Privacy Guides
In the digital age, protecting your personal information might seem like an impossible task. We’re here to help.
This is a community for sharing news about privacy, posting information about cool privacy tools and services, and getting advice about your privacy journey.
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Additional Resources:
- EFF: Surveillance Self-Defense
- Consumer Reports Security Planner
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- r/Privacy
- Big Ass Data Broker Opt-Out List
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Can’t you use iCloud services enabling the end to end encryption?
If you do, you have to be very careful. SOME data is encrypted at rest in iCloud, not all. It doesn’t matter if it’s encrypted in transit if it’s readable on the servers. Also, while some iCloud services are encrypted remotely against your private key, other services can also be decrypted by an Apple support key.
You can go through each service to ensure it (currently) fits your privacy needs, or you can just go with the basic rule that data managed by others is not private.
Oh yeah, afaik the only services which don’t have end to end encryption are the mail, books, calendar and contacts storages. Most stuff is E2E (if you enable it)
E2E refers to data in transit: the data will be encrypted between its source and destination. It says nothing about how that data is protected once it has arrived.
E2E iCloud means a third party won’t be able to snoop on the data while you are reading from iCloud or writing to iCloud. But Apple employees can still log into your account and decrypt the data at rest on iCloud in many circumstances because the data at rest is encrypted against a key held by Apple.
A recent example of how this can go wrong was seen with Azure (which hosts some of iCloud) where a Microsoft dev key leaked and attackers were able to use it to generate a working decryption key for the US Government Azure service (a different product) and read terabytes of government data off the cloud services.
The attackers could have targeted iCloud hosting services instead of the US government and done the same thing for all data in all iCloud accounts not specifically encrypted against a personal key held only in your personal keychain.
And if you use iCloud Keychain of course, the same technique can be used to attack your keychain by pretending to be Apple Support and “recover” the contents of the keychain.
According to Apple they do not have the keys when you enable Advanced Data Protection, which is why they force you to have your own backup recovery methods (recovery key, recovery contacts). When they talk about E2E the endpoints they are referring to are user-owned devices.
iCloud Keychain recovery is also much more complex than you are describing.
Yes Apple has their iCloud key, if you live in China, the key is controlled by the Ccp, potentially dangerous for abuse from lea, highly recommend not to use Apple devices if you live there. The other problem is if they same set of keys for global users that it is possible to crack encryption for global users using the same keys, hence compromising security if one day Ccp want to access to the files of some American's phone through iCloud.
Unlike Microsoft, Apple appears to use unique regional keys for iCloud, so this risk is significantly less than it could be.
Having said that, that means that the key associated with your iCloud account will be for the region you set when you set up the account— so if you move, I believe your data is still stored in the original region and the key is for the original region.
Ok
You know some people like to hack real people's phone for fun
And some for profit. I’m not sure what this has to do with iCloud security and EEE vs EAR though.
I suppose it's easier to access the cloud storage than the phone given how secure the iPhone is and with lockdown mode, it's even harder.
@nitefox @adespoton doesn't EEE imply that decryption happens on both ends?
Yes. The ends are user devices.
@Bitrot yes, but not only your devices. The corp hosting the data for you does have access to the unencrypted data. They can log into their systems and see the unencrypted contents. EEE will parent a 3rd party from reading g your data while I'm transit, but not once it has arrived at the final destination
Potentially only your devices. If they are encrypted on device with keys that the host does not have, it is still end to end encrypted with no way for them to recover. In the case of iCloud, this is how Advanced Data Protection works and even logging into the web only grants access to a subset of data (it is literally end to end encrypted between only user devices). When ADP is not enabled, some data is recoverable by Apple and some is not (when enabled a small bit still is, such as email because they need access for it to function, but far less).