this post was submitted on 01 Feb 2024
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SneerClub

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Hurling ordure at the TREACLES, especially those closely related to LessWrong.

AI-Industrial-Complex grift is fine as long as it sufficiently relates to the AI doom from the TREACLES. (Though TechTakes may be more suitable.)

This is sneer club, not debate club. Unless it's amusing debate.

[Especially don't debate the race scientists, if any sneak in - we ban and delete them as unsuitable for the server.]

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OpenAI blog post: https://openai.com/research/building-an-early-warning-system-for-llm-aided-biological-threat-creation

Orange discuss: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39207291

I don't have any particular section to call out. May post thoughts ~~tomorrow~~ today it's after midnight oh gosh, but wanted to post since I knew ya'll'd be interested in this.

Terrorists could use autocorrect according to OpenAI! Discuss!

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[–] Umbrias@beehaw.org 0 points 9 months ago* (last edited 9 months ago) (9 children)

The equipment and ppe for bio weapons and chemical weapons of the same health hazard is about the same. The only difference with biological weapons is you're doing stuff with fridges, incubators, agar, and petri dishes, rather than beakers, Bunsen burners, and filters.

In either case your logic is relying on a threatening actor to not have any education. Sure, the pool of candidates is lower for sophisticated say, anthrax, something you can almost trivially find in dirt, but it's also lower for sophisticated chemical weapons like say, sarin. And keep in mind, yes it's hard to do biology or chemistry, but devoted individuals do it in garages, for often innocuous reasons. You can't just assume some terrorist group will never have a strongly devoted individual or group who are competent enough to pull something off, you need to have preparedness. (In the form of local procedures, drills, and organization and plans and equipment to respond to threats as they develop, along with preventative measures)

Also make no mistake, spotting lab scale chem and biological warfare production is extremely difficult. Even moreso for biological production, but both resemble conventional labs (and could be!). Where biological becomes an issue is that lab scale production of a pathogen can self propagate in a way chem attacks or bomb attacks can't.

I'm not saying to be afraid, the barrier to entry on all weapons production is the lowest it's ever been, but sophistication in preventing them is also quite high. But it's not something that can just be brushed away, it's a real problem that real professionals are continuously solving.

[–] saucerwizard@awful.systems 5 points 9 months ago (4 children)

Have you read Barriers to Bioweapons?

[–] Umbrias@beehaw.org 2 points 9 months ago* (last edited 9 months ago) (3 children)

I have not. Is it good?

Keep in mind that it was written in 2014, the Field of bioengineering in the past ten years has advanced considerably.

[–] saucerwizard@awful.systems 3 points 9 months ago (1 children)

Yeah. It addresses your points I think.

[–] Umbrias@beehaw.org 1 points 9 months ago* (last edited 9 months ago) (1 children)

I'll have to check it out.

The general point seems to be yours, that intellectual availability is the largest restriction on bioterrorism. I don't disagree, but a big part of my argument is that access to this information has never been higher (which is better than not for a variety of reasons) and access to resources usable for this has never been higher. We have plenty of garage scale bio labs as it is. So yes, the biggest limit is availability of people with knowledge to do it, that's not a hard roadblock, at least not anymore.

And the prediction horizon on biotech is tiny. Give it another ten years? Twenty? It's not a zero threat because nobody has done it right now yet.

[–] saucerwizard@awful.systems 5 points 9 months ago

Not just intellectual availability, but the complexity of the job itself. iirc it goes into the Russian experience.

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