian school and kept rereading it throughout her life, less for “religious consolation,” she writes in her essay “The Books I Re-Read and Why,” than “for sheer enjoyment of the literature.” She was particularly drawn to the Book of Job, an anguished outcry against the seeming randomness of evil. And yet her tone throughout her work is so acidly droll, her touch so light and sly, that we could read most of her 22 novels and 41 short stories and never quite process that their central concern is God.

That’s because she communicates her theology largely through form rather than content. She rarely discusses; she prefers to sculpt. With a steely command of omniscience, selective disclosure, irony, and other narrative devices, Spark re-creates in the relationship between author and reader the sadomasochistic partnership between the Almighty and his hopelessly wayward flock—or, to put it another way, between his absolute truth and our partial understanding. In other words, she plays God.

Not necessarily a nice God, either. In the Book of Job, the Almighty is mercilessly capricious, condemning Job to bitter suffering in a wager with Satan. This God’s ends are not our ends. Nor are Spark’s. A Creator who acts according to his will on his own unknowable schedule darkens her bright, chipper prose like a skull in a still life. “Remember you must die,” the anonymous callers in Memento Mori (1959) say to their shocked elderly victims before hanging up. Frightening as these prank calls are, their recipients refuse to take the message seriously, because surely the whole thing is just a macabre practical joke. One feature of Spark’s comic genius is her ability to come up with screwball storylines that recapitulate our hapless drift toward final judgment. The collision between God’s lofty vantage point and human shortsightedness yields absurdist disaster.

In Electric Spark: The Enigma of Dame Muriel, Frances Wilson revels in her sublimely contrary subject. Her account is a corrective to Martin Stannard’s 2009 authorized Muriel Spark: The Biography, a sober, balanced, and plodding opus, though still the definitive biography. Stannard’s problem was that Spark had trained as a secretary and filed everything away, no matter how trivial. (Another way of saying this is that she hoarded.) When she died, her archives consisted of 195 linear feet of “letters, proofs, receipts, memos, agendas, minutes, newspaper cuttings, diaries and manuscripts,” Wilson writes. Spark had given Stannard exclusive access to it all. The mass of material seems to have crushed his spirit. Almost as soon as she chose him, she regretted it, and Wilson imagines her torturing Stannard the way the ghost of a murdered woman toys with her murderer in Spark’s short story “The Portobello Road.”

[From the September 2010 issue: The 20th century’s most wickedly funny novelist]

Wilson, by contrast, feels free to focus on the parts of Spark’s life that informed her art—and luckily for us, these are plentiful, both because Spark liked to rework her own experiences and acquaintances for her fiction, and because her life tended toward the fantastical in ways that served her writing. Wilson borrows Spark’s own mystical whimsy about the relationship between her life and her work, which was that her fiction somehow preceded her experiences. “If she wrote about a burglary,” Wilson says, “her own house would then be broken into; if she wrote about manuscripts being stolen from a bedroom or a cache of love letters being used as blackmail, this would likewise be her fate.”

This was true. Her house was burgled a decade after she wrote about similar burglaries in her novel Symposium (1990). Blackmail featured in her first novel, The Comforters (1957), and in Memento Mori; in 1963, she was blackmailed by a rare-book dealer in possession of her love letters. You’d think Spark took dictation from a far-seeing God. Indeed, that’s more or less the subject of The Comforters. A young woman hears voices narrating her exact movements, or else predicting the near future, accompanied by the sound of typing. Everyone presumes she’s going mad, but what the voices say is either true or about to come true. Who controls the narrative? That’s Spark’s big question. Whether to trust or resist those who attempt to control it is the follow-up question.

A lot of untrustworthy people tried to take charge of Spark over the course of her adult life, most of them men. Her childhood, however, was happy and relatively free of such power struggles. Born Muriel Sarah Camberg in 1918 to a Jewish father, Barney, and a mother, Cissy, who had some Jewish heritage, she was raised on a haphazard mix of gods and rituals. Her mother, more eclectic than observant, Wilson writes,

put seven candles in the window on the Sabbath, went to synagogue on Yom Kippur (in order, Muriel said, to show off her hat collection), celebrated Passover, kept an image of Christ in her locket, a Buddha on a lotus leaf in the living room, served hot cross buns at Easter, mince pies at Christmas and pork all year round.

The family lived modestly on a street in central Edinburgh that was full of delights for a curious child. In her building were a painter, a singer, a sweetshop, and a jeweler, and outside was a communal garden to play in. The Cambergs—Muriel had an older brother—gave over one of two bedrooms in their small apartment to lodgers, then to Barney’s sister and later Cissy’s mother, a former suffragette (indomitable, witty, and “astonishingly ugly,” Spark later wrote). Muriel adored them both. Her father, an engineer, was genial and funny, and friends were always dropping by. Spark’s mother mocked them behind their back; Spark once called Cissy, not disapprovingly, “a complete hypocrite.” The child internalized her mother’s satirical edge as well as the neighborhood “maxims, idioms, accents, aphorisms, rhythms and catchphrases,” Wilson writes. Her ears had memories, was how Spark put it.

When she was 11 and a student at James Gillespie’s High School for Girls, Spark came under the spell of Miss Kay, a pedagogical grande dame who exposed her to Italian art and Romantic poetry and trained her in poetic meter. By the time Spark was 12, she had published accomplished poems in her high-school magazine and in an anthology of poetry by Edinburgh high-school students. Miss Kay, Wilson says, “both was and was not the model for Miss Jean Brodie,” Spark’s most notorious character. They shared “mannerisms and speech patterns”; both overpraised their protégés as the “crème de la crème.” But Miss Kay was much nicer. Miss Brodie is partial to Nazis and Italian fascists and maneuvers her girls into position to act as her advocates and surrogates—which is not always in their interest. “By the time they were sixteen,” Spark writes with characteristic mordancy, “they remained unmistakably Brodie, and were all famous in the school, which is to say they were held in suspicion and not much liking.”

Spark’s marriage at 19, in 1937, drove home to her that the world was not inclined to let women take charge of their own destiny. Oswald Spark, a teacher who courted her for a year, had accepted a job in Rhodesia and asked Spark to follow him. He’d support her, he said, and she could keep writing poetry. She consented. Their wedding night was “an awful mess,” Spark said later, “a botch-up,” and marital relations did not continue for long. But she got pregnant and nearly died of septicemia after giving birth to a son, Robin, toward whom she was never able to muster as much maternal solicitude as he longed for. Oswald turned out to have a “severe nervous disorder,” in Spark’s words, and after two years, she left him. Colonial society horrified her, especially the way white people talked about black people as if they weren’t human, but war had broken out and she only managed to make her escape in 1944, resorting to a troopship that had to navigate through enemy waters. She was forced to leave Robin behind; it took her 10 years to win back custody.

Wilson frames the next phase of Spark’s life as a key to the fiction that was still a decade away, and she’s not exaggerating its importance. When Spark arrived in London in 1944, she got a job as a secretary for the head of a clandestine project overseen by the British Foreign Office. In fact, she may already have been doing undercover work. Wilson hypothesizes that she spied for the British colonial government during her last year in Rhodesia, possibly trying to uncover enemy aliens among the settlers. Wilson cites no direct evidence but rather a curious gap in the record of what she was up to, or even where she lived.

Spark’s new boss was a wildly imaginative and very demanding foreign correspondent of Falstaffian proportions named Sefton Delmer. His outfit, the Political Warfare Executive, conducted psyops from a secret compound north of London. The PWE’s mission was “the successful and purposeful deceit of the enemy”; it produced disinformation in German that was published in a counterfeit newspaper, sent in the form of forged letters and fake secret messages, and broadcast over the radio. An anti-Semitic Nazi talk-show host who ranted drunkenly about corruption and sexual depravity among the party elite from his illegal outpost in the fatherland, for instance, was in reality a German writer of detective fiction employed by Delmer in England.

[From the February 2001 issue: Dame Muriel’s surreal meditation on belief ]

Working for Delmer may have been the best training a future novelist could get. He was fanatical about verisimilitude: All the details in the team’s fabrications had to ring true. He hired people from every profession. In addition to writers, he enlisted farmers, psychologists, actors, even cabaret singers, some of them German Jewish refugees knowledgeable about German life. Plus the military fed Delmer the latest intelligence. He was “omniscient,” Wilson writes, and scary; he liked to play mind games with his own people as well as the Germans.

Spark’s immersion in “a world of method and intrigue,” as she put it, taught her about the slipperiness of truth. For the rest of her life, she would be obsessed with—indeed, paranoid about—“codes, secret messages and the circulation of fictions posing as fact,” Wilson writes. Several of Spark’s novels feature shady characters spying on one another and hatching whisper campaigns against a defiant but naive heroine. She later was the target of a plot herself. During Spark’s brief tenure in 1947 as the editor hired to update The Poetry Review, a stodgy publication overseen by an elderly poetry society, a board member scheming to oust her pried into her life and threatened to use her divorce against her. Spark put this experience to use in more than one novel, most notably Loitering With Intent (1981), probably her funniest. The Poetry Society becomes the Autobiographical Association, whose ridiculous members write their memoirs under the supervision of the director, a snooty character clearly conniving to use their confessions for some sort of skulduggery.

Then there was Spark’s nervous breakdown in January 1954. Always worried about her weight, an anxiety shared by some of her heroines, she had been taking Dexedrine to control her eating. During the ensuing psychotic interlude, she fixated on T. S. Eliot, whose most recent play, The Confidential Clerk, had a character named Muriel. Convinced that Eliot, whom she had never met, had sneaked encrypted declarations of love for her into the script, she spent months obsessively trying to decode them. This wasn’t easy. At one point, Wilson writes, “Eliot’s words started jumping around and cavorting, reshaping themselves in anagrams and crosswords.”

A doctor weaned Spark from Dexedrine and put her on antipsychotic medication, and she briefly went into therapy with a Jungian psychologist. But Roman Catholicism restored order to her disorderly mind, Spark said. It made her “see life as a whole rather than as a series of disconnected happenings.” She put herself in the hands of God, who sees and hears all—God being a preferable eavesdropper and spy to ex-boyfriends and boards of directors. Piety did not make her dogmatic or conservative. She neither went to confession nor renounced abortion, contraception, or divorce, and she embraced doubt.

[From the November 1965 issue: Muriel Sparks’s poem “Note by the Wayside”]

Spark’s turn to religion coincided with her turn to fiction, which was not an accident. Catholicism allowed her to find her voice as a writer. While editing a volume of the letters of Cardinal John Henry Newman, she had read his Apologia Pro Vita Sua, which details the steps of his conversion to Catholicism and inspired her to begin to take her own. The qualities in his reflections that attracted her—simplicity, concision, a refusal to accept easy answers—double as a good description of the style she was developing.

Catholicism itself had aesthetic appeal. She was drawn to its living magic—its “saints, angels, miracles, and mysteries,” Wilson writes. “She also liked the paradox, metaphor, sixth dimension and rearrangement of time and space.” For believers, those staples of faith had an immediacy and a proximity to the everyday that Spark may have felt was best embodied in fiction. From the start, in her very first (and prize-winning) short story, “The Seraph and the Zambezi” (1951)—still one of her best—she effaced the distinction between naturalism and the supernatural. During a Christmas pageant held by a gas-station owner in his rickety garage near Rhodesia’s Zambezi River, a six-winged creature appears onstage and proceeds to kick everyone else off it. It’s a seraph, straight out of the Book of Isaiah. “This is my show,” the owner, Cramer, tells it.

