Overall, Antonescu’s Armenian policy was both inconsistent and ambiguous. While the primary focus was upon Jews, the Antonescu régime persecuted Armenians, especially the Nansen Armenians [read: stateless Armenian refugees], primarily through restrictions on employment, real estate ownership, and conduct of business—although to a lesser extent than the Jews.
As an ultranationalist government, which aimed to construct a homogenous nation‐state (and to find a scapegoat for the threats posed by the revisionist neighbours, and for the problems of comparatively low participation of ethnic Romanians in the economy), Romanian official accusations against Armenians resembled some used by Turkish nationalists a few decades earlier, namely that they were disloyal to the state in favour of that dangerous eastern neighbour, the Soviet Union/Russia, that Armenian entrepreneurs took over vital sectors of the local economy, and sabotaged Romanianization by profiting from it and collaborating with the Jews.²⁰
The apparent contradictory nature of the anti‐Armenian accusations—that they belonged to the exploiting bourgeoisie and harboured pro‐Soviet sympathies—was nothing new among [the Axis’s] Romanian leaders (as well as among […] other [Axis] leaders), who did not seemed to be bothered by the contradictions of their antisemitic/racist worldviews.
Romanianization also resembled the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP)’s and, later on, the Kemalists’ policy of creating a Muslim/Turkish bourgeoisie through the confiscation of property from Armenians and Greeks and redistribution of assets to deserving Muslim beneficiaries. Thus, CUP and Kemalist leaders tried to address the under‐representation of Muslim/Turkish and over‐representation of Christian minorities among urbanites and middle‐class entrepreneurs.²¹
However, as one of the smallest Christian minorities of [the Kingdom of] Romania—Armenians were mostly affiliated with the Gregorian and Catholic Churches—they were viewed as less threatening than the Jews and were not targeted for deportation and mass murder.²² Nonetheless, they and particularly the Nansen Armenians were swept up in the hostility towards non‐Romanians.
[…]
Antonescu’s main obsession and fear was the threat posed by the Soviet Union and communism, and any suspicion about a group’s sympathy for the USSR triggered his hostility towards that community.
This happened with certain of the Nansen Armenians. The intention of some Nansen Armenians to emigrate to Soviet Armenia—in 1940 and 1941, repatriation applications were submitted to the MAI and the Soviet Legation in Bucharest by 400 individuals (possibly 1,000 families by other sources) and a committee was formed to pursue this issue as a result of a rumour that the government would persecute them like the Jews³⁵—was interpreted by the Antonescu régime as ultimate proof of disloyalty to [the Kingdom of] Romania and of allegiance to the Soviet Union.
Romanian officials failed to understand the desire of some Armenians to escape their uncertain refugee status and live in their own republic, even if this meant relocation to a state with worrying domestic policies. The Soviet Union was nevertheless a state that promised equality to all its citizens and seemed to be the main international protector of Armenians.³⁶
The Antonescu régime ignored the fact that only a tiny minority of Armenian refugees wanted to emigrate to the Soviet Union and that native Armenians and most Nansen Armenians opposed the idea of such ‘repatriation’, publicly criticizing the organization advocating emigration.³⁷ For Antonescu it was important that, just like some Jews, especially from Bessarabia and northern Bukovina in 1940, certain Armenians wanted to live under the rule of its most threatening enemy, the Soviet Union.
While in the case of the former, their intention to return to their natal land and families took place during the war—accompanied by mass violence fostered by antisemitism, border changes, and rumours of war and domestic treason³⁸—the Armenians did not emigrate to the Soviet Union during the Antonescu régime.
In fact, as the Soviet troops approached Romania[n] borders (in late 1943 and early 1944), some wealthy Nansen Armenians planned to emigrate from [the Kingdom of] Romania to Egypt (via Turkey) in order to escape a future Soviet occupation and a [people’s republic].³⁹
Nevertheless, the mere discussion of potential emigration to the USSR and the submission of repatriation applications kept Nansen Armenians on Antonescu’s list of suspect groups under close surveillance.⁴⁰
[…]
While the régime spared Armenians from ‘too harsh and inhumane measures’ unlike […] towards the Jews, the hostility of Romanian officials towards Armenian businessmen continued.
