Every summer, there is a brief window—call it August—when the produce is exquisite. The cherries are at their best, as are the peaches, plums, and nectarines. The watermelon is sweet. The eggplants are glossy. The corn is pristine. And the tomatoes! The tomatoes are unparalleled. There’s a reason tomatoes are synonymous with summer, staple of home gardens and farmers’ markets alike. Giant, honking beefsteaks and sprightly Sungolds are begging to be transformed into salads and gazpachos, tossed with pasta and sliced into sandwiches, or eaten raw by the fistful. Enjoy them while you can.

Come fall, tomato season will be over just as quickly as it began. Yes, you can obtain sliceable red orbs in virtually any supermarket, at any time of year, anywhere in the United States. But they are pale imitations of dripping August heirlooms. Out-of-season tomatoes—notoriously pale, mealy, and bland—tend to be tomatoes in name only. They can be serviceable, dutifully filling out a Greek salad; they can valiantly garnish a taco and add heft to a grilled-cheese sandwich. At the very least, they contribute general wetness and a sense of virtue to a meal. Flavor? Not so much.

This year, of all years, it’s worth indulging in the bounties of high tomato season. The bloodless tomatoes waiting for us in the fall are mostly imported from Mexico, and as with so many other goods these days, they are now stuck in the middle of President Donald Trump’s trade war. This week, the White House imposed 17 percent tariffs on Mexican tomatoes. In all likelihood, that will mean higher prices for grocery-store tomatoes, Tim Richards, an agricultural economist at Arizona State University, told me. This will not make them better in terms of color, texture, or flavor—but it will make them cost more.

[Read: America has never been so desperate for tomato season]

Grumbling about grim winter tomatoes is a long-standing national hobby, and at the same time, their existence is a small miracle. You can eat a BLT in the snow or a Caprese salad for Valentine’s Day with no effort at all. In August 1943, before Americans could get fresh tomatoes year-round, New York City Mayor Fiorello La Guardia encouraged housewives to brace for winter by canning as many tomatoes as they could. “They are in your city’s markets and I want to see every woman can them while they are at this low price,” he announced. They wouldn’t have to do it for long. By the 1960s, “just about every supermarket and corner store in America was selling Florida tomatoes from October to June,” the author William Alexander wrote in Ten Tomatoes That Changed the World. They were visually perfect but tasted like Styrofoam, which is in many ways what they were supposed to be: durable, pest-resistant, long-lasting, and cheap. Tomatoes are famously fragile and quick to rot, so they are often picked while still green, and then gassed with ethylene. It turns them red, giving the appearance of ripeness but not the corresponding flavor. In recent years, the situation has somewhat improved: Instead of focusing exclusively on looks and durability, horticulturalists have turned their attention to maximizing flavor.

There is another reason year-round tomatoes have improved: Mexico. “Most of the nice-looking, really tasty tomatoes in the market are Mexican,” Richards said. That includes small varieties such as cherry tomatoes, grape tomatoes, and cocktail tomatoes, or, as he classified them, “those little snacking tomatoes in the plastic things.” Mexico manages to produce this steady stream of year-round, pretty-good tomatoes by growing them primarily in greenhouses, which Richards said is the best possible way to produce North American tomatoes at scale. Even in winter, tomatoes sheltered from the elements can be left to ripen on the vine, which helps improve the taste.

All of which is to say that an America without easy access to imported Mexican tomatoes looks bleak. Like all of Trump’s tariffs, the point of taxing Mexican tomatoes is to help producers here in the U.S. Thirty years ago, 80 percent of the country’s fresh tomatoes were grown in America. Now the share is more like 30 percent, and sliding. America could produce enough tomatoes to stock grocery stores year-round—Florida still grows a lot of them—but doing that just doesn’t make a lot of sense. “It’s not cost-effective,” Luis Ribera, an agricultural economist at Texas A&M University, told me. “We cannot supply year-round tomatoes at the prices that we have.” Unlike Mexico, Florida mainly grows its tomatoes outside, despite the fact that it is ill-suited to outdoor tomato growing in pretty much all ways: The soil is inhospitable. The humidity is an incubator for disease. There are regular hurricanes. “From a purely botanical and horticultural perspective,” the food journalist Barry Estabrook wrote in Tomatoland, “you would have to be an idiot to attempt to commercially grow tomatoes in a place like Florida.”

[Read: Who invented the cherry tomato?]

Exactly what the tariffs will mean for grocery prices is hard to say. Tomatoes will be taxed when they cross the border, so importers and distributors will directly pay the costs. But eventually, the increase will likely trickle down to the supermarket. The story of tariffs, Ribera said, is that “the lion’s share is paid by consumers.” In the short term, Richards estimated that price hikes will depend a lot on the variety of tomato, with romas hardest hit. “That’s the one we rely on most from Mexico,” he said. Beefsteaks, he added, will face a smaller increase.

Compared with some of the other drastic tariffs that Trump imposed, a 17 percent price bump on Mexican tomatoes hardly portends the tomato-pocalypse. Last year, the average import price of Mexican tomatoes was about 74 cents a pound. If the entire 17 percent increase is passed on to consumers, we’d be looking at an additional 13 cents—enough to notice, but not enough for a critical mass of people to forgo romas altogether. Here’s the other thing: People want tomatoes, and they want them now. “We don’t want to wait for things to be in season,” Ribera said, and we aren’t about to start.

For all of the many problems with out-of-season tomatoes, Americans keep eating them. It was true when winter tomatoes were a novelty: “I don’t know why housewives feel they have to have tomatoes,” one baffled supplier told The New York Times in 1954. But they did, and people still do. Season to season, our national tomato consumption fluctuates relatively little, the grocery-industry analyst Phil Lempert told me. Every burger joint in America needs tomatoes—not the best tomatoes, but tomatoes that exist. There is a whole genre of recipes about how to make the most of out-of-season tomatoes. A lesser tomato, of course, is better than no tomato at all.

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From The Atlantic via this RSS feed

For decades, countries around the world have held up the United States’s rigorous approach to vaccine policy as a global ideal. But in Robert F. Kennedy Jr.’s Department of Health and Human Services, many of the officials responsible for vaccine policy disagree. For the best immunization policy, they argue, the U.S. should look to Europe.

Marty Makary, the new FDA commissioner, and Vinay Prasad, the new head of the agency’s center for regulating vaccines, have criticized the nation’s COVID-19-vaccine policy for recommending the shots more broadly than many European countries do. Tracy Beth Høeg, a new adviser at the FDA, has frequently compared the U.S.’s childhood vaccination schedule unfavorably with the more pared-down one in Denmark, and advocated for “stopping unnecessary vaccines.” (Prasad, citing Høeg, has made the same points.) And the new chair of the CDC’s Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices, Martin Kulldorff—whom Kennedy handpicked to serve on the panel, after dismissing its entire previous roster—announced in June that ACIP would be scrutinizing the current U.S. immunization schedule because it exceeds “what children in most other developed nations receive.”

This group has argued that the trimness of many European schedules—especially Denmark’s—implies that the benefits of the U.S.’s roster of shots may not outweigh the risks, even though experts discussed and debated exactly that question when devising the guidance. But broadly speaking, the reasons behind the discrepancies they’re referencing “have nothing to do with safety,” David Salisbury, the former director of immunization of the U.K.’s Department of Health, told me. Rather, they’re driven by the factors that shape any national policy: demographics, budget, the nature of local threats. Every country has a slightly different approach to vaccination because every country is different, Rebecca Grais, the executive director of the Pasteur Network and a member of the WHO’s immunization-advisory group, told me.

One of the most important considerations for a country’s approach to vaccines is also one of the most obvious: which diseases its people need to be protected from. The U.S., for instance, recommends the hepatitis A vaccine for babies because cases of the contagious liver disease continue to be more common here than in many other high-income countries. And conversely, this country doesn’t recommend some vaccine doses that other nations do. The U.K., for example, routinely vaccinates against meningococcal disease far earlier, and with more overall shots, than the U.S. does—starting in infancy, rather than in adolescence—because meningitis rates have been higher there for years. Using that same logic, countries have also modified prior recommendations based on emerging evidence—including, for instance, swapping the oral polio vaccine for the safer inactivated polio vaccine in the year 2000.

Vaccines are expensive, and countries with publicly funded insurance consider those costs differently than the U.S. does. Under U.K. law, for instance, the National Health Service must cover any vaccine that has been officially recommended for use by its Joint Committee on Vaccination and Immunisation, or JCVI—essentially, its ACIP. So that committee weights the cost effectiveness of a vaccine more heavily and more explicitly than ACIP does, and will recommend only a product that meets a certain threshold, Mark Jit, an epidemiologist at NYU, who previously worked at the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, told me. Price also influences what vaccines are ultimately available. In 2023, JCVI recommended (as ACIP has) two options for protecting babies against RSV; unlike in the U.S., though, the NHS bought only one of them from manufacturers, presumably “because the price they gave the government was cheaper,” Andrew Pollard, the director of the Oxford Vaccine Group, the current JCVI chair, and a former member of the World Health Organization’s advisory group on immunizations, told me. (The prices that the U.K. government pays for vaccines are generally confidential.)

[Read: The neo-anti-vaxxers are in power now]

The nature of a country’s health-care system can influence vaccine policy in other ways too. In the U.S. system of private health care, health-equity gaps are massive, and access to care is uneven, even for one person across their lifetime. Many Americans bounce from health-care provider to provider—if they are engaged with the medical system at all—and must navigate the coverage quirks of their insurer. In this environment, a more comprehensive vaccination strategy is, essentially, plugging up a very porous safety net. Broad, simple recommendations for vaccines help ensure that a minimal number of high-risk people slip through. “We’re trying to close gaps we couldn’t close in any other way,” Grace Lee, a pediatrician and a former chair of ACIP, told me.

The U.S. strategy has worked reasonably well for the U.S*.* Universal flu-vaccine recommendations (not common in Europe) lower the burden of respiratory disease in the winter, including for health-care workers. Hepatitis B vaccines for every newborn (rather than, like in many European countries, for only high-risk ones) help ensure that infants are protected even if their mother misses an opportunity to test for the virus. More generally, broad recommendations for vaccination can also mitigate the impacts of outbreaks in a country where obesity, heart disease, and diabetes—all chronic conditions that can exacerbate a course of infectious illness—affect large swaths of the population. American vaccine experts also emphasize the importance of the community-wide benefits of shots, which can reduce transmission from children to elderly grandparents or decrease the amount of time that parents have to take off of work. Those considerations carry far more weight for many public-health experts and policy makers in a country with patchy insurance coverage and inconsistent paid sick leave.

The current leadership of HHS thinks differently: Kennedy, in particular, has emphasized individual choice about vaccines over community benefit. And some officials believe that a better childhood immunization schedule would have fewer shots on it, and more closely resemble Denmark’s, notably one of the most minimalist among high-income countries. Whereas the U.S. vaccination schedule guards against 18 diseases, Denmark’s targets just 10—the ones that the nation’s health authorities have deemed the most severe and life-threatening, Anders Hviid, an epidemiologist at Statens Serum Institut, in Copenhagen, told me. All vaccines in Denmark are also voluntary.

But “I don’t think it’s fair to look at Denmark and say, ‘Look how they’re doing it, that should be a model for our country,’” Hviid told me. “You cannot compare the Danish situation and health-care system to the situation in the U.S.”

Denmark, like the U.K., relies on publicly funded health care. The small, wealthy country also has relatively narrow gaps in socioeconomic status, and maintains extremely equitable access to care. The national attitude toward federal authorities also includes a high degree of confidence, Hviid told me. Even with fully voluntary vaccination, the country has consistently maintained high rates of vaccine uptake, comparable with rates in the U.S., where public schools require shots. And even those factors don’t necessarily add up to a minimalist schedule: Other Nordic countries with similar characteristics vaccinate their children more often, against more diseases.

At least some of Kennedy’s allies seem to have been influenced not just by Denmark’s more limited vaccine schedule but specifically by the work of Christine Stabell Benn, a researcher at the University of Southern Denmark, who has dedicated much of her career to studying vaccine side effects. Like Kennedy and many of his allies, Benn is skeptical of the benefits of vaccination: “It’s not very clear that the more vaccines you get, the healthier you are,” she told me. Along with Kulldorff, Høeg, and National Institutes of Health Director Jay Bhattacharya, Benn served on a committee convened in 2022 by Florida Governor Ron DeSantis that cast COVID-19 vaccines as poorly vetted and risky. She and Høeg have appeared together on podcasts and co-written blogs about vaccine safety; Kulldroff also recently cited her work in an op-ed that praised one Danish approach to multidose vaccines, noting that evaluating that evidence “may or may not lead to a change in the CDC-recommended vaccine schedule.” When justifying his cuts to Gavi—the world’s largest immunization program—Kennedy referenced a controversial and widely criticized 2017 study co-authored by Benn and her husband, Peter Aaby, an anthropologist, that claimed that a diphtheria, tetanus, and pertussis vaccine was increasing mortality among children in Guinea-Bissau. (Benn wrote on LinkedIn that cutting Gavi funding “may have major negative impact on overall child survival,” but also noted that “it is reasonable to request that WHO and GAVI consider the best science available.”)