“Since when?” the Seraph said.

“Right from the start,” Cramer breathed at him.

“Well, it’s been mine from the Beginning,” said the Seraph, “and the Beginning began first.”

Why Catholicism and not, say, Scottish Presbyterianism, the country’s Calvinist-inflected denomination of her youth, or her father’s Judaism? Spark’s love of high style surely rebelled against the austerity of Protestantism, both in worship and creed. (As a writer, however, she made heavy use of the doctrine of predestination, disposing of characters summarily and parodying herself in the figure of Miss Jean Brodie. “She thinks she is Providence,” a disenchanted student reflects. “She thinks she is the God of Calvin.”)

Spark was even more conflicted about Judaism. In The Mandelbaum Gate (1965), a chatty, muddled autobiographical novel, she describes her protagonist going back and forth between her chilly Christian relatives and her warmer Jewish ones and belonging among neither. To one side of the family, she was faintly pitiable because she was half Jewish; the other was kinder, but she felt her lack of Jewish knowledge excluded her from their cozy home rituals. Spark always had the Bible, though, and read it “with a sense that it was specially mine,” as she put it. She thought God had given a good answer when Moses had asked his name at the burning bush: I am who I am. Was she “a Gentile” or was she “a Jewess”? “Both and neither. What am I? I am what I am,” she writes in her essay “Note on My Story ‘The Gentile Jewesses.’ ”

Spark’s range as a novelist was impressive—one work might adopt the guise of a murder mystery, the next of a ghost story—but she had a signature rhetorical move: prolepsis. The scholar Clare Bucknell came up with a Spark-worthy term for it: the “auto-spoiler.” In a throwaway remark toward the beginning of a story, the narrator gives away the end. We learn in Chapter 3 of The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie (1961) that one of the Brodie set will betray her to the school’s administration, which is desperate for an excuse to get rid of her. In The Driver’s Seat (1970), Spark’s most surreal novel and also her favorite, we are told, also in the third chapter, that the tourist disembarking in a Southern European city will have been murdered by the next morning.

By revealing the fate of her characters, Spark frees us from the grip of curiosity about what’s going to happen and forces us to study why. Who made it happen? What does it mean? Does providence foreordain or do characters have a say? Is everything a conspiracy or does accident play a role? Spark’s convictions let her interrogate God’s designs without despairing that there are none. As a child, Spark had found God to be “a charming and witty character” with “a lot of conflicting sides to his nature,” as she wrote. The worry that crops up in her fiction is that he’ll turn out to be a rogue operator like her old boss Delmer.

But Spark also admired the God of Job because he was “not the God of love,” Wilson writes. He was the braggart God who boasted to Job that—in Spark’s words—“I made this and I created that, and I can crush and I can blast and I can blow. And who are you to ask questions?” A devoted ironist is the answer: Spark reserved the right not only to ask questions but to admit amusement and dismay into her faith. Anyone can worship a God who doesn’t trim himself to the size of the human imagination—that’s what God is for, to make sure that we don’t mistake our petty schemes for anything other than half-baked. But it takes a Spark to be fond of a God who chest-thumps and is otherwise outlandish—a God who, she writes, “basks unashamed in his own glory, and in his anger is positively blasphemous.” Because who are we to say how God should behave?

This article appears in the September 2025 print edition with the headline “The Judgments of Muriel Spark.”


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Vladimir Putin is coming to America, despite the international warrant for the Russian president’s arrest, despite his years of hostile threats against NATO, and despite him showing no remorse for his invasion of a sovereign nation.

None of that matters to President Donald Trump, who announced Friday night that he would meet the globally shunned leader this Friday in Alaska. What does matter to Trump is that he may be able to stop the bloodshed in Ukraine, the worst European conflict since World War II, fulfilling one of his biggest campaign promises.

Many of Washington’s European allies, Ukraine included, now worry that the Art of the Deal president could propose a solution to this conflict that makes concessions to the aggressor, including and especially a redrawing of Ukraine’s borders, when he sits with Putin. Putin has made no commitments to cede territory or scale back Russia’s aggressive military campaign, and he has long claimed that Ukraine does not exist. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, in a video message yesterday, angrily condemned the notion that Trump and Putin alone could decide Ukraine’s future. “Any decisions made against us, any decisions made without Ukraine, are at the same time decisions against peace,” he said.

Trump, who has grown frustrated in recent weeks with Putin’s lack of enthusiasm for compromise, had set a deadline for Russia to come to the negotiating table or risk increased tariffs and other punitive measures. He even threatened to move nuclear-armed submarines closer to Russia, and vowed to punish India—one of the largest buyers of Russian oil—for helping bankroll Moscow’s energy sector.

Trump had promised to end the conflict before even stepping foot inside the White House. As months passed with no deal, Trump finally came to believe that Putin was to blame.

But signs that an end to hostilities between Ukraine and Russia was remotely plausible came the day after Trump’s envoy to the Middle East (and beyond), Steve Witkoff, returned early this month from Israel. Through back-channel discussions with a close Putin ally, Witkoff—the real-estate executive who, like Trump, is more dealmaker than diplomat—received word of the Russian leader’s new willingness to discuss ways to end the fighting.

Witkoff had reason to believe that talks were in the making, but he did not want to discuss the details over the phone, according to two people who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the discussions weren’t public. After giving his pilot a night off in Miami, Witkoff shuttled back to Washington to brief Trump, Vice President J. D. Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and White House Chief of Staff Susie Wiles on what he had learned, before heading to Moscow last week to get a face-to-face guarantee from Putin that he would attend an in-person meeting in good faith. “We are not going to send Donald Trump there if it’s not perfect,” a top Trump adviser told us. By Wednesday, Trump and Witkoff looped in European allies, including Zelensky, on Witkoff’s meeting and their plans to get Trump and Putin in a room together.

[Read: Trump’s real secretary of state]

Trump is open to including Zelensky in the Alaska talks this week, a White House official told us. But for now, at Putin’s request, the Ukrainian leader has not received an invite. “The President hopes to meet with Putin and Zelensky in the future to finally bring this conflict to an end,” White House deputy press secretary Anna Kelly told us in a statement.

Zelensky’s resistance risks provoking the ire of Trump, who often hails himself as a peacemaker in a world that, in his telling, had plunged into warfare and chaos during Joe Biden’s presidency. There is real worry in Kyiv and Europe about the deal Trump may strike, especially as public opinion about U.S. assistance to Ukraine continues to sour, particularly among Republicans. At most, European and U.S. officials believe that Trump may walk away with some flimsy guarantees to freeze the conflict—meaning that Ukrainian territory captured by Russia since February 2022 will stay in Russian hands.

That, according to Zelensky, is a nonstarter.

Trump has disliked Zelensky dating back to their “perfect call” in 2019 that ultimately led to his first impeachment, and he views Ukraine as undeserving of U.S. support. Trump also remains skeptical of the traditional transatlantic alliances prized by his predecessors, and he routinely calls out Europe for failing to share more of the burden regarding NATO’s collective-defense agreement.

Trump’s skepticism of Ukraine was shaped even before he became president, when, in the thick of the 2016 election, the country’s anti-corruption agency released information alleging payments to his campaign manager at the time, Paul Manafort. In White House meetings and talks with foreign leaders during his first term, Trump repeatedly described Ukraine as “totally corrupt” and full of “terrible people.” Trump has even repeated Kremlin talking points that Ukraine is to blame for the war.

Trump has long believed that he and Putin share a special rapport. Allies say he felt that the two survived the “Russia, Russia, Russia hoax” together, and that Putin would respect his historic political comeback. Trump has been deferential to his Russian counterpart, fueling speculation about the true nature of their relationship in global capitals since his first term in office.

At their introductory meeting in Germany, in 2017, Putin urged Trump to recognize Russia’s claim of sovereignty over part of Ukraine, citing links dating to an 11th-century political federation located in modern-day Ukraine, Belarus, and part of Russia. Former officials with direct knowledge of the meeting said that Trump listened intently to Putin’s soft-spoken argument against Ukrainian sovereignty.

But Putin, a shrewd former Russian-intelligence officer, has never quite returned the affection. He openly admitted, when asked during the leaders’ 2018 Helsinki summit, that he had hoped Trump would win the election two years prior, although he never owned up to interfering in the contest on the Republican candidate’s behalf. He has been at times cool to Trump in recent months, including being slow to congratulate him on his election.

[Read: How Putin humiliated Trump]

Administration officials like to note the state of play when Trump took office the second time, emphasizing how much the U.S.-Russia relationship has deteriorated since February 2022, as Putin has been isolated from much of the Western world, particularly after the International Criminal Court issued a warrant for his arrest in connection with the war in Ukraine (the U.S. is not a party to the Rome Statute of the ICC). Witkoff, officials say, has largely been responsible for restoring those direct lines—something you want intact when dealing with two of the world’s biggest nuclear powers. Witkoff “speaks directly for the president,” one person said. “Trump is a chameleon, but when it comes to Witkoff, the two are in lockstep.”

Trump has many people he calls friends, but few like Witkoff; the men have the same background in New York real estate, and Witkoff made a point of not abandoning the president during his months of political exile after he left office, in 2021.

A person familiar with the White House discussions said the members of the small senior national-security team supporting Trump all bring different perspectives to the peace talks. Vance has long been a skeptic of U.S. involvement in Ukraine. Rubio has taken a more hawkish approach to Russia. Witkoff and Trump consider themselves dealmakers, often speaking with each other in front of the others in a language the others don’t speak, the person said. Still, Trump came into office believing that he could quickly deliver a cease-fire. For months, he generally sided with Moscow in its war against Ukraine, absolving Russia for having started the conflict and threatening to abandon Kyiv as it mounted a desperate defense. He upbraided Zelensky in the Oval Office in February, and briefly stopped sharing intelligence with Ukraine. He believed that he could, in addition to working with his Russian counterpart to end the war, reset relations and forge new economic ties between the two countries. He even envisioned a grand summit to announce a peace deal.

But Putin rejected repeated American calls to stop his attacks. And Trump, in recent months, began to take that personally, complaining privately to advisers—and then eventually in public—that Putin would tell him one thing in their phone calls (that he was committed to peace) and then act entirely differently afterward (by bombing Ukraine).

Putin only ratcheted up his attacks as the weather warmed and Russia began a renewed summer offensive. Some aides close to Trump came to believe that Putin would signal a willingness to negotiate—including agreeing to some low-level meetings with the Ukrainians in Turkey this spring—in order to buy time to continue his offensive.

Trump’s recent sanctions threat played a role in pushing Putin back toward negotiations, aides believe. The president imposed some steep secondary sanctions on India but held off on punishing other nations that do business with Moscow—namely China—and he did not sanction Russia directly by Friday’s deadline, giving Putin more time to negotiate.

[Read: Is Trump falling out of love with Putin?]

Still, the president had remained intrigued by the thought of a summit’s made-for-TV spectacle. When the idea resurfaced last week, Trump first said that he wanted an initial meeting with Putin, followed by a second one that included Zelensky. But the Kremlin balked at the subsequent summit, not wanting to legitimize Zelensky by putting him opposite Putin (Trump later said that Zelenky’s eventual inclusion would not be a deal-breaker). White House aides are leery of dispatching Trump to meet with Putin without any guarantee of a deliverable goal—specifically, a cease-fire or, at minimum, a real step toward the cessation of hostilities. U.S. and European officials were still gauging whether Russia was serious about curtailing the fighting or simply buying time for more attacks to strengthen its position for future negotiations. And though Trump believes his own personal negotiating skills could sway Putin, it is not clear that Russia would offer an agreement acceptable to Zelensky.