During the 4 September 1943 government meeting, which debated various topics including the sugar industry, Ion Antonescu blamed minority tradesmen, including Armenians, for exploiting Romanian customers by selling them cheap sweets and thus making huge profits. According to Ion Antonescu, minority entrepreneurs speculated in the sugar produced from the sugar beet delivered by Romanian peasants, who received little benefit for their hard work.
Marshal I. Antonescu: The peasant cultivated sugar beet and bore all the risks and the sugar manufacturers and speculators are the ones who gain [the money]. Who are these speculators? […] They are not [ethnic] Romanians. In this way, the Romanian nation’s snag had been sucked away by certain foreigners who seized several economic fields, where they encountered little competition. There are a lot of Armenians, [insert slur here], Greeks and stinky [insert slur here] who opened sweet stores where they transform the sugar into dirty and tasteless candies […] That is why I am asking you to put this field under surveillance. All Armenians, all Greeks, the so‐called Macedonians […] are making commerce with sweets.⁵¹
As a highly urbanized and economically dynamic population, with a significant diaspora and international trade connections, Armenians were indeed over‐represented in the economy during that era. According to SSRCI’s data, Armenian entrepreneurs owned almost one per cent of [the Kingdom of] Romania’s industrial and commercial capital, while Armenians represented around 0.2 per cent of the country’s population.⁵² Armenians had an even larger share in specific economic fields, such as the textile industry (4.56 per cent) and the food industry (2.44 per cent).⁵³
[…]
Lacking ‘proper’ ethnicity, citizenship, or international protection, Nansen Armenians struggled not only with business and real estate interdictions, but also with labour restrictions.⁷¹ For instance, Cividian, a Nansen Armenian, managed to work legally only when the post‐Antonescu régime cancelled the xenophobic laws protecting ‘national labour’ even though he earned his college degree from the University of Iași in 1937.
‘I graduated from Iași [University and] in 1937 […] I was unemployed and I could not work. [Because of] the laws for the protection of national labour that functioned at that time […] We had Nansen passports […] not [real] passports, but Nansen identity cards. Therefore, we were foreigners.’⁷²
(Emphasis added in most cases. Click here for more.)
German profiteers also saw Nansen Armenians as a major economic threat to the Romanianization (or Aryanization, as they preferred to think of it) of the economy.
During the 13 February 1942 government meeting, Mihai Antonescu, the deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, agreed with German complaints about the (alleged) privileges enjoyed by their Armenian competitors and urged his subordinates to register them and keep them under surveillance. His position was backed by Titus Dragoș, the head of the main Romanianization agency, the Under‐Secretariat for Romanianization, Colonization, and Inventory (SSRCI).
M. Antonescu: Yes, there are some [businessmen] with Nansen passports. Here, the Germans are right. That means that besides the problem of [insufficient ethnic] Romanian presence in some companies, we face the issue of foreign elements, besides Jews and Germans, who infiltrated these companies […] I asked the heads of MEN [Ministry of National Economy] and SSRCI to study this problem […]
Titus Dragoș: I advised the Marshal about the bearers of Nansen passports and he recommended their expulsion. For the state, this is one of the main issues which should be immediately implemented, because [they] are the only profiteers from our [economic] life.
M. Antonescu: Please, talk to Mr Iurașcu, whom I assigned to study the problem of all Nansen passport holders […] This [Nansen Passports] Commissariat should have not been allowed in Romania […] The MAE in collaboration with Siguranța [the Secret Police] should present us a statistic of all Nansen passport holders in our country. Together with MEN, Mr Dragoș, you should indicate in the table the activity of every such Nansen passport holder.⁴⁷
Antonescu and Dragoș exaggerated the rôle of the Armenian businessmen. The Armenian refugees were not the only or the main profiteers of [the Kingdom of] Romania’s economy in the context of the antisemitic Romanianization process. In reality, as recent studies on Romanianization by Jean Ancel, myself, and Vladimir Solonari have shown, even though some Armenians did profit from Romanianization, ethnic Romanians and Germans were the main beneficiaries of the dispossession of the Jews.⁴⁸
(Emphasis original.)
Somebody might think that the discrimination against Armenian businessmen was evidence of anticapitalism, but that would be a shallow conclusion. The goal of harassing Armenian capitalists was not to reduce capital, the law of value, or generalised commodity production, but to reduce competition, something that capitalists loathe, and thereby secure Romanian businesses.