[Read: The U.S. is going backwards on vaccines, very fast]

Several of the researchers I spoke with described Benn, with varying degrees of politeness, as a contrarian who has cherry-picked evidence, relied on shaky data, and conducted biased studies. Her research scrutinizing vaccine side effects—arguing, for instance, that vaccines not made from live microbes can come with substantial detriments—has been contradicted by other studies, spanning years of research and scientific consensus. (In a 2019 TEDx talk, she acknowledged that other vaccine researchers have disagreed with her findings, and expressed frustration over her difficulties publicizing them.) When we spoke, Benn argued that the U.S. would be the ideal venue for an experiment in which different regions of the country were randomly assigned to different immunization schedules to test their relative merits—a proposal that Prasad has floated as well, and that several researchers have criticized as unethical. Benn said she would prefer to see it done in a country that would withdraw vaccines that had previously been recommended, rather than add new ones. In a later email, she defended her work and described herself as “a strong advocate for evidence-based vaccination policies,” adding that “it is strange if that is perceived as controversial.”

When I asked her whether anyone currently at HHS, or affiliated with it, had consulted her or her work to make vaccine decisions, she declined to answer. Kulldorff wrote in an email that “Christine Stabell Benn is one of the world’s leading vaccine scientists” but did not answer my questions about Benn’s involvement in shaping his recommendations. HHS did not respond to a request for comment.

What unites Benn with Robert F. Kennedy Jr. and his top officials is that, across their statements, they suggest that the U.S. is pushing too many vaccines on its children. But the question of whether or not the U.S. may be “overvaccinating” is the wrong one to ask, Jake Scott, an infectious-disease physician at Stanford, told me. Rather, Scott said, the more important question is: “Given our specific disease burden and public-health goals, are we effectively protecting the most vulnerable people? Based on overwhelming evidence? The answer is yes.”

[Read: RFK Jr. is barely even pretending anymore]

That’s not to say that the U.S. schedule should never change, or that what one country learns about a vaccine should not inform another’s choices. Data have accumulated—including from a large clinical trial in Costa Rica—to suggest that the HPV vaccine, for instance, may be powerful enough that only a single dose, rather than two, is necessary to confer decades of protection. (Based on that growing evidence, the prior roster of ACIP was considering recommending fewer HPV doses.) But largely, “I’m not sure if there’s a lot in the U.S. schedule to complain about,” Pollard, the JCVI chair, told me. On the contrary, other nations have taken plenty of their cues from America: The U.K., for instance, is expected to add the chickenpox shot to its list of recommended vaccines by early next year, Pollard told me, based in part on reassuring data from the U.S. that the benefits outweigh the risks. The U.S. does recommend more shots than many other countries do. But the U.S. regimen also, by definition, guards against more diseases than those of many other countries do—making it a standout course of protection, unparalleled elsewhere.

*Illustration by Jonelle Afurong / The Atlantic. Source: Aleksandr Zubkov / Getty; Anna Efetova / Getty; Smith Collection / Gado / Getty; BBC Archive / Getty; Child and Adolescent Immunization Schedule by Age / CDC

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From The Atlantic via this RSS feed

1950–73: “Don’t Stare”

There was ambivalence about performers in my family. Part of this was caused by middle-class-Negro hypervigilance about drawing attention, especially bad attention. I still get nervous when children are out of control in public. Growing up in 1960s Baltimore, my siblings and I did not dare be out of control in public. In our wildest dreams we could not have imagined a meltdown in, say, Hutzler’s department store, where colored people were not allowed to try on clothes, or to return items that didn’t work out. When my aunt Esther and I went shopping, she’d throw me her sit-up-straight eye. As Baltimore began to be less segregated, she went to exceptionally fancy stores. I remember sitting in a chic, hushed fur salon, straining not to do anything that would draw attention to myself as she tried on a mink stole.

My inhibitions weren’t only about race; they were also about sin. My maternal grandmother was a Billy Graham–loving evangelical Christian. Grandma’s effect was far-reaching. We lived all the way across town, and my parents were not evangelical. Yet we were not allowed to dance on Sunday.

 I learned very early that one of my behaviors was unacceptable: staring. “Don’t stare.” “Close your mouth.” Staring was impolite. I should especially refrain from staring at white people. Stop looking at them. They are not interested in you. Why are you so interested in them? But I couldn’t help myself: I stared at everyone, of every color, especially everyone who was different from me in some way.

But Grandma was also interested in white people. She arranged for my brother Deaver and me to attend a Christian camp in Pennsylvania, where I believe we were the only colored children. Deaver, then 6, had blue eyes and light-tan hair. As we packed for camp, family and friends made much of the fact that people would probably not really know that Deaver was a little colored boy. He’d be okay. They said less about how I would fare. But it turned out all right. I have no bad memories, except for the one about the white girl who tried to wash my hair. The result was, as we Black women say, “hair all over my head,” and my mother was beside herself about this when she came to pick me up.

And yet Grandma’s preoccupation with sin didn’t keep her from being crazy about Sweetheart, who in many ways was transgressive. Grandma and Sweetheart were about the same age. They had grown up like sisters, though Sweetheart was actually Grandma’s niece. Sweetheart had left Baltimore in her 20s, gone to New York, passed as “Spanish,” become a chorus girl, and was “kept” (by a man). She left her daughter with Grandma, who already had eight children of her own. Sweetheart then moved to that faraway place with movie stars and Disneyland—California. She was gorgeous, charming, and funny. She sparkled. When she periodically returned to Baltimore, in fur coats and always with a different boyfriend, she was received like royalty. I never said more than the required “Hello, Auntie” before vanishing into another room. I was intimidated by her glamour.

But when I found myself in San Francisco in the early 1970s, I sought her out. I’d left Baltimore in September 1971 with $80 and an overnight bag, looking for the revolution. The revolution was finished on the East Coast, but embers of it still glowed out West. I made my way up the coast from San Diego, stopping in Belmont, California, then a humdrum town not far from the airport where single stewardesses and the like lived in flat apartment buildings with tiny swimming pools. I worked for a year at a drive-in movie theater until I landed a job coordinating tutors at a junior college. My boss and his wife were Black, proud, and beautiful. They looked like they’d stepped out of a Hollywood movie. As activists who’d participated in the upheaval at Berkeley, they emanated late-’60s glamour. Dave never sat behind his desk, choosing instead to perch on a counter, puffing on a cigarillo, musing philosophically or railing against injustice. Jazz played in the background. The point of everything, he told me, was to change the world! He had a plan for me: “You need to get your Ph.D.!” In what? “Education!” I continued north to San Francisco.

I was on a lark, with no place to live, and no real plan, but San Francisco was a lot more alive than Belmont. It was enchanting! The bay, the fog, the chill, the cable cars! I felt inspired—but to do what, I had no idea. I tried to get a job volunteering as a stage manager at a theater in town, only to learn that it was a union house. But I saw that they offered acting classes, so I decided to try one, just for fun. I auditioned and somehow was accepted. I hadn’t realized the place was a serious conservatory—turned out I’d have to go to school all day.

Sweetheart and Eddie, her third or fourth husband, picked me up at the Greyhound station. Eddie, Chinese American, was a former chef who spoiled us nightly with delicious meals. His English appeared to be minimal, but it was hard to tell, because Auntie, now 80, and still sparkling, was a nonstop raconteur. The tenant in Auntie’s basement apartment had just left, so I took it, for $75 a month.

I was the least likely person to wind up in a conservatory to study acting. I had no idea that people actually “studied” acting in the way that was unfolding in front of me. My classmates pirouetted down the hallways of the school. They sang Broadway tunes as they strode up and down the hills of San Francisco.

[From the March 2024 issue: How a playwright became one of the most incisive social critics of our time]

One evening when I came home from acting class, Sweetheart handed me a letter from Grandma, who by then had been overtaken by dementia. “I hear you want to become an actress,” she had written in a messy scrawl. “Please don’t take off your clothes. Here’s five dollars, buy yourself a new dress. Love, Grandma.” Grandma’s effect was still far-reaching. Part of me wondered if what I was doing was sinful. I put the $5 in my pocket, and taped the letter inside my journal.

If I was the least likely person to end up at that conservatory, the most likely person was a tall woman with a Philadelphia Main Line accent and vocal resonance. She looked like Katharine Hepburn. Everything she did had a sense of urgency. One night she rushed into the café where we’d planned to have a cheap dinner and said: “Beethoven’s Ninth starts in a few minutes at the cathedral! Let’s go.” We bolted the five blocks to Grace Cathedral, on Nob Hill. After only the first two words of “Ode to Joy”—O Freunde—my perpetual sense of non-belongingness was transformed into a sense of oneness. I was one with the chorus. I was one with the music. I was one with it all.

The next morning, my forehead was on fire. “Can a performance give you the flu?” I asked our yoga teacher. She assured me that all was well. I had no disease. My chakras were opening and Beethoven was the cause.

1976: “You Don’t Look Like Anything”

The acting class turned into a three-year commitment at the American Conservatory Theater, where I completed an M.F.A. in acting. When you finished conservatory and hit the road, your first stop was an agent’s office. I walked into the office of an agent who had a deal to meet the few of us who knew nothing about the business. I’d barely sat down on the couch when she stated perfunctorily: “I won’t be able to send you out.” Long pause. “You will antagonize my clients.”

“Antagonize?”

“You don’t look like anything.” Another long pause. “Will you go as Black or white?”

This is when I finally got it, about the staring. Stop looking at them. Why are you so interested in them? They are not interested in you.

About 20 years ago, I met a bull rider from Shoshone, Idaho, named Brent Williams. Here’s a photo of him, by the great photographer Diana Walker.

Diana Walker

We was in West Jordan, Utah. And I had this bull shove my face right into the metal chutes. Some buddies drove me to the hospital. Took, like, five hours to sew me up. When they straightened my nose, I had to be at a rodeo that night. I didn’t really wanna go under the anesthesia, or however you say that word. So I told ’em just to do it without it. They shove these two rods up your nose, and work their way up, and that straightens your nose all up. Felt like they was shoving it clear through my brains and it was gonna come out the top of my head. And everyone that saw it, they said it should have killed me.

Shove my face right into the metal chutes: Over the past two decades, I’ve said those words thousands of times. But it wasn’t until a few months ago that Brent’s words knocked on the door of my subconscious and released a memory into full consciousness:

“You don’t look like anything.” Long pause. “Will you go as Black or white?”

A Shoshone bull rider gave me the words to express what I’d felt on that agent’s couch. The casting couch holds many different kinds of offenses.

1977: New Rhythms, New Intentions

A simple A-frame building with a huge wraparound porch in the Sierras near Lake Tahoe, California, was the headquarters of the Squaw Valley Community of Writers, a week-long conference where wannabe writers like me enjoyed tutorials with big shots: poets, novelists, screenwriters, directors.

The place was peppered with East Coast literati, but the vibe wasn’t as pretentious as a certain East Coast theater workshop I’d attended where one of the directors walked around with a cigarette holder and a coat over his shoulders. No need to genuflect to Frank Pierson, who’d won the Best Screenplay Oscar for Dog Day Afternoon and been nominated for another, for Cool Hand Luke. No hush fell when Sam Shepard ambled into the beat-up saloon, and made his way to the pool table.

I was in the hang on the wraparound porch when a car full of poet-teachers crossed the field and stopped in front of us. A rail-thin poet-teacher stepped out. He looked like a monk who’d been on a month-long fast. The guy had presence.

He gave a public reading. I sat in the front row—nothing between us but a music stand. One of his poems was quite brief but, like Beethoven’s “Ode,” it caused a physical reaction. The next morning, all my muscles were sore, as if I’d just done a massive full-body workout or been beat up. Or was it the flu?

At the welcome cocktail party that night, I walked right up to the poet and told him that I’d woken up with aching muscles and that I thought his poem was the cause. His face lit up. “That’s because I wrote that poem as a curse against my ex-wife.” he stated.

The power of language comes from its intention. “Ode to Joy,” with lyrics from Friedrich Schiller’s poem, had been full of good intentions. The poet’s poem was full of bad intentions. His poem was written to make somebody feel some pain. As I developed my own artistic approach in the years to come, I never forgot this.