Trump has long argued that it is always better to talk, regardless of who it is with, and he has especially emphasized that dialogue between nuclear-armed states, such as the U.S. and Russia, is imperative. He’s been known to walk away from splashy summits when talks go awry, as he did in 2019 when he abruptly ended his Vietnam meeting with North Korean Chairman Kim Jong Un. He canceled a highly controversial Camp David meeting with the Taliban before it ever took place. But five days is also a long time in Trump’s America, and these fragile efforts to get Trump and Putin in the same Alaskan meeting room could easily hit barriers before the delegations board their flights.


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Something is rotten in the village of Little Nettlebed. There isn’t enough rain. A sturgeon of ungodly proportions has been beached on the bank of the Thames. Worse, five sisters have tried to save its life, defying both the mysterious beneficence that brought the fish to shore and local norms dictating that it must be killed for food. In the glow of the late-afternoon sun, the world is no longer beautiful. Instead, it is sickly, the light “jaundicing the saucers of white flowers” on an elder tree.

It is the early 18th century in Oxfordshire, England, and readers likely know how this story goes: A “season of strangeness” begins, and the witch, or witches, who are responsible must be found. Except it goes weirder, and wilder, in Xenobe Purvis’s debut novel, The Hounding. The suspected witches in question—those five sisters—stand accused of transgressing nature by transforming not the world around them but their own bodies. The local ferryman, a perpetually inebriated and aggrieved man called Pete Darling, is convinced that he has seen them turn into dogs—and soon, almost everyone else in the drought-stricken village will come to believe him.

The bluntness of Purvis’s title, which refers both to the girls transforming into dogs and to their neighbors taking up the hunt, is a hint: This is not a novel particularly interested in nuance. Instead, it wants to directly engage the subtext of all witch stories, in which femininity itself is perceived as a menace, and to try to understand why women are often seen as natural conduits for unnatural forces. Hence the sisters—because if a woman is strange and unnerving, a group of them connected by the inherited bonds that link sisters is even more so.

And oh, are these sisters strange. They are pale and aloof. They are prone to playing harmless but cruel tricks on people outside their own tight circle. They are largely indiscernible from one another, despite a helpful guide in the book’s second paragraph. (Mary is the baby; Grace, the shy one; Hester, the tomboy; Elizabeth, the beauty; Anne, the eldest, unpredictable and independent.) Even their grandfather, the sole responsible adult in their lives, cannot quite distinguish their faces through his deteriorating eyesight. To others, they always appear as an odd unit.

They seem to speak a secret, frequently nonverbal language—one observed with fascination by Thomas, a hired man with only brothers, who becomes preoccupied with “their spiritedness and singularity, the way rumours around them bred.” They refuse to honor the etiquette of village life, a violation that triggers first Pete Darling’s suspicion and then his rage. Robin Wildgoose, a local young man who is, like the sisters, not quite built to the village form, finds the fivesome a sticking point in his efforts to fit in. He likes them, but joining the collective dislike of them is a tempting route toward acceptance.

[Read: A novel with a secret at its center]

The novel is told through the perspectives of these men—Thomas, Pete, Robin—and that of Joseph, the girls’ grandfather, and Temperance, the local pub owner’s wife. The result is a refracted view: five girls seen by five curious outsiders who each learn something about themselves as they watch.

This is an old function of sisters in literature: They serve as a mystical sort of test for other, more central characters, usually men. The weird sisters of Macbeth show a once-honorable Scotsman that he is power-mad and disloyal. In early Arthurian legend, nine sorceress sisters, including Morgan le Fay, are fascinating and fearsome foes that test the mettle of knights and noblemen. And in the classic fairy tale “The 12 Dancing Princesses,” the man who solves the riddle of the titular sisters’ nocturnal adventures is an old soldier, who wins a royal wife after many princes have died trying.

The Hounding transparently engages with that history; it is full of invocations of the sisters of fiction. As in Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice, the second-eldest of five sisters is named Elizabeth. The girls’ last name is Mansfield, as in Austen’s Mansfield Park, a novel that arguably features one of the most provocatively unsympathetic pairs of sisters ever put to page. Purvis also makes sly references to other fictional women who have served as a moral foil; the nearly feral Hester, for instance, evokes Hester Prynne of The Scarlet Letter. The novel is daring readers to see past the stereotypes, while also trying to showcase their allure.

It only partially works. Purvis writes with a kind of lush violence that makes the sisters’ experiences feel immediate and fresh. Hester is struck with fury upon the arrival of her first period, and takes to climbing trees and sobbing in protest. She’d rather be a pebble, says Anne, because “pebbles look very peaceful and are unencumbered by ugly things like blood and breasts.” This scene is key to understanding exactly what Purvis is after: She is taking the idea of women’s bodies changing or behaving in alien ways to an extreme, and satirizing the cultural inclination to fear them.

Purvis leaves ambiguous whether the girls’ transformation into dogs is real or something of a collective hallucination. But so long as the sisters aren’t hurting anyone—beyond, perhaps, a few small slain animals—the novel asks why anyone should be so intensely afraid of them. The possibility of girls mutating into animals is certainly alarming, a startling aberration from the natural order; even the sisters’ defenders struggle with squeamishness and suspicion once the hearsay starts to spread. But The Hounding questions why that alarm should curdle so quickly into animosity. Is the escalation, perhaps, a consequence of the fact that womanhood has always been threatening to some, and the rumor of the sisters’ transfiguration gives the Pete Darlings of the world an acceptable outlet for their hatred?

Like many good questions, these ones risk inviting well-worn answers. In an indelible, grotesque scene, six young pregnant women are forced to carry the coffin of a peer who died in childbirth, as a ritual reminder of the fate that might soon await them. Unfortunately, that scene is capped by Temperance’s musings about “the great, gruelling trial of being a woman in a world governed by men”—a nail hit too bluntly on the head. As the rumors about the girls spread, Robin Wildgoose thinks that girls “who became dogs, or who let the world believe they were dogs, were either powerful or mad: both monstrous possibilities.” The implied criticism of the idea that a girl must care what others think of her is both trenchant and tired.

[Read: An all-female society, pushed to extremes]

I wish there were more stories about persecuted women that don’t lose a bit of steam due to predictability. But the inevitability of some triteness is perhaps, itself, part of what Purvis is trying to illustrate. Joseph thinks to himself that he’d “rather they were dogs than damaged girls”; after all, being a dog might be safer. People “dreaded and pursued them and might eventually ruin them,” Thomas reflects, as he falls deeper under the sisters’ charms. “No other girls in history had ever met with such a fate.”

Of course, he’s wrong about that. And yet. Although the novel reaches old conclusions about its old subject—that many girls in history have been unjustly persecuted, and many more will be—it did give me something new to think about. I found it in the image of that gargantuan sturgeon gasping on the riverbank, surrounded by onlookers torn between their yearning to tear into its flesh and their revulsion at its animal strangeness. The asphyxiating creature “was as thick and muscular as a man’s torso,” Purvis writes; “From its face trailed long, white whiskers, twining and coiling like sea snakes.” After the girls make their ill-fated attempt to save the fish, Pete stomps on its head.

We are all just creatures in a world that can turn against us at any time, for any reason, or for no reason at all. The rains can stop. The river can dry up. The route that once was safe will be safe no longer. Someone might see our beauty; someone else might want to crush the life right out of us. The Mansfield sisters show that writing a new story can be difficult. But they also reveal that the old story is new in every fresh life that it touches, that understanding a trope is not the same as being protected from it, and that persecution feels like a startling new invention when it comes for you—whether you’re a fish, a dog, or a girl.


From The Atlantic via this RSS feed

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Yes, a Moon Base (www.theatlantic.com)
submitted 20 hours ago by paywall@ibbit.at to c/theatlantic@ibbit.at
 
 

No one can say that the Trump administration is entirely against alternative energy. In his first bold policy stroke as NASA’s interim head, Sean Duffy has directed the agency to put a 100-kilowatt nuclear reactor on the moon by decade’s end. This is not a lark. If humanity means to establish a permanent settlement on the moon, nuclear power will almost certainly be essential to its operation. And a lunar base may well be the most wondrous achievement in space exploration that people reading this will see during their lifetime.

The moon has gone unvisited, except by robots, for more than 50 years, and as of several months ago, it seemed as though Americans would be staying away from it for a good while longer. President Donald Trump was taking cues from Elon Musk, who seemed inclined to shelve the plan to put Americans back on the lunar surface and focus instead on an all-out sprint to Mars. But Musk has since fallen out of favor, and last month, congressional Republicans secured a funding boost for the moon program.

NASA astronauts are now scheduled to return to the moon in 2027, and if all goes well, they will be landing on it regularly, starting in the early 2030s. Each crew will carry parts of a small base that can grow piece by piece into a living space for a few people. The astronauts will also take a pair of vehicles for expeditions—a little rover that they can use for local jaunts in their space suits, and a larger, pressurized one that will allow them to go on 500-mile regolith road trips in street clothes.

A base on the moon would be more democratic than those that Musk and his acolytes have advocated building on Mars. Given shorter travel times, a greater number of people would be able to experience its otherworldly ashen plains. Their homesick calls to Earth would have only second-long delays, as opposed to minutes for a call from Mars.

[Read: Inside the Trump-Musk breakup]

But even a small encampment on the lunar surface is going to require considerable energy. Temperatures dip to –410 degrees Fahrenheit in the shade, and human bodies will need to keep cozy amid that deep chill. The International Space Station runs on solar power, but that won’t be enough on most of the moon, where nights last for 14 days. Some of the agency’s other off-world projects are powered by raw plutonium. Hunks of it sit inside the Mars rovers, for instance, radiating heat that the wheeled robots convert into electricity. These hot rocks are also encased inside NASA’s probes to the outer planets and their moons. Without plutonium, the two Voyager spacecrafts couldn’t continue to send data back to Earth as they recede from the solar system.

The moon base will need more than a radioactive rock. It will need a reactor that actually splits atoms, like the one that Duffy has proposed this week. Even if that reactor were to fail, the resulting meltdown wouldn’t present the same risks to humans that it would on Earth. The moon is already a radiation-rich environment, and it has no wind to blow the reactor’s most dangerous effluvia around; the material would simply fall to the ground.

Duffy framed his push to get the reactor in place as a matter of national security. NASA’s program to return to the moon, called Artemis, will be an international effort, with several countries contributing pieces of the final base. (Japan’s space agency has tapped Toyota to design the large, pressurized lunar vehicle.) But when the United States invited Russia to join, Vladimir Putin declined. He has instead opted to help out with a larger Chinese lunar base, which is supposed to include a nuclear reactor 10 times as powerful as the one that Duffy announced.

Last month, Bhavya Lal, who served as an associate administrator at NASA during the Biden administration and is now a professor at RAND, and her fellow aerospace expert Roger Myers released a report arguing that a county could sneakily establish a sovereign zone on the moon in defiance of the Outer Space Treaty just by building a reactor. For instance, the Chinese could insist on a buffer around theirs for the sake of nuclear safety, and use that to keep Americans away from desirable ice-rich craters nearby. Lal and Myers seem to have captured the new administration’s attention: Duffy’s new directive ordering the development of the reactor specifically mentioned this risk.