Click here for other events that happened today (August 26):
1900: Hellmuth Walter, an engineer for the Axis, was born.
1901: Hans Kammler, Axis SS officer and engineer, burdened the planet with his existence.
1936: Santander fell to the Spanish fascists, dissolving the Republican Interprovincial Council. Meanwhile, Vienna signed in Berlin the Agreement regarding Passport Facilities to be granted in Minor Frontier Traffic, with Annex.
1940: With clear weather, the Fascists launched three major raids. At 1200 hours, 150 aircraft flew over the Strait of Dover from Calais in France; № 616 Squadron’s Spitfire fighters of RAF Kenley and № 264 Squadron’s Defiant fighters were attacked and devastated by escorting Bf 109 fighters; the Fascist bombers split up after reaching Britain and bombed RAF Biggin Hill, RAF Kenley, and various towns in Kent. At 1500 hours, 170 Fascist aircraft flew up the Thames estuary, but most were turned back by British fighters; six Do 17 bombers made it through the fighter defense and bombed RAF Debden, causing heavy damage. At 1600 hours, 55 Fascist bombers of KG55 escorted by about 100 fighters attacked Portsmouth, but the group was repulsed by five № 11 Group and three № 10 Group squadrons. In total, the Luftwaffe lost 22 bombers and 24 fighters. While the machine losses were heavy for both sides, the RAF only lost six airmen, while most of the downed Fascist crews suffered either death or capture.
Aside from that, Fascist torpedo bombers attacked two British ships east of Kinnaird Head, Fascist submarine Dandolo sank British steamer Ilvington Court in the Atlantic Ocean, slaughtering eight, and Berlin ordered the transfer of ten infantry divisions together with two armored divisions from France to Poland. (To avoid Soviet suspicion, it made plans to make this transfer appear as if these fresher troops were coming in to relieve older men who were going to be released back into the work force.) Lastly, Fascist armed merchant cruiser Pinguin’s seaplane attacked Norwegian tanker Filefjell off Madagascar at 1748 hours. Pinguin soon arrived to capture the ship which was carrying 10,000 tons of gasoline and 500 tons of oil.
1941: Axis submarine U‐571 seriously damaged Soviet submarine supply ship Marija Uljanova with two torpedoes north of Teriberskij lighthouse in northern Russia in the Barents Sea at 0459 hours, then the Armeegruppe Nord surrounded and destroyed Soviet forces in Velikije Luki as Adolf Schicklgruber and Benito Mussolini inspected Axis troops at Uman, Ukraine. Additionally, the Hungarian Army rounded up eighteen thousand Jews at Kamenets‐Podolsk, Ukraine.
1942: At Chortkiv, the collaborationist police and the Schutzpolizei deported two thousand Jews to Bełżec extermination camp, and the Axis massacred five hundred of the sick and children on the spot. This continued until the next day. Likewise, the Axis arrested 7,000 Jews arrested in Vichy, and Japanese Special Naval Landing Force troops that had landed at Waga Waga late on the previous day began making contact with positions held by troops of Australian 25th Infantry Militia Battalion and 61st Infantry Militia Battalion. Behind them, Allied aircraft discovered the Waga Waga landing site and destroyed landing barges and other equipment. Axis warships entered Milne Bay for support. Inland, 2,500 Axis troops marched onto the Kokoda Track from Buna, along with a mountain gun and several mortars.
1943: Albert Speer called a meeting with Hans Kammler, Walter Dornberger, Gerhard Degenkolb, and Karl Otto Saur to negotiate the move of V‐2 (A‐4) rocket main production from Peenemünde Army Research Center on the Baltic Sea coast to an underground factory in the Harz mountains deeper inland.
1944: Berlin ordered its troops to withdraw from Greece, and an Axis air raid on Paris, France destroyed several residential neighborhoods. Apart from that, Axis forces led by Lieutenant General Reiner Stahel attacked Bucharest.
1945: Vice Admiral Sadayoshi Yamada was named the commanding officer of the Japanese Navy 3rd Air Fleet, with Captain Chihaya Takahashi as his chief of staff. Meanwhile, I‐400 and I‐401 both dumped all of their ammunition and Seiran aircraft overboard according to orders.
1974: Junio Valerio Borghese, Axis commander, in Cádiz, Spain.