1979: Gatekeepers and “Hostile Circumstances”

I’m in my fifth-floor walk-up in New York City. I’m living gig by gig now because I chose to leave a very fine tenure-track position at an excellent university for the sake of my “art.” Freed from the demands of being junior faculty, I walk dogs. I work as a temp in a JCPenney basement office. I work in the complaint department at KLM Airlines. (The complaint department was crucial to my development as a dramatist. Those letters of complaint were filled with drama and emotion.)

One Sunday morning I hear two unusual voices coming out of the radio. By now my study of people’s speech and its effect has become for me a lifelong project. Drawn to the rhythmic differences in their vocal patterns, I grab a tape recorder and press “Record.” Turns out, the interview had originally taken place in 1959. This is a five-minute extract of a 20-minute conversation.

Mike Wallace: Our guest was an unknown, unpublished writer until early this year, when her play A Raisin in the Sun came to Broadway. And was voted by the New York Drama Critics as the best play of the year. Better even than plays by Tennessee Williams, Archibald MacLeish, and Eugene O’Neill.

And now to our story. One night, Lorraine Hansberry, a girl who had dabbled in writing, made a brash announcement to her husband. She was going to sit down and write an honest and accurate drama about Negroes.

John Chapman, the drama critic for the New York Daily News, wrote that he has great respect for your play, but he feels that part of the acclaim may be a sentimental reaction—an admirable “gesture,” I think is the way that he put it—to the fact that you are a Negro, and one of the few Negroes ever to have written a good Broadway play.

Lorraine Hansberry: I’ve heard this alluded to in other ways—I didn’t see Mr. Chapman’s piece. I would imagine that if I were given the award because they wanted to give it to a Negro, it’d be the first time in the history of this country that anyone had ever been given anything for being a Negro. I don’t think it’s a very complimentary assessment of an honest piece of a work. Or of his colleagues’ intent.

Wallace: Well, let me quote him. He said, “If one sets aside the one unusual fact that it is a Negro work, A Raisin in the Sun becomes no more than a solid and enjoyable commercial play.”

Hansberry: Well, I’ve heard this said, too. I don’t know quite what people mean. If they are trying honestly to analyze a play, dramaturgically, there’s no such assessment; you can’t say that if you take away the American character of something then it just becomes, you know, something else … The Negro character of these people is intrinsic to the play; it’s important to it. If it’s a good play, it’s good with that.

Wallace: Is it fair to say that even in proportion, very few Negroes have distinguished themselves … as playwrights, novelists, and poets? … How come?

Hansberry: Whether they’ve distinguished themselves is kind of difficult to discuss because we always have to keep in mind the circumstances and the framework that Negroes do anything in America—which of course is a hostile circumstance. We’ve been writing poetry since, you know, the 17th century in this country, been writing plays that simply never see the light of day, because the circumstance, as I say, is hostile.

Wallce: But the same is not true in the case of Negro athletes, Negro entertainers.

Hansberry: Yes, well—

Wallace: I think in proportion there are more of them who become hugely successful.

Hansberry: Yes, of course, because one of the features of American racism is that it has a particular place where it allows Negroes to express themselves! We’re not very warm to the idea of Negro intellectual exploration of any kind in this country. We presume, or at least the racists do—not me—that it’s all right to display physical or musical or other features like that, but don’t go writing and don’t go trying to suggest that anything cerebral is within our sphere, you see … There’re any number of professional playwrights who simply don’t get their scripts read by Broadway producers. So I’d be the last person to say that it’s because they write poorly. An awful lot of poor scripts get to Broadway and, uh, I don’t think that’s the reason why theirs don’t.

Wallace: What is the reason why theirs don’t?

Hansberry: Racial discrimination in the industry, of course.

[Daniel Pollack-Pelzner: The theater world has never understood Lorraine Hansberry]

The relationship between the gatekeepers and those of us who do not fit their picture depends on, to use Miss Hansberry’s word, circumstances. In 1993, 34 years after that recording was made, Toni Morrison would win the Nobel Prize. This would change how Black-women writers and intellectuals are regarded, and significantly open up opportunities for them. It did for me.

1979: Chasing That Which Is Not Me

While still at acting school, I’d sought new dramatic forms. At that time, the American playwrights who were getting their work produced were white heterosexual-presenting males. Like others across the country, but not so many at my conservatory, I thought that our art form could benefit from fewer stereotypes, and from greater particularity, more physical details in characters who lived on our stages. I also thought the sonic life of the theater could use new rhythms, new intentions—like when bebop emerged on the jazz scene.

I drew inspiration from something my grandfather used to say when we were kids: “If you say a word often enough, it becomes you.” In 1979, I set out with a tape recorder to record unique voices, unique stories, with the intention of becoming American word for word. My tape recorder was soon an appendage.

I would interview people around the country, especially in moments of disruption and discord. It was in those moments that people spoke in sometimes-profound ways—as they tried to make sense out of disarray, tried to put together the exploded fragments of assumptions that follow catastrophe.

This required chasing that which is not me. It was a chase that would never end. I called the overall project, which now includes about 18 plays (the first 12 never made it to major stages), “On the Road: A Search for American Character.” It meant embodying the words of people who were very different from me and with whom I did not agree, and absorbing them into my heart.

What have I learned after interviewing thousands of Americans? Most do believe “you can make it if you try.” Even rebellion is a sign of belief in that credo. Why protest for fairness, equality, and dignity if you don’t think those things can exist?

The Martinican poet and philosopher Édouard Glissant, a close comrade of Frantz Fanon, left revolution behind in favor of what he called the “poetics of relation.”

“Sometimes,” Glissant wrote, “by taking up the problems of the Other, it is possible to find oneself.”

The not-me and the me are related. In my work, my goal was to get to us.

April 12, 2015: “Just a Glance”

Freddie Gray is arrested and beaten. He dies in police custody. The beating is filmed. Riots explode in Baltimore. I interview the man who took the video, Kevin Moore:

The screams was what woke me outta my sleep. So I jumped up and threw some clothes on and went out to see what was going on. And then I came out that way, and I’m like, “Holy shit!”

They had him all bent up and he was handcuffed and, like, face down on his stomach. But they had the heels of his feet,like, almost in his back? And he was handcuffed at the time. And they had the knee in the neck, and that pretty much explains the three cracked vertebrae and crushed larynx, 80 percent of his spinal cord being severed and stuff. And then when they picked him up, I had to zoom in to get a closer look at his face. You could see the pain in his face.

On Mount Street, [they] pulled him out again! To put leg shackles on him. You put leg shackles on a man that could barely walk to the paddy wagon? Then you toss him in the back of the paddy wagon like a dead animal. You know what I’m saying? Then you don’t even put a seat belt on him. So basically, he’s handcuffed, shackled, sliding back and forth in a steel cage, basically.

I was like, Man, somebody has to see this. You know what I mean? I have to film this. I just basically called every news station that I could and just got the video out there!

I asked Moore what triggered the incident.

Eye contact. That’s how the officers, I guess, wrote the paperwork: that Freddie made eye contact. And he looked suspicious. Oh. “And that gave us probable cause to” … do whatever. We know the truth, y’know what I’m saying? Just a glance. The eye-contact thing, it’s like a trigger. That’s all it takes here in Baltimore—just a glance.

“Just a glance.”

Don’t stare. Why are you so interested in those people? They are not interested in you.

2018: Brokenness and the Promise of Fairness

I’m in Montgomery, Alabama, to do my pilgrimage to the National Memorial for Peace and Justice—commonly known as the “lynching memorial.” While there I am going to interview Bryan Stevenson, its founder.

From a distance, the memorial is beautiful and majestic. In close proximity to the columns that constitute the memorial, a story of terror unfolds. There are 800 steel columns, each representing a county. On the columns are etched the names of people who were lynched there.

Bob Miller / GettyEd Sykes, 77, visits the National Memorial For Peace And Justice on April 26, 2018 in Montgomery, Alabama.Bob Miller / GettyMarkers display the names and locations of individuals killed by lynching at the National Memorial For Peace And Justice on April 26, 2018 in Montgomery, Alabama.

Here’s a portion of what Stevenson told me:

Some of these were what we call “public-spectacle lynchings,” where thousands of people came downtown and watched Black men, women, and children being burned alive. Some of these lynchings are as recent as 1949, 1950.

I had a case not that long ago where we tried to stop an execution. The man was scheduled to be executed in 30 days. And I learned that he suffered from intellectual disability. Our courts have banned the execution of people with intellectual disability. And so we went to the trial court and said, “You can’t execute him. He’s intellectually disabled.” And the trial court said, “Too late. You should have raised that years ago.” And I went to the state court, and they said, “Too late.” The appeals court said, “Too late.” The federal court said, “Too late.” Every court I went to said, “Too late.” And we went to the U.S. Supreme Court, and they reviewed our motion, and about an hour before the scheduled execution, the clerk called me and said, “Yeah, the Supreme Court’s going to deny your motion. You’re too late.”

And I got on the phone with this man and I said, “I’m so sorry, but I can’t stop this execution.” He started to cry. It’s literally 50 minutes before the execution, I’m holding the phone, and the man is just sobbing. And then he said, “Please don’t hang up. There’s something important I have to say to you.” And he tried to say something to me, but in addition to being intellectually disabled, he stuttered when nervous. He was trying to say something, but he couldn’t get his words out. Tears were just running down my face.

And then he said to me: “Mr. Stevenson, I want to thank you for representing me. I want to thank you for fighting for me.” The last thing he said to me was, “Mr. Stevenson, I love you for trying to save my life.”

He hung up the phone. They pulled him away. They strapped him to a gurney. They executed him. And I thought: I can’t do this anymore. I just can’t. Something about it just shattered me.

And I was thinking about how broken he was, and I just couldn’t understand: Why do we want to kill broken people? What is it about us that when we see brokenness, we get angry? All of my clients are broken people. I represent the broken. Everybody I represent has been broken by poverty or disability or addiction or racism. And then I realized that the system I work in is a broken system. And in that moment something said, You better think about why you do what you do if you’re not gonna do it anymore. And it was in that moment that I realized why I do what I do. And it surprised me. I don’t do what I do because I’ve been trained as a lawyer. I don’t do what I do because it’s about human rights. I don’t do what I do because if I don’t do it, no one will. I do what I do because I’m broken, too.

It’s in brokenness that we understand our need for grace, our need for mercy. Brokenness helps us appreciate justice. It’s in brokenness that we begin to crave redemption. That we understand the power of recovery. It’s the broken among us that actually can teach us what it means to be human. Because if you don’t understand the ways in which you can be broken by poverty or neglect or abuse or violence or suffering or bigotry, then you don’t recognize the urgency in overcoming poverty and abuse and neglect and bigotry.

I even feel broken by this history. When I was a little boy, everybody had to get their polio shot. I was, like, 5. Black people had to go through the back door. So we line up out back. They gave all the shots to the white kids before they gave shots to the Black kids. They had little sugar cubes they were giving the white kids, and by the time they got to the Black kids, they ran out of sugar cubes. The nurses were tired. And they just had lost their capacity to be kind to these little children. And so they were grabbing these Black kids and giving them these needles. And my sister was in front of me, and when she was next, she was so terrified, she looked to my mother, and she said, “Please, Mom. Please, please don’t let them do this.” And they grabbed my sister, and they pulled her aside, and took the needle, and they jabbed it into her arm.

And they pulled me aside, and they were about to jab me. And then all of a sudden I heard glass breaking: And my sweet, loving mother had gone over to a wall, picked up a table of beakers and glasses, and was slamming them against the wall. And she was screaming: “This is not right! This is not right! Y’all should not have kept us out there all day! This is not right!” And the doctor came running in and said, “Call the police.” And two Black ministers came running over and said, “Please, doctor. Please, sir. Please don’t call the police. We’re sorry. We’re gonna get her out of here.” One of the ministers fell to his knees. Was, like, just begging: “Please, please. Please give the other kids their shot.” And he persuaded them not to call the police, and to give the other Black kids their shots.

And so I got my polio shot. They didn’t arrest my mom, which I was happy about. But you can’t have a memory like that without it creating a kind of injury. A consciousness of hurt. That’s what I mean when I say I’m broken, right?

That consciousness of hurt creates a kind of anxiety that requires a response. I just think a lot of us were taught that you just have to find a way to silently live with your brokenness, with this injury, with that memory. And I don’t think that’s the way forward. I’m looking for ways to not be silent.

Stevenson believes in the promise of treating humans with dignity, as expressed by a law that should keep an intellectually disabled human from being executed. Stevenson believed in that promise all the way up to 50 minutes before the scheduled execution, when the Supreme Court denied his final appeal. Which is when he realized that he works with broken people in broken systems where promises are broken.