If worry over Chinese lunar land grabs is the motivation for a moon base, so much the better. Space exploration often requires a geopolitical spur. And if NASA can build this first small lunar settlement, something grander could follow close behind. Once the agency has mastered the construction of a 100-kilowatt lunar nuclear reactor, it should have little trouble scaling up to larger ones that can support tens, or even hundreds, of people—in bases of the size that now exist on Antarctica. Some space agencies have reportedly discussed building hydroponic greenhouses and other elaborate structures inside the voluminous caves that run beneath the moon’s Sea of Tranquility.

All of this infrastructure could enable some serious lunar dystopias. The moon’s surface could become an industrial hellscape, pocked with mining operations where robots and human serfs extract platinum and titanium for use in advanced electronics back on Earth. Or the Outer Space Treaty could break down and the moon could become a heavily militarized zone—even a staging ground for nuclear weapons.

But an inhabited moon could also be a global commons for research. Both the U.S. and China have developed designs for large radio telescopes on the lunar dark side, where they’d be shielded from Earth’s radio noise and would greatly aid the search for signals from distant civilizations. In one design, robots would spread a metal mesh from a crater’s center to its rim, turning its concave surface into a natural radio dish. One can imagine an astronomer at a lunar base, peering out from a porthole, seeing the Earth shining in the sky, picking out its individual oceans and continents, and knowing that on the moon’s opposite side, a giant ear would be listening for messages from other Earths and other moons, all across the Milky Way and far beyond.


From The Atlantic via this RSS feed

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This is an edition of The Atlantic Daily, a newsletter that guides you through the biggest stories of the day, helps you discover new ideas, and recommends the best in culture. Sign up for it here.

Welcome back to The Daily’s Sunday culture edition, in which one Atlantic writer or editor reveals what’s keeping them entertained. Today’s special guest is Isaac Stanley-Becker, a staff writer who has reported on Steve Witkoff’s role as President Donald Trump’s “shadow secretary of state,” the early tenure of Tulsi Gabbard as director of national intelligence, and the dire situation at the Federal Aviation Administration.

Isaac has crowned “Sad Eyed Lady of the Lowlands” as the greatest song of all time, enjoys rereading old email exchanges with friends, and is transfixed by the ambiguous nature of Mark Rothko’s paintings.

The Culture Survey: Isaac Stanley-Becker

A good recommendation I recently received: A German politician recently recommended Michael Young’s satirical 1958 novel The Rise of the Meritocracy to me. The book popularized the term meritocracy, but Young, a sociologist who helped develop Britain’s postwar welfare state, meant it as a pejorative. His story envisions a dystopian future society stratified by educational achievement rather than social class, concluding with a wave of protests in which a group called the “populists” rebel against the meritocratic elite.

My favorite way of wasting time on my phone: Rereading old emails with friends. I’ve always been drawn to letters (I recommend the published correspondence between the poets Nelly Sachs and Paul Celan, with a terrific translation by Christopher Clark), and email is an approximation of that experience. I enjoy returning to the little asides and evasions and expressions of affection.

The television show I’m most enjoying right now: The Bear is a perfect TV show, and I’m savoring the fourth season at the moment. I tell everyone who gets overwhelmed by the chaos of the first season to wait because good things are in store. The show is a tender study of people struggling to do right by themselves and others. It’s also a paean to Chicago, my hometown, a city about which Nelson Algren wrote: “Like loving a woman with a broken nose, you may well find lovelier lovelies. But never a lovely so real.”

Something delightful introduced to me by a kid in my life: A friend recently soothed her baby with a West African lullaby called “Mami wata,” by Issa Dakuyo.

A quiet song that I love, and a loud song that I love: “Slow Show,” by the National, and “40-16 Building,” by Nas.

An online creator whom I’m a fan of: I’m not sure how Melvyn Bragg would feel about the designation of “online creator,” but I’m a fan of his show on BBC Radio 4, In Our Time, in which he convenes several experts on a given topic and peppers them with questions for about an hour. There’s something for everyone: hypnosis, Bauhaus, the Haymarket Affair. One of my favorite episodes is on W. H. Auden—it’s fitting for the 2020s, our own “low dishonest decade.”

The last museum or gallery show that I loved: I recently took a tour through five centuries of the Middle Ages in a single room at the Palazzo Citterio, in Milan. Objects as disparate as northern-Italian mosaics and Gothic marble heads recorded the eclectic interests of Lamberto Vitali, a 20th-century critic and collector who believed that art was able to dissolve geographical and temporal boundaries.

An author I will read anything by: For fiction, Péter Nádas. For nonfiction, Kathryn Schulz. For commentary, I’m a devoted reader of Adam Tooze’s Substack and articles in the Financial Times.

A painting, sculpture, or other piece of visual art that I cherish: I’m very fond of Mark Rothko’s paintings, and some of the best are on view in the National Gallery of Art’s East Building, including No. 1 (1961). When I’m face-to-face with these hovering blocks of color, I can’t tell whether I’m looking at something natural or unnatural, human or inhuman. Rothko’s own words lend this ambiguity a sense of high drama. As part of the “Paintings on Paper” exhibition from about a year ago, the National Gallery displayed his haunting statement: “You think my paintings are calm, like windows in some cathedral? You should LOOK AGAIN. I’m the most violent of all the American painters. Behind those colors there hides the final cataclysm.”

A musical artist who means a lot to me: Bob Dylan. I think “Sad Eyed Lady of the Lowlands” is the greatest song of all time.

A favorite story I’ve read in The Atlantic**:** I loved Jennifer Senior’s recent story on insomnia. But everything Jennifer writes is completely captivating.

The last thing that made me cry: I cried during I’m Still Here, a film about the military dictatorship in Brazil and the disappearance of the dissident politician Rubens Paiva. What got me, in particular, was the moment when a photographer visited the Paiva family home and told them to look sad for the camera, but they insisted on smiling and laughing. I was overcome by this simple fortitude.

The last thing that made me snort with laughter: I laughed out loud reading my friend Johannes Lichtman’s novel Such Good Work, about a recovering addict whose quest for moral purpose takes him to Sweden amid the international refugee crisis. It’s a sweet and very insightful bildungsroman that captures the absurdities of life in the first quarter of the 21st century.

A poem, or line of poetry, that I return to: Patience doesn’t come easily to me, but I try to listen to the admonition that begins Galway Kinnell’s “Wait”:

Wait, for now.

Distrust everything if you have to.

But trust the hours. Haven’t they

carried you everywhere, up to now?

Here are three Sunday reads from The Atlantic:

Anne Applebaum: The most nihilistic conflict on EarthNancy Walecki: My father, guitar guru to the rock godsEnough with the mom guilt already.

The Week Ahead

Rehab: An American Scandal, a book by the Pulitzer finalist Shoshana Walter on true stories about the opioid crisis, and the dark side of the rehab industry (out Tuesday)

Americana, a new movie about a Lakota ghost shirt that sets off violence in a small South Dakota town (in theaters Friday

Love Is Like, a new album by the pop-rock band Maroon 5 (out Friday)

Essay

Illustration of a row of four airplane seats next to a window with a person in each seat holding the hand of the person next to them, on a light-pink background. Illustration by Matteo Giuseppe Pani

Captain Ron’s Guide to Fearless Flying

By Elaine Godfrey

I’d experienced 21 years of unmemorable flights before my own fear of flying took hold. In May 2015, I was traveling from my home state of Iowa to New York City for a summer internship. I was already nervous about moving, and then, somewhere above Illinois, the plane hit a patch of turbulence and dropped what felt like a thousand feet. Several people screamed. For the first time in my life, I began to experience what I would later understand to be panic: My face and neck went clammy, and black spots filled my vision. At one point, an overhead bin popped open and a few unbuckled passengers smacked their head on the ceiling. They were all okay, and, physically, so was I. But I had unlocked a new fear.

Read the full article.

More in Culture

What’s really behind the cult of Labubu

Mrs. Dalloway’s midlife crisis

The tech novel’s warning for a screen-addled age

Six books that explain how flying really works

Catch Up on The Atlantic

Does the stock market know something we don’t?How Democrats tied their own hands on redistrictingAnnie Lowrey: Children’s health care is in danger.

Photo Album

Curiosity used its mast camera to capture this mosaic of Gediz Vallis Curiosity used its mast camera to capture this mosaic of Gediz Vallis on November 7, 2022, its 3,646th Martian day. (NASA)

This week, NASA marked the 13th anniversary of its Curiosity rover landing on Mars. Curiosity has now traveled more than 22 miles over the course of 4,620 Martian days, making numerous discoveries across this planet.

Play our daily crossword.

Explore all of our newsletters.

Rafaela Jinich contributed to this newsletter

When you buy a book using a link in this newsletter, we receive a commission. Thank you for supporting The Atlantic*.*


From The Atlantic via this RSS feed

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Tens of millions of Americans voted for President Donald Trump in the belief that he would be competent. They might not have been thrilled that Trump is a convicted felon, or pleased with his role in the violent attack on the Capitol on January 6, 2021. Many worried that he posed a threat to democracy. But enough were willing to overlook all that, because they convinced themselves that Trump would be an effective chief executive, that under his stewardship their lives would get better and the country would prosper.

A survey from the Democratic pollsters Douglas Schoen and Carly Cooperman, conducted shortly after the election, helps illustrate the point. By an 11-point margin, independents said they would be less confident that the Trump administration would share accurate information compared with the Biden administration. Yet, by a 10-point margin, those same voters said that they thought the Trump administration would be more effective at getting things done.

“Ultimately, our postelection poll makes clear that voters prioritized perceived effectiveness rather than upholding democracy this election,” Schoen and Cooperman wrote, “and while they are deeply skeptical towards our institutions generally, they are cautiously optimistic that the incoming administration will be effective at providing real-world solutions.”

[Read: Trump loudly insists that he’s incompetent]

A little more than half a year into Trump’s second term, however, the public’s confidence in his skill as a chief executive is shattering. In a recent AP/NORC poll, only about one-quarter of U.S. adults said that Trump’s policies have helped them. Roughly half report that Trump’s policies have “done more to hurt” them, and about two in 10 say his policies have “not made a difference” in their lives. Remarkably, Trump failed to earn majority approval on any of the issues in the poll, including the economy, immigration, and cutting government spending.

As a result, a politically toxic impression is hardening. Trump’s approval rating in the most recent Gallup poll is 37 percent, the lowest of this term and only slightly higher than his all-time low of 34 percent, at the end of his first term. (Among independents, Trump’s approval rating is down to 29 percent.) Americans already understood Trump to be corrupt, and proved themselves willing to tolerate that. But now they are coming to believe that he is inept. In American politics, that is an unforgivable sin.

On the economic front, Trump’s tariff increases—announced and then altered, often without rhyme or reason—are only now beginning to percolate through the economy, and the steepest hikes haven’t yet kicked in. The economy appears to be slowing down. Consumer prices are up 2.6 percent from a year earlier, which is keeping the Federal Reserve from cutting interest rates despite intense pressure from Trump. The jobs report for July showed a gain of only 73,000, a sign that the labor market is weakening. Perhaps more significant, the Bureau of Labor Statistics revised the jobs totals from May and June downward by more than a quarter of a million. Unemployment ticked up to 4.2 percent. Consumer spending is well below what it was last year. More than half of all Americans say the cost of groceries is a “major” source of stress in their life right now. Many industries are postponing hiring, and the national hiring rate is near its lowest level in a decade. Customers appear to be holding off on large, long-term purchases. The Budget Lab at Yale University calculates that the American consumer is dealing with an average effective tariff rate of 18.3 percent, the highest since 1934, and it estimates that price increases will cost each household $2,400 on average this year. General Motors reported last month that Trump’s tariffs have cost the company more than $1 billion. And the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, said in a statement that Trump’s latest tariffs “would disrupt essential transatlantic supply chains, to the detriment of businesses, consumers and patients on both sides of the Atlantic.”

