The problem is that the judges often use their decisions to campaign instead of simply applying the law. So they might give an unpopular criminal defendant a harsher sentence to look tough on crime or even tilt a trial against an innocent defendant. Not that doesn't happen with judges that are appointed by the executive, but it's usually not as bad.

[–] GarbageShootAlt2@lemmy.ml 6 points 1 month ago (1 children)

"usually not as bad" requires a citation, since we can point to lots of evidence of systemic injustice in sentencing as it is. example

What you are describing is a judge pursuing an agenda and/or having an unconscious bias, which is what we have already. That's the thing I keep getting with objections to voting in judges, problems that we already have presented as though they only apply to elected judges, or problems that would be demonstrably less bad with popular input.

[–] pingveno@lemmy.world 0 points 1 month ago (1 children)

Via the Brennan Center. Elected judges are more punitive and more likely to rule against defendants.

[–] GarbageShootAlt2@lemmy.ml 2 points 1 month ago

As far as I can tell, that's mostly not what the study says. What it is saying is that the event of a judicial election and the pressures associated therewith demonstrably cause systemic disadvantage to defendants and appellants near election time, but it doesn't actually address how the overall rulings of elected judges compare to appointed judges except for one study it mentions that does say, in your defense, that they [elected judges] reverse death sentences less often in the states that have the death penalty. However it goes on to say:

These studies leave open several important research questions. For example, they generally do not compare systems, and thus do not address whether some re-election or retention election systems have more of an impact on criminal justice outcomes than others, or whether reappointment processes may also have an effect.

And later says:

Much of the empirical research considering the impact of judicial selection dynamics on criminal justice outcomes has focused on elections. Further study is needed to understand the incentive structures created by appointive systems, particularly those that provide for reappointment. The few studies that have considered these dynamics suggest there may be reasons for concern.

For example, in one such study, Joanna Shepherd examined how the political preferences of those determining whether to extend a judge’s tenure impact judicial decision-making. Just as the public’s preferences may impact case outcomes within electoral systems, Shepherd found that the preferences of governors can have a similar effect in states where they play a role in reappointing judges. 92 Indeed, Shepherd determined that as governorships change hands, so too do judicial rulings; when a Republican governor replaces a Democratic governor, judges’ rulings in a variety of cases, including criminal cases, shift.93 Shepherd’s findings suggest that reselection pressures are a concern even outside the election context, and highlight the need for further inquiry into the dynamics of appointive systems.

And that's really the full extent to which it addresses the subject of appointment.