[From the June 2024 issue: The lynching that sent my family north]

Stevenson’s mother believed in the promise that she and her children should be treated equally. That’s why she screamed, “This is not right! This is not right!” When that promise was broken, his mother indicted the system. The preacher believed in the promise, which is why he got down on his knees and begged the doctor not to call the police and to give the other kids their shot. He surely knew that this promise was not yet realized in 1960s Delaware, where this scene took place—but he would not have begged if he did not believe that the promise of fairness was in sight.

2025: Errantry and Hope

It’s around broken promises that we have a chance at restoring, changing, improving. But of course we need a deep belief in the promise to do that. I am particularly interested in what happens to language when a promise is broken. Sometimes the shards make something intoxicating. Such an assemblage of broken shards can be found Atopolis: for Édouard Glissant, an extraordinary 2014 painting by the late African American artist Jack Whitten, which is being exhibited at the Museum of Modern Art through August 2.

Jack Whitten. *Atopolis: For Édouard Glissant, 2014. (*Jonathan Muzikar / The Museum of Modern Art, New York)

Glissant, the Martinican poet and philosopher whose “poetics of relation” I mentioned earlier, said: “The thought of errantry is not apolitical nor is it inconsistent with the will to identity, which is, after all, nothing other than the search for a freedom within particular surroundings. One who is errant (who is no longer traveler, discoverer, or conqueror) strives to know the totality of the world yet already knows he will never accomplish this—and knows that is precisely where the threatened beauty of the world resides.”

Whitten wrote the following about Atopolis:

A = not

Topos = place

Polis = city

In Greek: Atopy = placelessness, unclassifiable, a borderless city built from the uprooted, ungrounded, and nomadic destinies of old and new migrants—a fluid identity.

Elsewhere, Whitten wrote: “Ever since white imperialist entrepreneurs forced us into slavery, Black identity has been linked to our not having a ‘sense of place.’ This ‘sense of place’ for us had to be created through hard work involving all of our faculties of being.”

In America, that hard work has been done with courage by individuals who have, to some extent, found “us” through:

1. Unique meetings of their “me”-ness and their “not me”–ness. (Sometimes there was bloodshed around that meeting.)

2. Recognizing when good intentions become bad intentions.

3. Practicing hospitality.

4. Manifesting grace.

5. Understanding that, as Senator Cory Booker once told me: “Black folks have to resurrect hope every day.”

Amazing Grace

In 2015, I interviewed the late Congressman John Lewis, and then portrayed him in my play and film Notes From the Field.

I been going back to Selma every year since 1965, to commemorate the anniversary of Bloody Sunday, that took place on March 7, 1965. But we usually stop in Birmingham for a day. And then we go to Montgomery for a day. And then we go to Selma.

On one trip to Montgomery, we stopped at First Baptist Church, the church that was pastored by the Reverend Ralph Abernathy. It’s the same church where I met Dr. Martin Luther King and the Reverend Abernathy, in the spring of 1958.

A young police officer—the chief—came to the church to speak on behalf of the mayor, who was not available. The church was full. Black. White. Latino. Asian American. Members of Congress. Staffers. Family members, children, and grandchildren. “What happened in Montgomery 52 years ago durin’ the Freedom Rides was not right,” the chief said. “The police department didn’t show up. They allowed an angry mob to come and beat you,” and he said, “Congressman? I’m sorry for what happened. I want to apologize. This is not the Montgomery that we want Montgomery to be. This is not the police department that I want to be the chief of. Before any officers are hired,” he said, “they go through trainin’. They have to study the life of Rosa Parks. The life of Martin Luther King Jr. They have to visit the historic sites of the movement. They have to know what happened in Birmingham, and what happened in Montgomery, and what happened in Selma.” He said, “I want you to forgive us.” He said, “To show the respect that I have for you and for the movement, I want to take off my badge and give it to you.”

And the church was so quiet. No one sayin’ a word. And I stood up to accept the badge. And I started cryin’. And everybody in the church started cryin’.

And I said, “Officer. Chief. I cannot accept your badge. I’m not worthy to accept your badge. [Long pause.] Don’t you need it?” He said, “Congressman Lewis, I can get another one. I want you to have my badge!”

And I took it. And I will hold on to it forever. But he hugged me. I hugged him. I cried some more. And you had Democrats and Republicans in the church. Cryin’. And his young deputy assistant—a young African American—was sittin’ down. He couldn’t stand. He cried so much, like a baby, really.

It was the first time that a police chief in any city where I visited, or where I got arrested or beaten durin’ the ’60s, ever apologized. It was a moment of grace. It was a moment of reconciliation. The chief was very young—he was not even born 52 years ago. So he was offerin’ an apology and to be forgiven on behalf of his associates, his colleagues of the past …

For the police chief to come and apologize, to ask to be forgiven—it felt so good, and at the same time so freein’ and liberatin’. I felt like, you know, I’m not worthy. You know, I’m just one. I’m just one of the many people who were beaten.

It is amazing grace.

You know the line in there, “Saved a wretch like me?” In a sense, it’s saying that we all have fallen short! ’Cause we all just tryin’ to just make it! We all searching! As Dr. King said, we were out to redeem the soul of America. But we first have to redeem ourselves.

This message—this act of grace, of the badge—says to me, “Hold on.” And, “Never give up. Never give in. Never lose faith. Keep the faith.”

Keep the faith, yes. But don’t look away.

This essay was adapted from the 2024 Mellon Lectures at the National Gallery of Art.

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From The Atlantic via this RSS feed

When I was growing up in the early 2000s, few cultural figures confused me more than Ozzy Osbourne. He was, I understood, the “Prince of Darkness,” a legendary influence upon Tool, Linkin Park, and various other fearsome and dour bands I worshipped. But Osbourne was also the bumbling, profanity-dribbling star of The Osbournes, the smash reality show about his life of Hollywood domesticity with his wife and kids. On TV, Osbourne wasn’t a demon; he was just some dude.

Years later it’s clear that this cognitive dissonance is precisely why he was regarded as a titan. The Black Sabbath front man, who died yesterday at age 76, helped invent heavy metal—a sound and a countercultural identity with terrifying connotations. But he showed how that identity was rooted in the very thing that it superficially seemed to obscure: the warm, soft human core inside each of us. Osbourne knew that metal is not the music of hell but rather the music of Earth, not a fantasy but a survival guide.

His own survival story began early in life. Raised in a working-class family of eight in the industrial English town of Birmingham, Osbourne had parents who put in long hours at factories. His father was “one of those guys who’d go to work if he’d been in a car accident, if his house had been blown up,” Osbourne later said. Dyslexia caused Osbourne to struggle with academics, and his headmaster once humiliated him by sending him home for looking, as Osbourne remembered it, “not clean enough.” Two classmates routinely sexually abused him—an experience whose effects festered in his psyche for years. “I was afraid to tell my father or mother and it completely fucked me up,” Osbourne said.

Like many kids of the ’60s, Osbourne had his mind blown by the Beatles and felt called to form a band. It was first called the Polka Tulk Blues Band, then called Earth, and then called Black Sabbath. Bloody serendipity helped create Sabbath’s signature sound: When guitarist Tony Iommi sliced the ends of his fingers on the job at a sheet-metal factory, he was forced to create false fingertips out of soap bottles, which in turn caused him to play in an eerie, leaden-sounding fashion. But the nightmarish vibe of the band’s self-titled 1970 debut was also the result of strategic thinking—inspired, in part, by the knowledge of how popular horror movies were at the time.

Black Sabbath perform live at Paradiso in Amsterdam on December 4, 1971. (Gijsbert Hanekroot / Redferns / Getty)

Osbourne sang in the high howl of a man being burned at the stake, and his melodies unfolded in a slow, hypnotic smolder. The lyrics—chiefly written by other bandmates, with input from Osbourne—were about devils and wizards and men made of iron, but they were also about reality. “Wicked World,” a B-side from the debut, delivered peacenik thoughts with a snarl: “People got to work just to earn their bread / While people just across the sea are counting their dead.” The protest epic “War Pigs,” from 1970’s Paranoid, portrayed military generals as evil occultists. Despite what Christian activists during the Satanic Panic of the 1980s would claim, much of Osbourne’s music was doing the opposite of sympathizing with the devil.

[Read: How heavy metal is keeping us sane]

Black Sabbath partied like any rock band, but Osbourne was famous for partaking of drugs and alcohol at extremes. The group kicked him out in 1979 after he slept through a concert and didn’t wake up until a day later. He went in and out of rehab repeatedly. He described many of his most notorious experiences as resulting from confusion—confusion that seems inextricable from living life intoxicated. When he bit off a bat’s head in 1982, it was because he thought it was a stage prop. When he devoured two doves during a record-label meeting in 1981, he was drunk. When he tried to strangle his wife, Sharon, in 1989, he woke up in jail with no memory of what had happened. (He later spoke of that incident with horror and regret.)

Accordingly, Osbourne’s music captured the viewpoint of someone out of touch with their own mind, whose good intentions are thwarted by terrible urges. On “Paranoid,” Osbourne shouted monotonously from within a maze of riffs, like he was trapped and needing help. On “Crazy Train,” the enduring single from his 1980 solo debut, Blizzard of Ozz, his high notes sounded like the Doppler-distorted cries of someone strapped into a vehicle they can’t control. The parents of a teen who died by suicide in 1984 sued him over the lyrics to “Suicide Solution,” claiming that it encouraged self-harm. But the song was really about alcoholism, a “reaper” that stalks its helpless victims.

Osbourne’s public rebirth with *The Osbournes—*the MTV reality series that ran from 2002 to 2005—transmuted his erratic nature and past struggles into a miraculous joke. Living in a taupe-painted mansion rather than a haunted castle, Osbourne was clearly mismatched to his surroundings—hence all the befuddled stammering and incongruous black outfits. But he also obviously wanted to be a good dad and husband. This normalcy was something he’d prized for decades. A lifelong Christian, he told The New York Times in 1992, “I am not the Antichrist. I am a family man.”

He also eagerly played the role of rock elder statesman by founding the influential Ozzfest with Sharon and seemingly showing up to most any awards show or commercial shoot that would have him. Weeks before his death, Black Sabbath reunited for a final show featuring a host of bands it had influenced (including my beloved Tool). It now seems like it was an early wake for Osbourne. Frail from Parkinson’s disease and other health issues, he sat on a throne, grinning at the crowd’s adulation. Being so known, so loved, and so loving might not seem very metal. But it takes iron to last like he did.

Flowers are left at a makeshift memorial at Osbourne’s Star on the Hollywood Walk of Fame on July 22 in Los Angeles. (Patrick T. Fallon / AFP / Getty)

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From The Atlantic via this RSS feed

Earlier today, Donald Trump unveiled his administration’s “AI Action Plan”—a document that details, in 23 pages, the president’s “vision of global AI dominance” and offers a road map for America to achieve it. The upshot? AI companies such as OpenAI and Nvidia must be allowed to move as fast as they can. As the White House officials Michael Kratsios, David Sacks, and Marco Rubio wrote in the plan’s introduction, “Simply put, we need to ‘Build, Baby, Build!’”

The action plan is the direct result of an executive order, signed by Trump in the first week of his second term, that directed the federal government to produce a plan to “enhance America’s global AI dominance.” For months, the Trump administration solicited input from AI firms, civil-society groups, and everyday citizens. OpenAI, Anthropic, Meta, Google, and Microsoft issued extensive recommendations.

The White House is clearly deferring to the private sector, which has close ties to the Trump administration. On his second day in office, Trump, along with OpenAI CEO Sam Altman, Oracle CEO Larry Ellison, and SoftBank CEO Masayoshi Son, announced the Stargate Project, a private venture that aims to build hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of AI infrastructure in the United States. Top tech executives have made numerous visits to the White House and Mar-a-Lago, and Trump has reciprocated with praise. Kratsios, who advises the president on science and technology, used to work at Scale AI and, well before that, at Peter Thiel’s investment firm. Sacks, the White House’s AI and crypto czar, was an angel investor for Facebook, Palantir, and SpaceX. During today’s speech about the AI Action Plan, Trump lauded several tech executives and investors, and credited the AI boom to “the genius and creativity of Silicon Valley.”

At times, the action plan itself comes across as marketing from the tech industry. It states that AI will augur “an industrial revolution, an information revolution, and a renaissance—all at once.” And indeed, many companies were happy: “Great work,” Kevin Weil, OpenAI’s chief product officer, wrote on X of the AI Action Plan. “Thank you President Trump,” wrote Collin McCune, the head of government affairs at the venture-capital firm Andreessen Horowitz. “The White House AI Action Plan gets it right on infrastructure, federal adoption, and safety coordination,” Anthropic wrote on its X account. “It reflects many policy aims core to Anthropic.” (The Atlantic and OpenAI have a corporate partnership.)