The Trump administration is betting that the president’s tariffs will not be inflationary, will generate massive revenue flows that significantly reduce the deficit, and will lead to a renaissance in American manufacturing and investment. If it’s right, Trump will reap the political benefits. But we believe the administration to be dead wrong, and that this will become painfully obvious to ordinary Americans in the months and years ahead.

The economy isn’t the only place where Trump’s policies will hurt rather than help. Estimates predict that the number of Americans without health insurance will increase by more than 10 million in less than a decade, with particularly devastating impacts for vulnerable rural populations. Eliminating a quarter of the IRS workforce may well undermine tax collection and increase the wait time for Americans to receive refunds. Slashing the Social Security Administration, which is serving more people than ever before, with the fewest workers in half a century, will increase wait times for those needing help. It will lead to field-office closures that will hit seniors in rural communities the hardest and may well delay the processing of retirement, disability, and survivor benefits. A 70-year-old retiree in Indiana told The Guardian, “For the first time in my life, my wife and I are stressed out and worried if I will get my payment and if it will be on time.”

The Trump administration has devastated the National Institutes of Health, one of the world’s foremost medical-research centers and the biggest sponsor of biomedical research in the world. Nearly 2,500 grants have been ended or delayed, disrupting vital medical research, reducing the pool of available researchers, and compromising public health and disease prevention.

“The country is going to be mourning the loss of this enterprise for decades,” Harold Varmus, a Nobel Prize–winning cancer biologist who served as the director of the NIH from 1993 to 1999, told The New York Times. (There are signs that some Republicans in Congress are finally stirring from their slumber and might be ready to push back against what the Trump administration is trying to do, though the administration may attempt to thwart their will by ignoring appropriations or setting up a fight over impoundment or trying more rescission.)

Massive cuts to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, resulting in the loss of some of the weather service’s most experienced leaders and impeding the collection of data that are essential for accurate and timely weather forecasting, will place Americans at greater risk of experiencing extreme-weather events.

As The Atlantic’s David A. Graham has written, the Federal Emergency Management Agency is in disarray, headed by a person who is clearly out of his depth. Trump wants FEMA eliminated by the end of the year. It has already lost about a third of its permanent workforce, and its program dedicated to helping communities prepare for natural disasters such as floods and fires has been canceled. FEMA is hardly a model federal program; a slew of changes could make it better. The problem is that the Trump administration has no plan to pick up the slack in a post-FEMA world, and states and municipalities will be hard-pressed to do so.

[David A. Graham: FEMA is not prepared]

In the immediate aftermath of the recent Texas floods, FEMA’s earlier decision to lay off hundreds of call-center contractors resulted in thousands of unanswered calls for recovery assistance. (The administration dismissed reports about this as “fake news.”) FEMA didn’t deploy to St. Louis for several weeks after a tornado destroyed parts of the city, leaving people unable to apply for even basic payments for fresh food and medicine, let alone get help addressing uninsured losses from the natural disaster.

The Trump administration is also decimating anti-corruption efforts within the federal government. It announced earlier this year that the landmark 1977 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act would no longer be enforced. It also announced the termination of two Justice Department programs designed to seize and return foreign assets from kleptocrats and oligarchs close to Russian President Vladimir Putin. And it has fired or demoted 20 inspectors general and acting inspectors general, who are ferreting out waste, fraud, and abuse within the government.

As lifelong conservatives, we are completely on board when it comes to insisting on accountability in government programs; increasing their efficiency; and, in some instances, reorganizing them, downsizing them, and even eliminating them. The problem is the thoughtless and reckless way in which the Trump administration is going about this—all while passing a “big, beautiful bill” that will add a staggering $3 trillion to the national debt.

Trump has surrounded himself with nihilists, people waving around a chain saw onstage like a madman and boasting that career civil servants should be viewed “as the villains.” Trump’s director of the Office of Management and Budget, Russell Vought, said in 2023: “We want to put them in trauma.”

So Democrats have a lot to work with. On an almost-daily basis, Trump is discrediting his own leadership; that gives Democrats the opportunity to highlight, with laser-like focus, his failure to deliver on his own promises. In doing so, Democrats need to present themselves not as the party of government but rather as the party of reform, as disrupters of the status quo on behalf of the common good. We believe they must tell voters that in all sorts of ways—the economy, health and health care, disaster relief—Trump is making their lives worse, not better. He and his administration are amateurs, inept and in over their head. They are entertainers and grifters, shock jocks and freaks. Whatever talents they may possess, mastery of governing is not one of them.

Perhaps most important, the incompetence argument needs to be humanized. Democrats need compelling, empathy-evoking narratives pointing to the harm being done to ordinary people by the enormous ineptitude of Trump and his enablers. For example, Democrats could tell the story, as former NIH Director Francis Collins has done, of the woman in her early 40s, afflicted with Stage 4 colorectal cancer, who was on the path to an immunotherapy clinical trial that might have saved her life, until cuts to the NIH caused a devastating delay; or of the children afflicted with rare diseases whose lives may be affected because advances in gene editing have been stopped in their tracks; or of the families who are seeing their hopes for breakthroughs in Alzheimer’s disease potentially dashed. They could talk about the role that Secretary of Health and Human Services Robert F. Kennedy Jr., who has spread anti-vaccine conspiracy theories, is playing in the worst outbreak of measles in decades. Or about his decision to cancel nearly $500 million in grants and contracts for developing mRNA vaccines, which have been responsible for saving millions of lives from COVID and were considered the most exciting new opportunity in cancer immunotherapy. They could also explain why the Trump administration isn’t prepared for a bird-flu pandemic, should one happen.

[Read: Bird flu is a national embarrassment]

Democrats could tell the story of how farmers in places such as western Iowa are struggling as tariffs increase their costs at home—for machinery, fertilizer, herbicides, and feed—while limiting their access to international markets.

Democrats could show how workforce raids by ICE agents with battering rams are in the process of destroying Glenn Valley Foods in Omaha, which had been one of the fastest-growing meatpacking companies in the Midwest. According to The New York Times, “In a matter of weeks, production had plummeted by almost 70 percent. Most of the work force was gone. Half of the maintenance crew was in the process of being deported, the director of human resources had stopped coming to work, and more than 50 employees were being held at a detention facility in rural Nebraska.”

Thanks to the reporting of Nick Kristof at The New York Times, Democrats could talk about the babies such as Gbessey, who lived in a village in Liberia and died of malaria because the Trump administration shut down USAID, which meant health workers had no malaria medicine to offer the child; and how Gbessey’s younger sibling, Osman, also became seriously ill with malaria. They could tell of children orphaned by AIDS dying in South Sudan because the community-health workers who had brought them medicine have been laid off. (A recent study in The Lancet projected that the defunding of USAID could lead to 14 million deaths by the end of the decade.)

These examples are but the beginning; Trump, after all, has more than 1,200 days left in office. There is no evidence that he’s going to get more competent or more compassionate, and plenty of evidence to the contrary. The challenge for Democrats will be to keep up with the cascading horror stories and to tell them in compelling and sensitive ways, conveying the devasting effects of the Trump administration’s across-the-board mistakes.

IN THE GREAT GATSBY, F. Scott Fitzgerald wrote about Tom and Daisy Buchanan, the aristocratic couple who exemplify the moral corruption of the wealthy.

“They were careless people, Tom and Daisy,” Fitzgerald wrote. “They smashed up things and creatures and then retreated back into their money or their vast carelessness or whatever it was that kept them together, and let other people clean up the mess they had made.”

[From the March 2023 issue: A new way to read Gatsby]

Trump is smashing up things on a scale that is almost unimaginable, and he seems completely untroubled by the daily hardships and widespread suffering he is leaving behind. And the president is hardly done. The pain and the body count will rise, and rise, and rise. It will be left to others to clean up the mess he has made. Some of the damage may be repaired with time; some will be irreparable. Democrats should say so. It’s their best path to defeating his movement, which is the only way for the healing to begin.


From The Atlantic via this RSS feed

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Editor’s Note: Washington Week With The Atlantic is a partnership between NewsHour Productions, WETA, and The Atlantic airing every Friday on PBS stations nationwide. Check your local listings, watch full episodes here, or listen to the weekly podcast here.

Donald Trump imposed additional global tariffs this week—but is there a governing theory to how the president is carrying out his trade policy? Panelists on Washington Week With The Atlantic joined to discuss Trump’s latest trade announcements and how they may affect the U.S. economy.

Meanwhile, Trump has said he will meet with Vladimir Putin next week in Alaska to talk about ending Russia’s war in Ukraine. “The Biden-era mantra of ‘Nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine’ is now ancient history under the Trump administration,” Vivian Salama, a staff writer at The Atlantic, said last night. Although this once meant that “you cannot negotiate the future of Ukraine without Ukraine at the table,” she continued, “that’s out of the question.”

“Obviously, it puts the Ukrainians in a very difficult position because they basically have lost, first, their sovereignty to the war, and then again to the Trump administration essentially twisting their arm,” Salama said.

Joining the editor in chief of The Atlantic, Jeffrey Goldberg, to discuss this and more: Jonathan Karl, the chief Washington correspondent at ABC News; Tyler Pager, a White House correspondent at The New York Times; Jonathan Lemire, a staff writer at The Atlantic and a co-host of Morning Joe on MSNBC; and Vivian Salama, a staff writer at The Atlantic.

Watch the full episode here.


From The Atlantic via this RSS feed

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This is an edition of The Wonder Reader, a newsletter in which our editors recommend a set of stories to spark your curiosity and fill you with delight. Sign up here to get it every Saturday morning.

Conventional wisdom says that a beach read ought to be light and fun—a book with a pastel cover. But the beach read can be anything you want it to be. Vacation might feel like the perfect moment to escape into frivolity, or to dive into something dense that you finally have the mental space for. (If you’re me, that latter category may have once included the historian Timothy Snyder’s Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin, which I acknowledge is a very odd choice due both to its physical and metaphorical weight.)

Whether you’re taking a big trip or just finding a few moments of quiet this August, the list of recommendations below will give you a place to start.

On Beach Reads

Five Books That Will Redirect Your Attention

By Rhian Sasseen

When malaise strikes, a book can break the spell—if you choose the rightone.

Read the article.

24 Books to Get Lost in This Summer

By The Atlantic Culture Desk

Here are 24 books to read before fall comes around.

Read the article.

Seven Books for People Figuring Out Their Next Move

By Xochitl Gonzalez

These titles are great tools for anyone trying to navigate new opportunities, new places, or new phases of life.

Read the article.

Still Curious?

The one book everyone should read: The Atlantic’s staffers on the books they share—again and again

Six books to read before you get to the airport: The fact that we regularly float six or seven miles above the Earth is worth our fascination and attention.

Other Diversions

“My father, guitar guru to the rock gods”

Resist the snark and be happy.