In a sense, the action plan is a bet. AI is already changing a number of industries, including software engineering, and a number of scientific disciplines. Should AI end up producing incredible prosperity and new scientific discoveries, then the AI Action Plan may well get America there faster simply by removing any roadblocks and regulations, however sensible, that would slow the companies down. But should the technology prove to be a bubble—AI products remain error-prone, extremely expensive to build, and unproven in many business applications—the Trump administration is more rapidly pushing us toward the bust. Either way, the nation is in Silicon Valley’s hands.

[Read: The computer-science bubble is bursting]

The action plan has three major “pillars”: enhancing AI innovation, developing more AI infrastructure, and promoting American AI. To accomplish these goals, the administration will seek to strip away federal and state regulations on AI development while also making it easier and more financially viable to build data centers and energy infrastructure. Trump also signed executive orders to expedite permitting for AI projects and export American AI products abroad.

The White House’s specific ideas for removing what it describes as “onerous regulations” and “bureaucratic red tape” are sweeping. For instance, the AI Action Plan recommends that the federal government review Federal Trade Commission investigations or orders from the Biden administration that “unduly burden AI innovation,” perhaps referencing investigations into potentially monopolistic AI investments and deceptive AI advertising. The document also suggests that federal agencies reduce AI-related funding to states with regulatory environments deemed unfriendly to AI. (For instance, a state might risk losing funding if it has a law that requires AI firms to open themselves up to extensive third-party audits of their technology.) As for the possible environmental tolls of AI development—the data centers chatbots run on consume huge amounts of water and electricity—the AI Action Plan waves them away. The road map suggests streamlining or reducing a number of environmental regulations, such as standards in the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act—which would require evaluating pollution from AI infrastructure—in order to accelerate construction.

Once the red tape is gone, the Trump administration wants to create a “dynamic, ‘try-first’ culture for AI across American industry.” In other words, build and test out AI products first, and then determine if those products are actually helpful—or if they pose any risks. The plan outlines policies to encourage both private and public adoption of AI in a number of domains: scientific discovery, health care, agriculture, and basically any government service. In particular, the plan stresses, “the United States must aggressively adopt AI within its Armed Forces if it is to maintain its global military preeminence”—in line with how nearly every major AI firm has begun developing military offerings over the past year. Earlier this month, the Pentagon announced contracts worth up to $200 million each with OpenAI, Google, Anthropic, and xAI.

All of this aligns rather neatly with the broader AI industry’s goals. Companies want to build more energy infrastructure and data centers, deploy AI more widely, and fast-track innovation. Several of OpenAI’s recommendations to the AI Action Plan—including “categorical exclusions” from environmental policy for AI-infrastructure construction, limits on state regulations, widespread federal procurement of AI, and “sandboxes” for start-ups to freely test AI—closely echo the final document. Also this week, Anthropic published a policy document titled “Building AI in America” with very similar suggestions for building AI infrastructure, such as “slashing red tape” and partnering with the private sector. Permitting reform and more investments in energy supply, keystones of the final plan, were also the central asks of Google and Microsoft. The regulations and safety concerns the AI Action Plan does highlight, although important, all dovetail with efforts that AI firms are already undertaking; there’s nothing here that would seriously slow Silicon Valley down.

Trump gestured toward other concessions to the AI industry in his speech. He specifically targeted intellectual-property laws, arguing that training AI models on copyrighted books and articles does not infringe upon copyright because the chatbots, like people, are simply learning from the content. This has been a major conflict in recent years, with more than 40 related lawsuits filed against AI companies since 2022. (The Atlantic is suing the AI company Cohere, for example.) If courts were to decide that training AI models with copyrighted material is against the law, it would be a major setback for AI companies. In their official recommendations for the AI Action Plan, OpenAI, Microsoft, and Google all requested a copyright exception, known as “fair use,” for AI training. Based on his statements, Trump appears to strongly agree with this position, although the AI Action Plan itself does not reference copyright and AI training.

[Read: Judges don’t know what AI’s book piracy means]

Also sprinkled throughout the AI Action Plan are gestures toward some MAGA priorities. Notably, the policy states that the government will contract with only AI companies whose models are “free from top-down ideological bias”—a reference to Sacks’s crusade against “woke” AI—and that a federal AI-risk-management framework should “eliminate references to misinformation, Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion, and climate change.” Trump signed a third executive order today that, in his words, will eliminate “woke, Marxist lunacy” from AI models. The plan also notes that the U.S. “must prevent the premature decommissioning of critical power generation resources,” likely a subtle nod to Trump’s suggestion that coal is a good way to power data centers.

Looming over the White House’s AI agenda is the threat of Chinese technology getting ahead. The AI Action Plan repeatedly references the importance of staying ahead of Chinese AI firms, as did the president’s speech: “We will not allow any foreign nation to beat us; our nation will not live in a planet controlled by the algorithms of the adversaries,” Trump declared. The worry is that advanced AI models could give China economic, military, and diplomatic dominance over the world—a fear that OpenAI, Anthropic, Meta, and several other AI firms have added to.

But whatever happens on the international stage, hundreds of millions of Americans will feel more and more of generative AI’s influence—on salaries and schools, air quality and electricity costs, federal services and doctor’s offices. AI companies have been granted a good chunk of their wish list; if anything, the industry is being told that it’s not moving fast enough. Silicon Valley has been given permission to accelerate, and we’re all along for the ride.

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From The Atlantic via this RSS feed

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Imagine you were an elected official who discovered that an old friend had been running a sex-trafficking operation without your knowledge. You’d probably try very hard to make your innocence in the matter clear. You’d demand full transparency and answer any questions about your own involvement straightforwardly.

Donald Trump’s behavior regarding the Jeffrey Epstein case is … not that.

The latest cycle of frantic evasions began last week, after The Wall Street Journal reported that Trump had submitted a suggestive message and drawing to a scrapbook celebrating Jeffrey Epstein’s 50th birthday, in 2003. This fact alone added only incrementally to the public understanding of the two men’s friendship. Rather than brush the report off, however, Trump denied authorship. “I never wrote a picture in my life,” he told the Journal—an oddly narrow defense for a man reported to have written “may every day be another wonderful secret” to a criminal whose secret was systematically abusing girls, and one that was instantly falsified by Trump’s well-documented penchant for doodling.

On Truth Social, Trump complained that he had asked Rupert Murdoch, the Journal’s owner, to spike the story, and received an encouraging answer, only for the story to run. Under normal circumstances, a president confessing that he tried to kill an incriminating report would amount to a major scandal. But Trump has so deeply internalized his own critique of the media, according to which any organ beyond his control is “fake news,” that he believed the episode reflected badly on Murdoch’s ethics rather than his own.

[Helen Lewis: MAGA influencers don’t understand what journalism is]

Having failed to prevent the article from being published, Trump shifted into distraction mode. In a transparent attempt to offer his wavering loyalists the scent of fresh meat, Trump began to attack their standby list of enemies. On Friday, Tulsi Gabbard, the director of national intelligence, renewed charges that the Obama administration had ginned up the Russia scandal to damage Trump. None of the facts she provided supported this claim remotely. The entire sleight of hand relied on conflating the question of whether Russia had hacked into voting machines (the Obama administration said publicly and privately it hadn’t) with the very different question of whether Russia had attempted to influence voters by hacking and leaking Democratic emails (which the Obama administration, former Special Counsel Robert Mueller, and a subsequent bipartisan Senate-committee investigation all concluded it had done).

Why did Gabbard suddenly pick this moment to release and misconstrue 2016 intelligence comprising facts that the Obama administration had already acknowledged in public? Trump made the answer perfectly clear when he used a press availability with the president of the Philippines to deflect questions about Epstein into a rant about the need to arrest Obama.

“I don’t really follow that too much,” he said of the Epstein matter. “It’s sort of a witch hunt. Just a continuation of the witch hunt. The witch hunt you should be talking about is that they caught President Obama absolutely cold.” Trump has yet to specify why the “witch hunt” he’s been stewing over nonstop for nearly a decade remains fascinating, while the new “witch hunt” he just revealed to the world is too tedious to address.

In fact, Trump himself suggested that the two matters were related. He described the Epstein witch hunt as part of a continuous plot that culminated in Joe Biden stealing the 2020 presidential election. (“And by the way, it morphed into the 2020 race. And the 2020 race was rigged.”) You might think that this link would increase Trump’s curiosity about the Epstein matter, given his inexhaustible interest in vindicating his claim to have won in 2020. Not this time!

By invoking 2020, Trump managed to make the Epstein conspiracy theory sound more world-historically important—while attaching his protestations of innocence to claims that were hardly settled in his favor. Again, imagine you were in Trump’s position and were completely innocent of any involvement with Epstein’s crimes. You would probably not try to compare the Epstein case to the scandal in which eight of your associates were sentenced to prison, or to the other time when you tried to steal an election and then got impeached. Instead, Trump is leaning into the parallels between the Epstein case and his own long record of criminal associations and proven lies, arguing in essence that the Epstein witch hunt is as fake as the claim that Biden won the 2020 election (i.e., 100 percent real).

[Ashley Parker and Jonathan Lemire: Inside the White House’s Epstein strategy]

Yesterday, House Speaker Mike Johnson, faced with demands by some Republican members to pass a nonbinding resolution calling for full disclosure of the government’s files relating to the Epstein investigation, announced that he would instead shut down the House for summer recess. Given that Trump had previously been eager to squeeze as many working days out of his narrow legislative majority as he could get, and the impression in Washington that Johnson will not so much as go to the bathroom without Trump’s permission, declaring early recess communicates extreme desperation on the part of the president.

Also yesterday, the Trump administration announced that it was releasing thousands of pages of documents relating to the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. It is difficult to see why this disclosure was suddenly necessary. Trump’s contention that the Epstein scandal is too dull and familiar to be worth discussing seems to be ever so slightly in tension with the notion that the death of King, in 1968, is fresh material. If anything, the disclosure of documents nobody asked to see painfully highlights his unwillingness to disclose the documents everybody is clamoring for. If the police ask to look in your basement for a missing hitchhiker recently spotted in your car, and you offer to let them inspect your desk and closet instead, this will not dispel suspicions about what a basement inspection might reveal.

Perhaps Trump is simply so habituated to lying that he has no playbook for handling a matter in which he has nothing to hide. Or maybe, as seems more plausible by the day, he is acting guilty because he is.

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This week, a friend sent me our horoscope—we’re both Gemini—from Seven Days, a beloved Vermont weekly, because, improbably, it was about the sea slug I’d been telling her about just days before.

“The sea slug Elysia chlorotica is a small, unassuming creature that performs a remarkable feat: It eats algae and steals its chloroplasts, then incorporates them into its own body,” the horoscope explained. Years ago I had incorporated this fact into my own view of the world, and it had changed my understanding of the rules of biology.

This particular slug starts life a brownish color with a few red dots. Then it begins to eat from the hairlike strands of the green algae Vaucheria litorea: It uses specialized teeth to puncture the alga’s wall, and then it slurps out its cells like one might slurp bubble tea, each bright-green cellular boba moving up the algal straw. The next part remains partially unexplained by science. The slug digests the rest of the cell but keeps the chloroplasts—the plant organelles responsible for photosynthesis—and distributes these green orbs through its branched gut. Somehow, the slug is able to run the chloroplasts itself and, after sucking up enough of them, turns a brilliant green. It appears to get all the food it needs for the rest of its life by way of photosynthesis, transforming light, water, and air into sugar, like a leaf.

The horoscope took this all as a metaphor: Something I’d “absorbed from another” is “integrating into your deeper systems,” it advised. “This isn’t theft, but creative borrowing.” And in that single line, the horoscope writer managed to explain symbiosis—not a metaphor at all, but an evolutionary mechanism that may be more prevalent across biology than once thought.

Elysia chlorotica is a bewitching example of symbiosis. It is flat, heart-shaped, and pointed at the tail, and angles itself toward the sun. Its broad surface is grooved by a web of veins, like a leaf’s is. Ignore its goatish head, and you might assume this slug was a leaf, if a particularly gelatinous one. Sidney Pierce, a marine biologist retired from the University of South Florida, remembers his surprise when a grad student brought a specimen into his office in the Marine Biological Laboratory at Woods Hole, on Cape Cod, more than two decades ago. Photosynthesis requires specialized equipment and chemistry, which animals simply do not have—“yet here was an animal that’s figured out how to do it,” he told me. He spent the next 20-odd years trying to find the mechanism. “Unfortunately, I didn’t get all the way to the end,” he said.

No one has, as my colleague Katherine J. Wu has written. The algae and the slug may have managed some kind of gene transfer, and over time, produced a new way of living, thanks not to slow, stepwise evolution—the random mutation within a body—but by the wholesale transfer of a piece of code. A biological skill leaked out of one creature into another.

All of us are likely leakier than we might assume. After all, every cell with a nucleus, meaning all animal and plant cells, has a multigenetic heritage. Mitochondria—the organelles in our cells responsible for generating energy—are likely the product of an ancient symbiosis with a distant ancestor and a microbe, and have their own separate DNA. So we are walking around with the genetic material of some other ancient life form suffused in every cell. And the earliest ancestor of all plants was likely the product of a fusion between a microbe and a cyanobacterium; plants’ photosynthesizing organelles, too, have distinct DNA. Lynn Margulis, the biologist who made the modern case for this idea, was doubted for years until new genetic techniques proved her correct.

Her conviction about the symbiotic origins of mitochondria and chloroplasts was a monumental contribution to cell biology. But Margulis took her theory further; in her view, symbiosis was the driving force of evolution, and many entities were likely composites. Evolution, then, could be traced not only through random mutation, but by combination. “Life did not take over the globe by combat, but by networking. Life forms multiplied and complexified by co-opting others, not just by killing one another,” she wrote, with her son, in 1986. This remains pure conjecture, and an exaggeration of the role of symbiosis beyond what mainstream evolutionary theory would support; random mutation is still considered the main driver of speciation.

Yet more scientists now wonder if symbiosis may have played a larger role in the heritage of many species than we presently understand. Phillip Cleves, a geneticist at the Carnegie Institution for Science who studies the symbiotic relationship between corals and their algae symbionts, told me how, as an undergraduate, he was blown away by the fact that corals’ alliance with algae made possible ecosystems—coral reefs—that support a quarter of all known marine life. The algae cells live, whole, inside coral cells, and photosynthesize as normal, sustaining the coral in nutrient-poor tropical waters. “I realize now that that type of interaction between organisms is pervasive across the tree of life,” he said.

It’s probable that the ancestors of all eukaryotes were more influenced by bacteria in their environments than modern evolutionary theory has accounted for. “All animals and plants likely require interactions with microbes, often in strong, persistent symbiotic associations,” Margaret McFall-Ngai, a leading researcher of the role of microbes in animal development, wrote in 2024. These interactions, she argued, are so fundamental to life that the animal immune system should perhaps be thought of as a sort of management system for our many microbial symbionts. Although biology has been slow to recognize symbiosis’s significance, she thinks this line of research should now take center stage, and could alter how all stripes of biologists think about their work.

Cleves, too, sees himself as working to build a new field of science, by training people on how to ask genetic questions about symbiotic relationships in nature: When I called him, he was preparing to teach a four-week course at the Marine Biological Laboratory in Woods Hole on exactly that. Genomic research has only relatively recently been cheap enough to apply it routinely and broadly to all sorts of creatures, but now scientists can more easily ask: How do animals’ interactions with microbes shape the evolution of individual species? And how does that change dynamics in an ecosystem more broadly?

Elysia chlorotica is also a lesson in how easily the boundaries between an organism and its environment can be traversed. “Every time an organism eats, a whole wad of DNA from whatever it’s eating passes through the animal. So DNA gets transferred all the time from species to species,” Pierce told me. Most times it doesn’t stick, but on the rare occasions when it does, it can reroute the fate of a species. “I think it happens more than it’s recognized, but a lot of times it’s hard to recognize because you don’t know what you’re looking for. But in these slugs, it’s pretty obvious,” he said. They’re bright green.

Patrick J. Krug

Still, attempts to understand what is happening inside Elysia chlorotica have mostly fallen short. Scientists such as Pierce presume that, over time, elements of the algal genome have been transferred to the slug, allowing it to run photosynthesis, yet they have struggled to find evidence. “It’s very hard to find a gene if you don’t know what you’re looking for,” Pierce said—plus, slug DNA is too muddled to parse a lot of the time. Slugs are full of mucus, which can ruin samples, and because the chloroplasts are embedded inside the slug cells, many samples of slug DNA end up picking up chloroplast DNA too.  After years of trying, and at least one false start by a different lab, Pierce and his colleagues did manage to find a gene in the slug that was involved with chloroplast repair, hinting that a genetic transfer had occurred, and offering a clue as to how the animal manages to keep the plant organelles alive.

But another research team showed that related species of photosynthesizing slugs can survive for months deprived of sunlight and actual food: They may simply be hardy. Why, then, if not to make nutrients, might the slugs be photosynthesizing? Perhaps for camouflage. Or perhaps they’re stashing chloroplasts, which themselves contain useful fats and proteins, as food reserves. (Pierce, for one, is skeptical of those explanations.)

Whatever benefit Elysia chlorotica derives from the chloroplasts, there couldn’t be a leakier creature. It crosses the divide between plant and animal, one species and another, and individual and environment. I first read about the slug in a book titled Organism and Environment by Sonia Sultan, an evolutionary ecologist at Wesleyan University, in which she forwards the argument that we should be paying more attention to how the environment influences the way creatures develop, and how those changes are passed generationally, ultimately influencing the trajectory of species.

While Elysia chlorotica is an extreme example of this, a version of it happens to us, and our bodies, all the time. Encounters with the bacteria around us reshape our microbiomes, which in turn affect many aspects of our health. Encounters with pollution can reroute the trajectory of our health and even, in some cases, the health of our offspring. Researchers think access to healthy foods—a factor of our environments—can modify how our genes are expressed, improving our lives in ways that scientists are just beginning to understand. We are constantly taking our environment in, and it is constantly transforming us.

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On this episode of The David Frum Show, The Atlantic’s David Frum opens with a warning about President Donald Trump’s escalating attacks on press freedom. David discusses Trump’s lawsuit against The Wall Street Journal, explains how Trump is using presidential power to suppress coverage of his alleged ties to Jeffrey Epstein, and argues that Trump’s second term represents a deeper threat to the First Amendment than anything seen in modern American history.

Then David is joined by Representative Ritchie Torres of New York for a conversation about the future of the Democratic Party. Torres explains why the Democratic center has become too passive; how the far left gained influence through intensity, not majorities; and why slogans alone can’t solve America’s affordability crisis. They discuss the rise of performative politics, the need for a serious governing agenda, and Torres’s personal journey from public housing to Congress.

The following is a transcript of the episode:

David Frum: Hello, and welcome to another episode of The David Frum Show. I’m David Frum, a staff writer at The Atlantic. My guest this week will be Congressman Ritchie Torres, who represents the South Bronx in the United States House of Representatives. It’s such a pleasure and an honor to welcome Congressman Torres to this program. We’ll be discussing the contest, the struggle between Democratic centrists and Democratic progressives in New York City, state, and federal politics, and we’ll talk, as well, about his vision for the future and direction of American politics, and his beliefs and principles as he’s become one of the most important voices in the United States Congress.

I want to begin with a few preliminary remarks about a new Trump administration attack on press freedom and press integrity. The Wall Street Journal recently released an important story on the personal connections between Donald Trump, the private citizen—as he then was—and Jeffrey Epstein, the disgraced financier and sex trafficker who died in 2019.

President Trump, as he now is, responded to the story by filing a massive lawsuit against The Wall Street Journal, one of many lawsuits in a long series that Donald Trump has brought against press institutions. Now, a private citizen who feels himself or herself ill-used by the press, of course, has a right to sue for defamation. These suits usually don’t go very far. It’s difficult to win a defamation suit in the United States, and people usually—while they may file them or threaten to file them—don’t proceed. For one thing, they bump into the threat of discovery, where the news organization will be able to say, Well, since you’re suing us, we get to ask some questions of you, and the person suing often doesn’t want to answer those questions, and that’s where the whole thing tends to break down. But President Trump has approached these lawsuits in a very different way.

The president of the United States—under Donald Trump, the presidency has become a very different kind of institution from what it ever was before. It has acquired large new immunity from criminal prosecution. The Supreme Court of the United States has made it much more difficult than it ever was to hold a president to account for criminal actions committed by that president, or alleged criminal actions committed by the president. The Court has carved out zones of immunity, in which the president simply cannot be questioned or challenged about criminal activity.

Meanwhile, Donald Trump, while he has all those august powers of the presidency, he’s using the powers of a private citizen to sue in ways that are augmented by the powers of the presidency. The suits that Donald Trump has brought against ABC News and CBS News were suits he almost certainly was not going to win. The CBS lawsuit was particularly feeble. It was a lawsuit where he said he didn’t like the way 60 Minutes had edited an interview with Vice President Kamala Harris, and he was invoking a Texas consumer-protection statute to attack the way that CBS had edited this interview. Now, the courts, for 50 years, have been very clear about the enormous protection of the right to edit under the First Amendment, and the Federal Communications Commission has made it clear they want no part of second-guessing the editorial judgments of news organizations. This lawsuit would not go anywhere. It’s almost guaranteed not to go anywhere. But CBS and ABC have corporate parents, and those corporate parents have a lot of business before the federal government. In the CBS case, the business was especially urgent. Paramount, the owner of CBS, wanted to execute a merger that would need FCC approval. And President Trump’s chairman of the FCC had made clear that regulatory approval could hinge on whether Paramount made some kind of settlement with President Trump in his complaint against CBS.

So President Trump used his regulatory powers overparent corporations to squeeze settlements out of ABC and CBS. He also extracted a big payday for his family from Amazon. At the beginning of the administration, Amazon announced that it was going to make a documentary or a movie about the life of First Lady Melania Trump and pay her millions and millions of dollars for the film rights for a movie that doesn’t look like it’s ever going to see the light of day, and maybe was never intended to see the light of day.

So the president is immune criminally. He sues, like any private citizen, but his lawsuits are backed up by the regulatory power of the federal government and under his control, exerting powers in new ways, in ways that had never been contemplated before by the Federal Communications Commission.

Now President Trump is using the same maneuver against The Wall Street Journal. Shortly before the story appeared, Vice President [J. D.] Vance made a special trip to visit the Murdoch family and presumably, or apparently, to plead the case against the story. So that was another form of pressure. So far, The Wall Street Journal has resisted, but how long they will resist is unclear because the parent corporation behind The Wall Street Journal also has a lot of business before the federal government, and of course, the Murdoch family that owns the parent corporation and President Trump have deep other causes.

So what we’re witnessing here is an attempt to use federal power by a criminally immune president to snuff out discussion of things that bear on that president’s potential criminal liability or potential civil liability.

You know, abuses of power by the president tend to bleed one into the other. You start with something small, like I don’t want people to know about my connections to Jeffrey Epstein, and pretty soon you’re deploying powers over the press, and you’re abusing the FBI.

I think the point is: There’s no easy way out of this for any of us. And I think this is one of the reasons why the Epstein story has become so important. Whatever is the exact truth of what happened between Donald Trump and Jeffrey Epstein—how deeply they were connected, or when their relationship began, when their relationship ended, what happened in between, why it ended, how Jeffrey Epstein’s future career, why his prosecution was handled in the way that it was, what happened in the final hours and moments before his death, all of those unanswered questions—in order to protect the present from potential revelations, we’re having to break apart all kinds of institutions, beginning with the FBI and ending with the First Amendment.

You know, I think a lot of people hope there’s some way to box in or limit the Trump presidency to treat it like, you know, not one of one’s favorite presidents, not one of America’s finest hours, but something that doesn’t threaten to do tremendous and permanent damage to the structure of American government. But as this latest story reveals, even in the most intimate and personal aspects of his life, Donald Trump’s needs and imperatives, and his attitude toward the presidency are a threat to every American institution.

If we’re going to come out of this unscathed, we’re going to have to have a real reckoning with what Donald Trump did. We’re not going to be able to box this in. We’re not going to be able to say, Well, that was then, and this is now, or This is his personal life,or These are his personal matters.For him, there is no barrier between the personal and the constitutional. And for the reverse, there’s no barrier for those who want to protect the Constitution against the person of Donald Trump. It’s going to be one, or it’s going to be the other. And that situation—here we are at the very beginning of the second Trump presidency, and it’s only likely to become more intense as that presidency continues.

Now my dialogue with Congressman Torres, and we’ll be talking about some of these very same issues in that conversation. I hope you’ll continue to watch. But first, a quick break.

[Music]

Frum: Representative Ritchie Torres is a native of the Bronx, New York. His first introduction to the ugly realities of New York City politics came at an early age. Congressman Torres grew up the child of a single mother in a public-housing project. The mold in the apartment unit inflamed his childhood asthma, but across the way, he could see the city of New York pouring millions of dollars of taxpayer money into subsidies for a golf course.