Captain Ron’s guide to fearless flying

P.S.

A bee in a red flower Courtesy of Belinda J. Kein

I recently asked readers to share a photo of something that sparks their sense of awe in the world. Belinda J. Kein shared the image above.

I’ll continue to feature your responses in the coming weeks.

— Isabel


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Last month, a small company in San Francisco announced that it had a plan to manufacture gold—not merely a flake or a nugget, but tons of the stuff. According to a paper written by one of Marathon Fusion’s co-founders (and not yet peer reviewed), the alchemist’s dream could be achieved not by mixing powders in a crucible but by tweaking atoms that were superheated during the process of nuclear fusion. The gold wouldn’t be the end game, more like a side hustle. The millions of dollars made from selling the precious metal could be used to offset the cost of nuclear fusion, a near-limitless power source that maybe, just maybe, could one day replace fossil fuels.

For more than two millennia, the promise of alchemy—and, specifically, transmuting ordinary elements into valuable ones—has intrigued scientists and scoundrels alike. Medieval alchemists were obsessed with finding or creating the Philosopher’s Stone, a substance thought to turn common metals into gold. That turned out to be elusive, though arcane tinkering continued for centuries. Then, in the early 1900s, physicists determined that they could change one element into another by altering the number of protons in its nucleus. In an essay published in The Atlantic in 1936, a physicist wrote that turning mercury into gold—which is what Marathon is advocating—was scientifically possible but “cannot be commercially profitable.”

[From the June 1936 issue: Modern alchemy]

That didn’t stop scientists from giving it a go. Over the past 50 years, researchers have produced gold in laboratories, but only on the scale of atoms. In 1980, Glenn Seaborg, who was part of the team that first isolated plutonium, was able to turn several thousand atoms of the metallic element bismuth into gold by using a particle accelerator. The amount was minuscule—not enough to see, much less sell—and the cost exorbitant. Seaborg estimated at the time that, using his technique, making a single ounce of gold would cost $1 quadrillion. In May, scientists reported that they had turned lead into gold inside the world’s largest particle accelerator, in Switzerland—although, again, the yield was tiny, measured in trillionths of a gram. And an instant after the gold atoms were created, they dashed themselves into subatomic particles inside the accelerator.

Nuclear fusion has proved similarly challenging, despite being pursued with similar fervor. Fusion, in which atoms are smashed together in order to release energy, is the holy grail of clean power, both because it creates less waste than fission reactors and because it doesn’t carry the same risk of melting down like the ones in Chernobyl and Fukushima. Although experimental fusion reactors that can make electricity have been built, the technology hasn’t advanced enough to allow fusion to be practical on a commercial scale. Fusion, like modern alchemy, is prohibitively expensive, in part because the reaction requires extremely high temperatures, which require a lot of energy to achieve.

Back in February, Adam Rutkowski, one of the co-founders of Marathon, started thinking about additional ways that a fusion reactor could prove useful—an extra revenue stream, perhaps, that could subsidize the costly process. He told me that he’d had a few other ideas, including one involving nuclear batteries, before he arrived at his epiphany: The neutrons produced during fusion could be repurposed to change one metal into another. A power plant, in other words, could double as a gold factory.

Rutkowski ran the idea past several fusion physicists, including Dennis Whyte, a professor of nuclear science and engineering at MIT. Whyte told me that he thought it was clever, and he plans to test the theory by using computer simulations during one of his classes next semester. Steven Cowley, the director of the Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory, who was not involved in the study, was likewise intrigued. Rutkowski has “a really nice idea,” Cowley told me, though he would like to see more analysis before he’s entirely convinced that gold could be manufactured in this way.

At the moment, Rutkowski’s idea is entirely speculative; he’s not sitting on a pile of gold, but rather would like to be one day, as commercial fusion becomes more of a reality. In fact, the utter lack of commercial fusion in 2025 is likely the largest and most obvious barrier to his vision. Marathon is not in the reactor-building business; instead, it hopes to team up with such companies by consulting and supplying them equipment. According to a recent survey, fusion companies have raised $2.6 billion in the past year, and the majority of company representatives who responded said they believe that fusion power will become a reality at some point in the next decade. Some physicists I spoke with thought that timeline might be optimistic, but they also noted that significant progress has been made in recent years.

[Read: Is this the ‘Kitty Hawk moment’ for fusion energy?]

I sent Marathon’s proposal to Lawrence Principe, a historian and chemist at Johns Hopkins University who has written several books about alchemy and has re-created alchemical recipes in his lab. (He successfully replicated one 17th-century experiment that made a lump of gold appear to grow into a glittering tree inside a flask.) Principe was struck, while perusing the company’s website, by the spirited promotional language—touting a “golden age,” for example—that echoes the pamphleteering of centuries past. “I’m getting deja vu here looking at this relative to 16th- and 17th-century texts,” he told me.

Like Marathon, many alchemists from that era advertised that they were on the cusp of a breakthrough, according to Principe. They wrote to kings and queens asking for an investment in their laboratory, or for a gold sample to kick-start the undertaking. In the 15th century, King Henry IV banned the practice because he was worried about alchemical advances undermining gold currency. That’s a theoretical consideration today too. But fusion seems unlikely to devalue anyone’s stockpile: Rutkowski estimates that a single reactor could produce just a couple of tons of gold per year—worth more than $200 million, but still a far cry from the 3,000-plus tons that are mined annually, not to mention that any gold produced through fusion would be somewhat radioactive and would take about 15 years to be considered safe.

The history of alchemy is replete with stories of dashed hopes and dubious boasts. In 1782, a British chemist named James Price, like Marathon, claimed that he could turn mercury into gold, though he professed doing it with mysterious powders rather than nuclear energy. After being repeatedly challenged to replicate his experiment, he agreed to put on a public demonstration. But instead, when the time came, he drank a vial of poison and died in front of the three witnesses who showed up. In the early 20th century, Rudolph Hunter, an engineer and inventor, was deemed a “modern Midas” after claiming he was set to build a factory that could produce thousands of dollars’ worth of gold a day by using principles he had learned from studying the sun. He passed away before proving his concept.

[From the January 1973 issue: History of alchemy]

Unlike those ill-fated efforts, Marathon’s plan has real science behind it. If it works, the achievement would mark the end of the alchemist’s quest, proof positive that humankind can alter the elements. But Rutkowski and company aren’t driven by the desire for gold itself. Instead, they’re after a technology that could help sate the world’s ever-growing need for energy—a prize that’s far more valuable and, for now, still just out of reach.


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In the past few weeks, Americans learned that Robert F. Kennedy Jr. canceled half a billion dollars of government investment in the development of mRNA vaccines, Las Vegas saw a 7 percent drop in visitors, residential electricity prices shot up by an average of 6.5 percent, the number of housing permits issued hit their lowest point in half a decade, employers quit adding workers, the manufacturing sector shrank, and inflation rose.

These bleak figures depict an American economy slowing and its labor market weakening. A recession isn’t guaranteed, but it’s becoming much more likely and the stagflation that forecasters described as inevitable when President Donald Trump began prosecuting his global trade war is now a lot closer. Americans, now and in the future, will be paying more and buying less. Trump’s second-term economic ideology is not only one of protectionism, mercantilism, atavism, and cronyism. It is also one of degrowth.

Trump, who entered the White House promising to slash prices on household goods and supercharge the American economy, would never use that term himself. Degrowth—the notion that wealthy countries can and should reduce their consumption and production—is associated with environmental activists and leftist and green parties in Europe. Still, at its heart, degrowth argues that people should not only tolerate but desire a smaller economy. That’s second-term Trumponomics, and everyone stands to be worse off for it.

Without admitting it, the White House is pursuing a multipronged strategy to raise prices, suppress consumption, freeze production, and lower productivity in the United States. The trade war is the most obvious example, as well as the one having the most immediate consequences. Since January, Trump has raised and lowered and raised tariffs on goods imported from American allies around the world. Such barriers will eliminate the country’s bilateral trade deficits and boost domestic manufacturing, the White House has promised, while warning that consumers and employers might have to endure a chaotic period of adjustment.

[Read: Does the stock market know something we don’t?]

But Trump has slapped tariffs on commodities and parts that factories use to make things in America, such as engine components and timber. He has slapped tariffs on products that are not or cannot be produced here, such as bananas and gallium. And he has slapped tariffs on items that would be too expensive for American consumers to purchase if they were made in this country, given the cost of American wages and the network of factories in operation, such as costume jewelry and sneakers. The Yale Budget Lab estimates that the country’s effective tariff rate now stands at 18.3 percent, the highest since 1934. Prices are beginning to rise as importers pass the cost of Trump’s import taxes on to retailers and families. Industrial production is falling, as uncertainty plagues the sector.

In response, Trump has argued with reality. “We’re only in a TRANSITION STAGE, just getting started!!! Consumers have been waiting for years to see pricing come down,” he wrote on Truth Social. “NO INFLATION,” he added, pointing to egg and gas prices. But those are just two of 80,000 prices the government tracks each month to calculate the overall inflation rate. The cost of eggs has declined as the bird-flu pandemic has waned; the price at the pump has gone down due to weaker global growth and increased OPEC production. Across the economy, costs have remained witheringly high, despite the Federal Reserve combatting them with high interest rates. If the Fed cut borrowing costs, inflation would climb.

Trump’s campaign against reality extends beyond the price of consumer goods. Unhappy with the pace of employment growth, the president canned the head of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. “Important numbers like this must be fair and accurate,” he wrote on Truth Social. “They can’t be manipulated for political purposes.” (Touché.) Unhappy with Fed policy, he has threatened to put Jerome Powell, his own appointee, “out to pasture.”

At the same time as he has prosecuted his bizarre unilateral war on imports, Trump has reduced government subsidies for a range of necessities. He has taken $1 trillion away from Medicaid, while vowing not to reduce the program’s budget. He has cut food-stamp benefits, meaning low-income families will buy fewer groceries. He has eliminated support for the loans and grants that poor kids rely on to get a higher education. And he has slashed financing for renewable-energy production.

Each of these policies will raise costs and reduce supply. Trump’s One Big Beautiful Bill Act, for instance, is expected to eliminate 1.6 million green-energy jobs and reduce electricity-generation capacity by 330 gigawatts by 2035. (That’s roughly equivalent to the country’s current solar-production capacity.) Americans a decade from now will pay higher prices for electricity and will use less of it, thanks to Trump.

Right now, the United States is suffering from shortages—yes, shortages—of immigrants and visitors. Tourist meccas around the country are reeling as visitors from Europe and Asia opt to take their euros and yen elsewhere. Farms and nursing facilities are suffering from a lack of workers. Global investors are opting to park their money abroad, raising domestic borrowing costs and weakening the dollar.

[Read: So, about those big trade deals]

In the long term, Trump’s attack on colleges and scientific-research institutions might end up being the most damaging of his degrowth policies. The American system of higher education—for all of its many, many faults—is an engine of global modernity. The country’s land-grant schools help feed the world. Its public colleges vault poor kids up the income ladder. Its name-brand universities are laboratories of scientific innovation.

But for the crime of supporting Black and brown kids, admitting foreign students, and hiring liberal thinkers, these institutions are under assault. The mathematician Terence Tao, described by some of his contemporaries as a latter-day Albert Einstein, might not be able to continue his research at UCLA, because of Trump’s budget cuts. What good could possibly come of that? The same good that will come from slashing financing for mRNA-vaccine research, meant to prevent cancer and end pandemics. “I’ve tried to be objective & non-alarmist in response to current HHS actions—but quite frankly this move is going to cost lives,” argued Jerome Adams, a physician who served as surgeon general during the first Trump administration.

As a counterweight, the White House has cut taxes and slashed regulations, for some industries at least. The wealthy stand to do just fine in the Trump economy—happy, I suppose, to have a smaller pie if they get a bigger piece of it. Yet Trumpian degrowth will hurt them, too, in time. Rich people purchase homes and sneakers and bananas, and send their kids to college. Rich people use energy. Rich people hire workers to provide them with home-health support and staff their businesses. And rich people use vaccines and require cancer treatments.

Unlike typical degrowthers—with their focus on long-term human flourishing and the conservation of the planetary ecosystem—Trump is engaged in financial nihilism. The president has, at least once, admitted that his policies will lead to Americans having less instead of more: “Maybe the children will have two dolls instead of 30 dolls, you know? And maybe the two dolls will cost a couple of bucks more than they would normally.” If only that was the worst of it.


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This is an edition of The Atlantic Daily, a newsletter that guides you through the biggest stories of the day, helps you discover new ideas, and recommends the best in culture. Sign up for it here.

Overnight, Israel’s security cabinet approved a proposal from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to occupy Gaza City, a plan that neither the Israeli security establishment nor the majority of the Israeli public supports. I spoke with my colleague Yair Rosenberg about the gap between what Israel wants and what Netanyahu is doing, and what this plan could mean for the future of the region.

Isabel Fattal: What exactly did the Israeli cabinet decide, and what do we know at this point about what it means for the region?

Yair Rosenberg: The Israeli cabinet approved a decision to occupy Gaza City—a part of the Gaza Strip where many civilians are still sheltering and that Israel had until recently not entered—in order, it claimed, to root out Hamas and its last bastions in the area.

The Israeli military has said that it currently controls some 75 percent of the Strip. Netanyahu’s hard-right Israeli coalition partners have pushed for full occupation of the area; the military and security establishments were against that entirely. Netanyahu split the difference and said, Okay, we’re not going to occupy all of Gaza, and we’re not going to do anything right away. The cabinet instead voted to allow the prime minister to approve a Gaza City–occupation plan from the Israel Defense Forces, which will likely happen in a few weeks. So it’s not entirely clear what the timeline is for everything here. It’s also not clear whether Netanyahu intends to go through with all of it or if he is actually trying to create pressure on Hamas to negotiate a hostage deal. He probably doesn’t yet know what he’s going to do, which is why he’s kicking the can down the road—his specialty. But if you had to put odds on the options, you should always bet on Netanyahu doing what the hard-right portion of his base wants him to do, which in this case would mean pushing deeper and deeper into Gaza.

Isabel: Talk me through why Netanyahu is so deferential to this part of his coalition, and what exactly it wants.

Yair: After being ousted from office for a year, Netanyahu returned to power in 2022 with an extremely narrow coalition that received less than 50 percent of the vote. If he loses the support of the hard-right anti-Arab parties that are propping him up, they can force the country to elections, which almost every poll shows Netanyahu and his allies would lose. The goal of these hard-right parties is to ethnically cleanse Gaza, annex it, and repopulate it with Jewish settlements. That’s not a goal that most Israelis support. But Netanyahu is beholden to these people for his political survival, and that has inflected all of his decision making.

Isabel: The Israeli security establishment and the Israeli public do not support annexing Gaza. Can you explain the tension here between what the military and the people want and what Netanyahu seems to be doing?

Yair: Significant majorities in Israel oppose the hard right’s vision of taking over Gaza—and have opposed it since the war started. Almost all the polls we have on the subject have shown strong Israeli opposition to annexing and settling Gaza, and also that some 70 percent of Israelis want to end the war with a hostage deal, not continue it in the way that Netanyahu is doing right now.

The other major contingent that has been opposed to the settler right’s vision is the Israeli security establishment, which sees occupying more and more of Gaza as a trap that will drain Israel’s resources, force the IDF to manage millions of Palestinian civilians who don’t want Israel to rule over them, and cause many more soldiers and hostages to be killed. Netanyahu’s former defense minister Yoav Gallantpublicly calledfor Gaza to be returned to non-Hamas Palestinian control, and criticized his boss for refusing to wind down the war. He was later fired. The IDF chief of staff, who was handpicked by Netanyahu, reportedly opposed the current Gaza-occupation proposal. This past week, 19 living former leaders of Israel’s major security agencies—its equivalents of the FBI, the CIA, and the Pentagon—put out a video saying that the war needs to end, that it has crossed moral and strategic red lines, that it’s serving only a messianic minority and not what the majority wants.

Isabel: How have President Donald Trump’s actions pushed events closer to the far right’s vision? And what could he do to change things if he wanted to?

Yair: Trump has a kind of power over Netanyahu’s political future that most American presidents haven’t had, because Netanyahu has tied his political cachet to Trump. The prime minister has presented himself as somebody who can get what Israel needs from the U.S. relationship—a singular statesman who can manage a mercurial president, unlike his rivals on the Israeli political stage. But that pitch doesn’t work if Netanyahu is at loggerheads with Trump. So whatever Trump says, Bibi is going to have to do, especially with elections looming next year.

But despite holding this leverage, in practice, Trump has largely permitted Netanyahu to do whatever he wants in Gaza. In fact, the one major intervention that the president has made since entering office was not to oppose the Israeli settler right’s plans but to supercharge them. He proposed this idea of a “Riviera on the Middle East,” in which all of the people of Gaza would be relocated, and then someone else would take over Gaza and build something new there. As ever, Trump was not very clear on the details, but the Israeli settler right filled in its own. Before Trump, the Biden administration was very explicit that the territory of Gaza had to be handed back to the Gazan people, and that it would remain under Palestinian control. Trump switched sides, and in so doing, he tilted the entire playing field toward these absolutist outcomes. He could change that by disavowing his plan, but he has not done so.

Isabel: Netanyahu has said that he wants to take control of Gaza but doesn’t want to keep it. What does this mean, and how seriously should we take his purported plan?

Yair: In recent statements explaining his new policy internationally, Netanyahu has claimed that although Israel is going to occupy much of Gaza, after it roots out Hamas, it will turn the territory over to Palestinian governance that is neither Hamas nor the Palestinian Authority—Hamas’s rival in the West Bank—in partnership with Arab states. But this is essentially a fantasy scenario; it’s not clear that such a coalition exists.

So he’s telling the international community what it wants to hear—I will not actually do what the hard right in my coalition wants to do, which is annex Gaza and resettle it.But talk is cheap, and nothing Netanyahu has done so far suggests that he has the ability or even the interest to do what is necessary to hand Gaza over to third parties. Outside pressure could make that outcome more likely. But right now, the pressure is coming primarily from the hard right in his own government, and combined with Trump’s neglect, that suggests the hard right will keep getting the things it wants.

Further reading:

The worst-kept secret of the Israeli-Palestinian conflictThe Israeli defense establishment revolts against Netanyahu. (From 2024)The right-wing Israeli campaign to resettle Gaza (From 2023)Israel’s government goes extreme right. (From 2022)

Here are three new stories from The Atlantic:

Tom Nichols: Pete Hegseth doesn’t want to talk about Golden Dome.How the Texas standoff will (probably) endSo, about those big trade deals

Today’s News

President Donald Trump has ordered the Pentagon to use military force against Latin American drug cartels that his administration has designated as terrorist organizations, according to people familiar with the matter.

Last night, the Canyon Fire, in California, grew to nearly 5,000 acres. Thousands in northern Los Angeles and eastern Ventura Counties are under evacuation orders as firefighters continue to battle the fast-moving blaze.According to people familiar with the matter, Trump is removing Billy Long as IRS commissioner; Long, who has been in the role for two months, is expected to be nominated for an ambassadorship. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent will serve as acting commissioner, according to a senior administration official.

Dispatches

The Books Briefing: Virginia Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway reveals new meanings with each reread, even 100 years after its publication, Boris Kachka writes.The Weekly Planet: The U.S. is rejecting climate laws while the world enforces them, Zoë Schlanger writes.

Explore all of our newsletters here.

Evening Read

photo of debris-strewn front lawn with huge tree and car with crumpled hood angled on sidewalk next to it When Clint Smith and his family returned to their New Orleans home in October 2005, they found a house, and a neighborhood, destroyed by flooding. Courtesy of Clint Smith

Twenty Years After the Storm

By Clint Smith

The scene before me appeared and disappeared and reappeared again with every breath I took, the hot air from my lungs fogging the gas mask that fit snugly over my face. My mother, father, and little sister stood in front of me wearing hazmat suits. It was October 2005, and we’d been among the first in Gentilly, our New Orleans neighborhood, to receive permission to return to our home after Hurricane Katrina. I was nervous. Gentilly had sat beneath up to eight feet of water for weeks. I didn’t know what I would see, or how I would feel.

Our neighborhood had never been this quiet before. There had always been kids riding bikes, or someone playing music from their car or their front porch or their shoulder with a bass line that made the street vibrate. There had always been the sound of a basketball colliding with concrete as boys went in search of a court and a hoop and a game. Squirrels had always scurried through trees, where birds sang. Now there were no birds, no balls, no squirrels, no bikes. Only an eerie silence.

Read the full article.

More From The Atlantic

The new ChatGPT resets the AI race.So much for the “best health-care system in the world.”The man who could unite Iran’s oppositionAutocracy in America: The storm before the calm

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dog surfing competition in california Eakin Howard / AP

Look. The Atlantic’s photos of the week include a Pride canal parade in Amsterdam, the World Dog Surfing Championships in California, a rally race through a Finnish forest, and more.

Read. Jeff Wise recommends six books to read before you get to the airport.

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Rafaela Jinich contributed to this newsletter.

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Last month, America’s top health officials gathered in downtown Washington for an ice-cream party. Health and Human Services Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr.—joined by Secretary of Agriculture Brooke Rollins—hunched over a cooler and served himself a scoop. Off to the side, FDA Commissioner Marty Makary licked a cone. There was a reason to celebrate: The dairy industry, like many of America’s largest food makers, had acquiesced to the “Make America Healthy Again” movement’s crackdown on synthetic food dyes. The International Dairy Foods Association, a lobbying group, announced that more than 40 major ice-cream companies would begin phasing out several dyes that RFK Jr. has blamed for a slew of chronic-health problems, especially in children. “I’m very grateful for this industry for stepping up,” Kennedy told onlookers.

By the end of 2027**,** Hershey’s birthday-cake ice cream won’t have Yellow 5 or Red 40, nor will its “blue moon” flavor have Blue 1. But your ice cream might still come with one particular artificial food dye: titanium dioxide, a chemical that turns food white and isn’t included in the International Dairy Foods Association’s “Ice Cream Commitment.” (Yes, the milk in ice cream already is white to begin with, but titanium dioxide helps keep some ice cream with added ingredients from looking like the muddied leftover milk in a bowl of cereal.) Titanium dioxide is added to many other foods, too, including salad dressings, low-fat milks, and soups. So far, the chemical seems to be largely surviving the food-dye purge. Many companies—including Kraft Heinz and General Mills—don’t mention titanium dioxide in their promises to replace similar dyes. (Neither company responded to multiple requests for comment.)