I don’t think he’s ever quite forgotten that lesson. Congressman Torres’s outrage over the misuse of public resources in this way powered his early rise, his astonishingly early rise, in city politics. He was elected to New York City Council at the age of 25: the first openly gay council member from the Bronx. He won election to Congress from New York’s Fifteenth District in 2022, age only 32. The Fifteenth is one of the nation’s poorest districts, and Representative Torres has worked hard on the bread-and-butter issues that matter most to his constituents, becoming a leading voice for the Democratic pragmatic urban center against the extremes of far left and far right.

A champion of civil liberties in every form, Torres has become one of Congress’s most effective and untiring voices against anti-Semitism and the defamation of the state of Israel. At a time when Democrats are questioning their future, Congressman Torres has offered one of the most fearless and forcefully argued visions of a way forward.

So I’m very pleased and grateful to welcome Congressman Torres to The David Frum Show. Thank you for joining us.

Ritchie Torres: Always a pleasure to be here.

Frum: I want to ask you about something I’ve heard you say in a number of your interviews, where you say the Democratic center has acquired this passive personality. The Democratic far left feels it can say whatever it likes. The Democratic center retires and reserves. It reminds me in some ways of what happened in the Republican Party, my party, during the Tea Party uprising, when Republican moderates just yielded the floor. What is going on? Why? Is it a personality issue? Is it an ideological issue? Why is the center so retiring?

Torres: Well, look—in politics, intensity is destiny. And it’s almost inherently the case that an intensely visible vocal minority will have outsized political power, more political power than a silent majority that largely resides in the center. And so it feels like American politics writ large is dominated by the extremes, by the far right and the far left and the symbiosis between the two. And there’s a sense in which the far left is a reaction—the modern far left, the new left—is a reaction to Donald Trump. I would submit to you that there would be no modern far left without the election of Donald Trump in 2016. You know, it’s Newton’s laws of physics at work: Every action produces an equal and opposite reaction. And it feels like American politics is largely driven by the endless feedback loop between the two extremes in American politics.

Frum: Yeah. Well, let me draw an analogy to the Republican Party prior to the politics that I know best. I remember I worked a long time ago for President George W. Bush, and there was a big bill coming up, and there was an important Republican vote that President Bush needed. And the vote was shy because this voter, this member of the House or member of the Senate, this member of Congress, was nervous about the vote. And President Bush asked, What do you need from me to win your vote? Give me a request. Give me an ask, something I can say yes to. Is there anything I can do to give you a member to get your vote? And the senator said, Yes, I need you to make sure that there are 70 votes in favor of this proposition.In other words, he didn’t care what the bill said so long as he could be a member of a herd. I sometimes wonder whether, is it that these people are moderates or they’re just fearful?

Torres: It feels like, should we rename the moderate category “miscellaneous”? Like, I feel if you were to ask me, “What does the far right stand for?” I could easily say it’s “America First.” It’s “Make America great again.” It’s “Build the wall,” right? There are simple, repeatable phrases that distill the worldview of the far right. And if you would ask me, “What does the far left stand for?” Green New Deal, Medicare for All. There are simple phrases that distill the worldview of the far left. I could not tell you what the center stands for. Like, if you were to speak to a hundred center-left Democrats, you would get a hundred different responses about what the center left stands for. And I see that lack of clarity of communication as a real challenge for the party.

Just like the Democratic Party cannot simply stand against Donald Trump, We have to stand for something. The center left cannot simply stand against the far left: It has to stand for something. And if the best the center left has to offer is Andrew Cuomo and Eric Adams, then that’s a challenge that we’re going to have trouble connecting with the next generation of voters.

Frum: Well, a great student of the politics of New York, Fred Siegel, wrote a book about Rudy Giuliani before his tragic later years in which he said that the secret of Rudy Giuliani’s success during the period when he was successful was that he was an immoderate centrist—that is, he had centrist politics, but not a moderate personality at all, not even then. And he was forceful. He was certain. He drove his points home. He was not afraid. Is that the solution? Immoderate centrism?

Torres: I thought Giuliani was a vicious person. So there is something to be said for decency. I have profound differences of opinion with a candidate like Zohran Mamdani, but I’m able to separate my appreciation for his skill from my disagreements with his politics—not everyone can make that emotional separation, but I can—and I have to say, I was impressed with the manner in which he ran his campaign. I saw him campaign in the Northeast Bronx a few weeks ago, and he was endlessly smiling. He was visibly enjoying the act of campaigning, the act of interacting with people. I feel like we can all learn from that. Like, we should all project the joy of public service, the joy of campaigning. Like, I prefer that to the viciousness and nastiness of Rudy Giuliani in the 1990s.

Frum: Well, look—politics, like every occupation, has things you have to do and things you do less. And I often do see people in politics, and I think, Why didn’t you choose, like, accountancy? I mean, you love numbers; you hate people. Why did you choose this line of work? There are a lot of things you can do with your one and only life.So I mean, politics is for people who like going into a room full of total strangers and grabbing hands and introducing themselves and making friends fast. And if you don’t like that work, there are a lot of other useful, valuable things you can do with your time on this Earth.

Torres: Look—for me, loving public service and loving people go hand in hand and you cannot have one without the other. Look—there are moments when we might be in a foul mood, and we have stressful moments, but it’s important to project, at every moment, the joy of public service because it is truly an honor to be a public servant in the greatest country on Earth.

Now, I represent 800,000 people, right? I get to vote on behalf of and speak on behalf of 800,000 people, and that’s an honor that I take to heart every day. And for me, it’s just the greatest gratification of my life because it happens to be the area where I grew up. And so when you keep that perspective in mind, it should inspire you to project the joy of public service and the joy of campaigning.

Frum: Well, let me press you a little harder, without going into personalities, with this contest between different visions of the Democratic Party. In 2016 and 2020, there were national contests—Hillary Clinton versus Bernie Sanders, and then Joe Biden against the field—in which there were far-left pressures and kind of old-fashioned, older, from-a-different-time candidates who spoke from a more moderate approach but didn’t always speak very forcefully. And the contest hung in the balance, and the people who made the difference were sort of older, more religious, more conservative Black voters who pushed the Democratic Party away from unelectable progressivism toward Hillary Clinton in 2016 and toward Biden in 2020. And I don’t know how much credit you give to the state of South Carolina specifically and to any person there, but that does seem to have been the moment where Biden won—and probably the election of 2020 was won.

One of the things I’ve noticed since 2024 is the way that those kinds of voters—older Black voters, churchgoers, people with a stake in the community—they seem to be sort of discounted. I’ll give you two data points that have struck me. First, there have been a couple of polls that have showed Pete Buttigieg in first place as a Democratic choice for president in 2028, which is fine; he’s a very impressive person. But when you look at, okay, Well, what is Pete Buttigieg’s support in the Black community? and the answer is zero, according to those polls—like, literally zero—you think, Okay, how do you get to be in first place in a Democratic preference poll when Black voters are saying, “Not our guy?” And in the recent Democratic primary in the city of New York, the candidate who won was the candidate who did worst among Black voters. The candidates who did well among Black voters both lost. Is the Democratic Party turning its back on these sort of moderate Black voters? What does that mean? Why is that happening? What does that mean?

Torres: Look—it’s certainly true that the strongholds of the Democratic Socialists of America, of the left, in places like New York tend to be college-educated, white-progressive or white Democratic Socialist neighborhoods. In New York City, it’s the gentrified neighborhoods of Queens and Brooklyn and Manhattan, not so much Staten Island and the Bronx. So that’s certainly true. And those voters tend to be much more ideological, much more left leaning.

Older Black voters, I find, tend to be more relational than ideological in their voting. And—

Frum: As Jim Clyburn said, “Joe knows us.”

Torres: Yeah. You know, there’s a great joke about Jim Clyburn that J. C. does not stand for Jesus Christ; it stands for “Jim Clyburn” because he was the single driving force behind the resurrection of Joe Biden in the 2020 Democratic primary. But, you know, it’s often said that familiarity breeds contempt. When it comes to older Black voters, the opposite is true: Familiarity breeds comfort. Like, Black voters were more comfortable with [Andrew] Cuomo because he was a familiar brand name. But I would not mistake a preference for a familiar brand name like Andrew Cuomo for opposition to Mamdani. As Mamdani becomes more familiar in Democratic circles, he certainly is in a position to build support within the African American community.

But there is a generational divide. You know, older African Americans tend to gravitate toward more familiar brand names like Cuomo; younger African Americans may be more left leaning and ideological in their politics. So there is a generational divide unfolding within the Democratic Party.

Frum: But is there something going on between these ideological, highly educated voters you mentioned and everybody else? So there was this great upsurge of protests in 2020 centered in Black America where it sounded like Black Americans—as a non-Black American, it sounded to me like they’re saying, What we want is fair and respectful policing. And a lot of the people who joined up for this movement who were from different communities, who were highly educated, said, Right. What you mean is you want no policing at all. And the people at the center were saying, *No, we want fair and respectful policing, but we actually would like—if it is fair and respectful—*more of it, not less. And this is one of the things that in the New York primary, that I think one of the big issues between people who said, We want more policing; we want it fair and respectful, but we want more. And those who said, Right, what you mean is you want less, and we know better, and we’re telling you.

Torres: Look—I’m one of the leading critics of the DSA, and my frustration with the DSA is the lack of self-awareness. There seems to be no acknowledgement that Democratic Socialists are different from most of the country, including most Democratic working-class people of color in places like the Bronx. And, you know, you’re entitled to believe whatever you wish, but you should not pretend that your beliefs are orthodoxy or the mainstream in America. I remember, when I would ride the subway as a kid, I would often come across a quote that read Never mistake your field of vision for the world. And I feel like the DSA often mistakes its field of vision for the world, and it often speaks for people of color without actually speaking to them, because if you spoke to people of color in places like the Bronx, you would realize there was never popular support for movements like “Defund the police” and that there were widespread concerns about the destabilizing impact of the migrant crisis on cities like New York. And so there is a lack of ideological self-awareness on the part of the DSA. The DSA is entitled to have whatever beliefs it wishes, but those beliefs are different from those not only of most Americans, but most Democrats.

Now, the one issue where every Democrat is aligned is the concern about the affordability crisis. And the genius of the Mamdani campaign lies in focusing like a laser on the affordability crisis, because it is truly the issue that has the most resonance with most voters. Not everyone agrees on the solution, but everyone agrees—in the Democratic Party, and even beyond—that it’s become the central challenge confronting the city and the country.

Frum: Well, I’m not sure you’re entitled to say you’re—well, suppose I say this: Here I am. I’m a politician. I’m from the Democratic Socialists of America, and I’m very concerned about the affordability crisis. Really? Are you? That’s great. Well, what is your solution? My solution is these magic wishing beans I have in my pocket. Aren’t I entitled to say, If your solution is magic wishing beans, you’re probably actually not that revved up about the crisis, because if you cared, you would look for a better idea than magic wishing beans?

Torres: Can I challenge—you’re putting me in the position of defending the DSA, which is making me uncomfortable. Do you think the average establishment Democrat has a thought-out solution to the affordability crisis? Do you think the average politician thinks deeply about cost-benefit analyses and trade-offs and unintended consequences that don’t—

Frum: You don’t need to think very deeply about the affordability of housing in New York to say—

Torres: That’s my frustration, though.

Frum: You say, Okay, what we need to do is bring in a bunch of people from the industry and say, What would it take to get you to build a quarter of a million units in the five boroughs of New York per year? What would we have to change for you to build a quarter of a million? And then they’d give you a list of a bunch of ideas, and you say, Well, I can’t do that one, but yeah, okay, the rest of these we can do. And maybe we won’t get a quarter of a million units a year; maybe we’ll get 200,000.What is being proposed instead are literally—I mean, to say what we’re going to do is take a million dollars of subsidy per apartment, and take the number of subsidized apartments we’re building from 10,000 a year to 20,000 a year in a city where 6 million people are applying for housing, that’s a magic wishing bean. That’s not going to do anything for anybody.

Torres: I agree. But Eric Adams has been mayor for four years. Has he had that convening? I mean, it is not enough for center-left Democrats to denigrate the sloganeering of the far left, which I agree is sloganeering. But we have to actually offer and put forward an affordability agenda, right? We should not put ourselves in the position of defending a status quo that is genuinely failing a generation of young Americans. There are young Americans who are struggling to cope with the crushing cost of housing and higher education and health-care, and we have to address their anxieties about the affordability prices.

I will just echo what I said earlier: It’s not enough for the center left to be against the far left, to sneer at them. We actually have to put forward an affordability agenda. We have to be more introspective about our failures, to be blunt.