You might be eating more titanium dioxide than you think. Even food that isn’t white might contain it. The chemical is commonly used as a base layer—kind of like primer on a wall—to make brightly colored products pop. It’s not always named as an ingredient in foods that are made with the dye. Other synthetic dyes, such as Red 40 and Yellow 5, which are made from petroleum, must be disclosed on a product’s nutrition label. (That’s also true for several other dyes that end in a number.) The FDA, however, allows food companies to simply label titanium dioxide as an “artificial color,” given that technically titanium is a mineral.

Food makers argue that this distinction demonstrates that titanium dioxide is not like other dyes. The International Dairy Foods Association told me that it’s “focused on removing certified artificial colors” when I asked whether the group’s pledge included titanium dioxide. A spokesperson for the Consumer Brands Association, a major lobbying group that recently announced a food-dye pledge of its own, similarly said that the numbered dyes “are a unique subset.” Whether people really should fret about titanium dioxide while licking an ice-cream cone is a contentious question. In 2022, the European Union banned the dye over concerns that tiny particles in the product could build up in the body and damage DNA. But the decision wasn’t based on clear evidence that links the chemical to specific ailments. Rather, European officials identified “some data gaps and uncertainties” about the dye’s health impacts, and acted out of an abundance of caution.

The evidence against titanium dioxide isn’t much different from that against other artificial dyes. Food makers have stopped using the numbered dyes based solely on preliminary science. Prior to Kennedy’s confirmation, many of the same organizations that are now touting the food industry’s efforts to remove synthetic dyes were arguing that requests to ban these ingredients were scientifically flawed. In 2023, the Consumer Brands Association, alongside two other trade groups, argued that the FDA should not ban Red 3, because the science around its health harms was unconvincing.

Kennedy has indicated that he does want to phase out titanium dioxide along with other synthetic dyes, pointing to the European ban. Titanium dioxide is listed as a food additive of concern in a report on childhood chronic disease recently released by the Trump administration’s MAHA Commission. (“HHS takes the safety of food ingredients seriously and will continue to review available evidence and expert guidance on this and other additives,” a Health and Human Services spokesperson told me in an email.) MAHA has had some victories when it comes to titanium dioxide. At the end of last year, the food giant Mars removed the chemical from Skittles. The ice-cream company Turkey Hill, which joined the dairy industry’s dye pledge, is in the process of purging its products of titanium dioxide, a spokesperson said. (The company did not respond after I asked when that transition would be complete.) A representative for PepsiCo told me that the company is phasing out titanium dioxide in the one product it sells that includes the chemical: Muscle Milk. But many more companies that are replacing other artificial food dyes have been quiet about titanium dioxide.

The food industry is reluctant to give the chemical up for a reason. It’s remarkably efficient as a food dye—nothing else comes close to its ability to turn food white. (No wonder versions of the chemical are also used in house paint.) The main replacement is calcium carbonate, also known as chalk, which is much less opaque, and so food companies would need to use much more of it to get the same whitening effect. This could not only make products more expensive, it could impact the texture and taste of the underlying food. Some companies have successfully been able to reformulate their products: Skittles look the same as they always have. “These reformulations are not easy and can sometimes take months to years to accomplish adequately,” Dave Schoneker, a food-dye consultant, told me. “This ends up being a big investment.” Not every company will have a bench of food scientists able to spend years reformulating its products.

Without titanium dioxide, consumers may just have to get used to uglier food. At one point while working on this story, I went to the grocery store and picked up two blue-cheese dressings—one with titanium dioxide and one without. The version with the additive looked like what I expected blue-cheese dressing to look like: pearly white. The other one looked a bit like grayish-green mucus.

That’s not a proposition that excites the food industry, nor is it something that companies seem to believe Americans can handle. As California prepared to become the first state to ban several food additives in 2023, titanium dioxide was removed from the legislation at the eleventh hour amid vocal opposition from food companies. Before caving to pressure, Mars had resisted calls for the company to stop using artificial dyes in sweets; instead, the company settled on doing so just in Europe, citing that it’s where “consumers have expressed this preference.” Indeed, European consumers are “okay with muted tones,” Chari Rai, the head of innovation for  North America at Oterra, a natural-color manufacturer, told me. "I think the difference in the U.S. market is they’re just so used to seeing vibrant colors.”

If the industry is correct and Kennedy cannot persuade Americans to embrace an ugly scoop of ice cream, that would signal he’s going to have an even harder time pushing Americans away from foods containing the many other ingredients that he claims, with varying degrees of evidence, are making people sick. Food dyes are just cosmetic. (Ice cream still generally tastes the same with or without titanium dioxide.) Other food additives, such as emulsifiers and low-calorie sweeteners, serve a bigger role; ultra-processed foods, which Kennedy opposes, make up a sizable portion of the American diet. MAHA still has much bigger battles to fight.


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Donald Trump wants to spend billions of dollars on a successor to President Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative, and he’s calling it “Golden Dome,” inspired by both Israel’s Iron Dome defense and Reagan’s early-1980s concept of a “peace shield” over North America. It’s a hugely ambitious project, but Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth apparently would prefer that no one talk about it.

This week, military and civilian experts are in Huntsville, Alabama, for the 2025 Space and Missile Defense Symposium, a gathering of more than 7,000 top experts, military officers, and defense-industry representatives from around the world. One might think that such a jamboree is the obvious place to cheerlead for a new American missile-defense plan. But one would be wrong: The Pentagon has barred anyone from speaking about Golden Dome in public. Instead, according to Politico, representatives of the Missile Defense Agency joined a closed meeting that was not part of, or sponsored by, the symposium.

This shyness about discussing Golden Dome is probably part of Hegeseth’s clampdown on Pentagon officials going to meetings at think tanks and attending other public symposia. Still, the choice to go silent at this meeting is strange: Golden Dome is projected to cost gobs of money, and SMDS is exactly the kind of place where the government can tell its story and get science, industry, and the military on the same page.

[Read: When Pete Hegseth’s Pentagon tenure started going sideways]

The official Pentagon announcement about why the Defense Department backed out of public meetings doesn’t offer any clues, and doesn’t even make much sense:

Golden Dome for America remains a strategic imperative for the Department of Defense. As we continue gathering information from industry, academia, national labs, and other government agencies for support to Golden Dome for America, it would be imprudent for the Department to release further information on this program during these early stages, keeping operational security of this endeavor top of mind.

Operational security? The Pentagon could in theory argue that the meeting with the Missile Defense Agency folks was held privately to thwart Russian and Chinese spies who might be lurking about the exhibition tables, but the project doesn’t even exist yet, and the closed session is only out of the public eye, not classified.

A more likely explanation is that no one is supposed to talk about Golden Dome because no one knows what it is yet. (A Lockheed Martin vice president said: “Golden Dome is the defense of our nation against all aerial and missile threats,” an unhelpful formulation that probably only means Whatever it is, it will be big and spread among multiple contractors.) If all anyone knows about Golden Dome is that it will be an expensive, all-azimuth defense against everything that flies, then the Pentagon’s reluctance to discuss it is understandable.

It’s also already a flawed concept: If Trump is indeed basing Golden Dome on Iron Dome, then he doesn’t understand the Israeli system. Iron Dome is a regional defense aimed at relatively slow-moving rockets—and not comparable to a national missile defense over the entire United States meant to stop warheads incoming at 20 times the speed of sound. The difference between the two, according to the nuclear-weapons analyst Jeffrey Lewis, is “the difference between a kayak and a battleship.” Or as the arms-control expert Joe Cirincione put it some years ago, trying to translate the success of Iron Dome’s short-range interceptions into an argument for national missile defenses is ‘‘like being good at miniature golf and thinking you can win the Masters.’’

Reagan’s SDI—or “Star Wars,” as its critics dubbed it—served its purpose at a particular time in history. I say this with a certain amount of affection for SDI, not least because one of my first jobs in Washington was working on the program. In the mid-1980s, I was hired by a defense contractor to be part of a “Red Team” of Soviet experts; we were supposed to game out how the Kremlin would react to the American development of space-based missile defenses.

The goal of SDI in those days was not to seal North America under an impenetrable missile shield. To be sure, Reagan pitched the program that way; his intention, he said in a 1983 television address, was to make nuclear missiles “impotent and obsolete.” But the instructions to our team a few years later made a lot more sense: How, we were asked, can the United States get the Soviet Union to move to a more stable world where defense, rather than instant nuclear attack, would dominate strategic thinking?

This might seem an odd question for readers who are not schooled in the arcana of nuclear strategy. But the basic problem is that long-range nuclear missiles are inherently offensive weapons. They are use-them-or-lose-them systems: They can’t hold territory, they can’t defend anything, and they are vulnerable to an enemy’s first strike. Their only purpose, should war come, is to travel far away, very fast, and destroy the most important enemy targets. In rough order of priority, these would include the enemy’s nuclear forces, command-and-control installations, and other military assets; then war-supporting industries, such as steel and energy; and then, if all else is lost, the enemy’s cities and the millions of people in them.

The inherent incentive to strike first was—and remains—dangerous and destabilizing, and SDI was supposed to add an element of uncertainty to the Soviet Union’s first-strike calculations. If their planning was disrupted by the wild card of space-based defenses against nuclear missiles, perhaps the Soviets would hesitate to go first, thus buying time for both sides.

When the Cold War ended, no one was quite sure what to do with the idea of national missile defense. President George H. W. Bush’s administration tried to repurpose SDI as “GPALS,” or “Global Protection Against Limited Strikes,” a kind of scaled-down defense against future troublemakers. Bill Clinton’s secretary of defense Les Aspin renamed and reorganized the program, and stripped out the space-based elements. Current missile-defense efforts are focused on shooting down small numbers of missiles rather than defending the entire nation from a full-on attack.

So far, shooting down one missile, to say nothing of more, is still an immensely risky proposition. Under controlled, best-case conditions, the Pentagon’s chances of successfully intercepting intercontinental ballistic missiles run at roughly 50 to 60 percent—a coin toss at best. (Regional defenses against shorter-range launches have a slightly better test record.)

Reagan planted the idea of a North American continental missile defense firmly in the American imagination. But Reagan’s people and those who came after them knew that peace shields and domes are impossible. Cities are always going to be vulnerable because of their size and exposure, especially in the United States, whose capital, along with its two largest cities, are all close to the coastline and vulnerable to the kind of close-in, submarine-launched attacks that missile defenses would be unlikely to catch in time.

[Tom Nichols: The Pentagon against the think tanks]

The value and strategic wisdom of trying to develop a national missile shield are as debatable now as they were when the efforts to create the first missile-defense systems began in the 1960s. The enemy, as the saying goes, gets a vote, and the Russians and Chinese could not only interpret a new push for national defense as provocative but choose the simple countermeasure of building more weapons to overwhelm that system. (Even the North Koreans could build enough weapons and decoys to overwhelm limited defense.) And during a crisis, American presidents—even the most cold-blooded of them—might not risk relying on a missile-defense system anyway. If the enemy seems about to attack, any commander in chief will be tempted to launch a preemptive strike (especially against a smaller nuclear power) rather than gamble on unproven defenses and take a 50–50 chance that the missiles won’t get through

“Golden Dome” probably sounded good to the president, and now no one is going to talk him out of it—especially given that the administration is willing to throw mountains of money at such a program, just as Reagan did. Hegseth can order his people not to talk about it at public gatherings, but at some point, the administration should answer the two most important questions about an expensive system that could destabilize nuclear deterrence: What is Golden Dome supposed to do, and does it have any chance of working?


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