Frum: Let me ask you about those failures. The Democratic Party is right now doing a big, supposedly, after-action review of the 2024 election. And there are mean stories circulating, which say, Oh, but everything that is actually the questions you’d want to talk about are off the table. We’re not going to talk about Biden staying in the race arguably too long. We’re not going to talk about having or not having a primary to replace him. We’re gonna talk about everything else. And it reminds me a little bit of the 2012 Republican autopsy, where the Republican Party decided the solution to Romney’s defeat in 2012 was Jeb Bush. And so it got a team of six people, four of whom had tight connections to Jeb Bush, to write a report saying, What do we need? And they wrote a report that took 80 pages to say, What we need is Jeb Bush. And that turned out, actually, not to be the correct answer, but it was very much the product of an in-group. And it looks like the Democratic Party is doing the same thing.

Torres: Look—I feel like we should acknowledge that we screwed up, and then move on. If we deny that there was an issue, it simply serves to perpetuate the story. We should acknowledge that Biden should have decided early on not to run for reelection. There should have been a full primary process. And I happen to believe that the American primary process—which is much longer than the process in Britain is—is an extraordinary character-building experience. It is a test of character. It’s a test of resilience. And you know, I often quote Frederick Nietzsche, who said, “That which does not kill [me], makes [me] stronger.” I feel like you’re made better and stronger and wiser by the demands, by the rigors of the Democratic-primary process. And that benefit was denied to Kamala Harris as the Democratic nominee.

Frum: Is that right? Because—I’m not a Democrat; I’m observing from outside—but the Democratic Party seems to be a family that can’t discuss its business in nondestructive ways. And there’s certain families where you say, Maybe family therapy is actually not the right option for you, because you’ll kill each other.

So I mean, let’s see how this would work. Supposing President Biden had done the patriotic thing and said after the election of 2022, We’ve had this extraordinary result in 2022, much better than anybody had reason to expect. I take that as my personal vindication. I’m pronouncing myself the winner here, and I’m now going to gracefully exit the stage, and I’m declaring an open primary. What would’ve happened? Well, people would’ve said, Oh, you’re betraying the Black woman. Why wasn’t the Black woman you picked good enough? While there would be answers to those questions, no Democrat would easily be able to articulate what the reasons were.

And then you turn into a fight of, you know, when Democrats argue, they don’t argue about ideas. They don’t argue about, even, personalities. They argue about categories. You’re a homophobe. You’re anti-Black woman. You’re anti-this. You’re anti-rural, anti—and they would’ve just ripped themselves to pieces in a bloodbath, which would’ve left the party in arguably even worse shape in 2024 than it actually was.

Torres: I’m not sure about that. I feel if we had more time for a full primary process, we would’ve had a full process, and we would’ve respected—we have Democratic primaries where you have a variety of people from every background run, and we conduct those primaries constructively. And infighting is not unique to the Democratic Party. There’s no shortage of infighting in the Republican Party. And frankly, I will argue that we manage our infighting more effectively than the Republicans do, just judging by the overwhelming dysfunction of the Republican House. I mean, we did not vacate our speaker. We did not go through 15 rounds of voting—I forget the exact number—the longest vote in 150 years. For all of our infighting, ours is much more manageable than what I’m seeing on the other side of the aisle.

Frum: Let me ask you a personal question. You’re too modest to mention this yourself, but you didn’t go to college. And my wife, who also didn’t go to college, likes to work it into the conversation early. (Laughs.) But you don’t do that. But does that give you an advantage? Because one of the things I notice about the Democratic world is there’s this jargon of the university that works itself into all kinds of weird—they have conversations. They have conversations in spaces. They speak from positions of privilege. They belong to certain categories. And none of this is the way anyone spoke English 15 years ago, and it’s the first language of the Democratic Party. Have you sort of acquired immunity to that because of your biography?

Torres: You know, it’s just my nature to speak simply to the extent that I can. Like, just say someone’s hungry rather than food insecure, or say someone is, you know, incarcerated rather than justice-involved. I use a language that’s familiar to everyday people rather than a language that originates from the academy.

But I attribute my pragmatism to a lack of a college degree. If I had graduated from college, I probably, ironically, would be more ideological in my politics and, I feel like, actually less in tune with Economics 101.

Frum: Alright, well, let me get you back to this question of Economics 101, because housing is the supreme issue in your city, and there are people who believe that if you build more housing, housing will become more available. There are people who think if you build more housing, you simply put money into the hands of people we hate who are criminals and who deserve to be expropriated and run out of town. How do you have a conversation between people who hold those two views?

Torres: I mean, I disagree with the second view. For me, it’s not a morality tale; it’s economics. Now, there are certainly unscrupulous landlords who have to be held accountable, but at the core of the affordability crisis is a gap between supply and demand. The demand for affordable housing far exceeds the supply. So we have to build enough housing to meet the demand, and we have to ensure that the housing we build is affordable to the lowest-income families who are often left behind by housing policy in cities like New York. And I’m a proponent of the abundance movement, which, you know, to me is a challenge for the Democratic Party. If Republicans purport to be the party of less government, we as Democrats should not be the party of more government. We should be the party of better, cheaper, and faster government. And we have to learn how to build better, cheaper, and faster, and bigger.

And there needs to be introspection. Why is it that Texas builds more affordable housing than New York? I think Houston builds 20 units per 1,000 residents; Austin, 10 units per 1,000 residents; New York, fewer than four units per 1,000 residents. So cities like Houston and Austin are outbuilding New York by orders of magnitude. Why is it that Texas, rather than New York, has emerged as the solar superpower of America? One of the cruel ironies of our time is that the states—it’s easier to build clean-energy infrastructure in the states that deny climate change than it is in the states that consider it an emergency. So I feel like the abundance movement is a challenge, is an invitation for Democrats to fundamentally reimagine what it means to govern progressively.

And progressive governance should be defined by actual progress. It should be defined not by more spending, but by more supply. What matters in the end is not only more housing spending—I’m in favor of more housing spending—but also expanding the actual supply of housing so that more people have access to homes.

Frum: There’s a classic novel about American urban politics called The Last Hurrah. And in The Last Hurrah, a young man is being groomed to run for mayor of Boston, and he is given introductions to this aspect of city politics and this aspect of city politics. And then finally, his coaches say to him, Now we come to the most important part: foreign policy. And he says, Foreign policy? Well, why do I need any foreign policy to be mayor of Boston? They say, Don’t worry. It’s not that difficult. You just need to remember two sentences: “Trieste belongs to Italy, and all Ireland shall be free.” That’s it.

And there seems to be something like that going on in New York, where one of the flash points between you and the Democratic Socialists of America is Gaza, which is not one of the five boroughs. And is not only the flashpoint, but almost, like Trieste and Ireland, the only one. They’re this world full of complicated, harrowing problems that Americans won’t even read about, let alone develop an opinion about.

Here’s this one flashpoint: Do you ever find there’s something kind of arbitrary and bizarre about the way that foreign policy does and doesn’t touch the politics of New York City?

Torres: Yes and no. If you are Dominican, the Dominican Republic is not a foreign country; it’s an important part of who you are, right? If you’re Irish, Ireland is an important part of who you are. And if you’re Jewish—it’s not true of every Jew, but it’s true of many, maybe most—that Israel is an important part of Jewish identity. So we’re a hyphenated country. We’re a country where we love not only America, but we love the country of our ancestors, as well, right? And that’s part of the American story. So in that sense, it makes sense to me. Like, even though Puerto Rico is a territory of the United States, I care deeply about Puerto Rico because I am Puerto Rican. It’s the home of my ancestry.

But it is strange. So I’ll give you an example of how it can be strange. In the summer of 2020, the New York City Democratic Socialists of America sent out a questionnaire to city-council candidates, and the questionnaire had a foreign-policy section—never mind that the city council plays no role in setting foreign policy—and the foreign-policy section only had two questions. Question No. 1: Do you pledge never to travel to Israel if elected to the city council? Question No. 2: Do you support the boycott, divestment, and sanctions movement against Israel?

So in the Democratic Socialist worldview, it is morally permissible to travel to China, which has committed genocide against Uyghur Muslims; to travel to Russia, which invaded a sovereign nation-state like Ukraine; to travel to Iran, which is the leading state sponsor of terrorism. But travel to the world’s only Jewish state, that is strictly forbidden. And that, to me, is an example of how anti-Zionism can morph into a form of anti-Semitism.

Frum: The two-part question is an example that nothing has changed since—I listened to those two questions, and thought, Huh, Trieste, not there anymore.​​ What happened to that?

Torres: Well, I think we’ve seen a radicalization of progressive politics on the subject of Israel, right? I mean, progressive politics went from embracing a two-state solution to embracing a one-state solution: “Free Palestine, from the river to the sea.” It went from opposing only offensive aid to Israel to now opposing both defensive and offensive aid to Israel, right? It has become heresy to even support Iron Dome, which exists to protect Israeli Jews and Arabs from acts of terror, from relentless rocket fire. And before October 7, a powerful case could be made that Iron Dome was an effective mechanism for deescalating the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Frum: Do you think the tendency to polarization and radicalism can be undone? If we get favorable social circumstances, like a slowdown in inflation and a pickup in wage growth; if the Trump administration is replaced by something more provocative; if the Democrats do well enough in 2026 that the most-progressive members get isolated, and they have to play nice if they want to be influential instead of being part of a very narrow majority, where they’re needed—can these things be unwound, or do you think there’s something deeper in our society that is pushing politics toward these ever-more-extreme views?

Torres: I’m conflicted. I don’t know. Part of me says yes, and part of me says no. Part of me says polarization is inevitable because the perverse incentive structure of our politics rewards polarization. It rewards political theater. It rewards the extremes. You know, if you’re on the extremes, whether you’re the far left or the far right, you’re going to generate far more fundraising online. You’re going to generate more publicity from cable news and talk radio and elsewhere. You’re gonna have a much larger following on social media. The member of Congress to raise the most in the wake of January 6 was Marjorie Taylor Greene after she voted to decertify the election.

And so it does feel like the perverse incentives of our politics are conducive to extremism. And it feels like the social-media algorithm, just by its very nature, amplifies extremism and disinformation and outrage. So that’s where my concern lies.

At the same time, voters can have a moderating effect on political parties, and if we swing the pendulum too far to the left and the voters punish us, we will adjust. When there was a backlash against the “Defund the police,” even the left has largely abandoned it. I mean, Zohran Mamdani ran away from “Defund the police” because he knew it was deeply unpopular among voters. The mismanagement of the migrant crisis, I felt like, had a moderating, humbling effect on the Democratic Party on the issue of border security. So I see arguments in both directions, and I haven’t settled on what I believe.

Frum: You mentioned these incentives, because there’s an incentive that has disappeared. It’s easy—let’s talk about Marjorie Taylor Greene to make this easier to understand by looking at the other party. Thirty, 40, 50 years ago, a character like Marjorie Taylor Greene would’ve won an election to Congress because as Sam Rayburn said, “The American people will elect anybody to anything once.” So she’s elected to Congress in 1974 or 1984. At that point, somebody important in the party would’ve come to her and said, Look—maybe you’re a genuinely crazy person, and there’s nothing anyone can do for you, but maybe you’d like to go to the Senate. Maybe you’d like to be governor. And if that’s the case, you need to dial back the crazy, because the crazy can get you to the House, like, once, twice. It won’t make you a committee chair in the House, and it certainly won’t let you run for anything else. So if you have political ambition, you want to dial back the crazy if it’s in you to dial back the crazy.

And the Marjorie Taylor Greene of a generation ago, or two, would’ve had to think about that, if she were capable of thinking about it. And if she weren’t, the political system would’ve washed her away, as it washes away various kinds of people who genuinely are mentally unbalanced who sometimes show up in Congress. That doesn’t seem to happen anymore, because people in your party and the Republican Party say, You know, I could be governor, but I’d rather have 12 million Instagram followers.

Torres: I think one of the most corrosive trends in politics has been the celebritization of politics. There are growing numbers of Congress who see Congress not as an institution, but as a stage on which to perform, as a theatrical production. And that’s a dynamic that’s present both on the left and on the right. But the situation is far worse, I believe, on the far right, because the majority of Democrats remain in the center, whereas I feel like the center right has all but collapsed, and the Republican Party has been reduced to nothing more than a cult of personality around Donald Trump. And Donald Trump truly represents the Freudian id of the Republican base. And he has created an atmosphere in which conspiratorial politics can thrive. And you know, we’re seeing it with the—on the campaign trail, he spent much of his time stoking the fires of the Jeffrey Epstein conspiracy, and now those fires are threatening to devour his own administration. So he’s being hoisted by his own petard.

Frum: Yeah. There is something so weird about that story. Like, did the people around Trump who made it the central issue in their politics not understand or know that if you go to the very heart of the labyrinth here, the person you’re going to find is Donald Trump?

Torres: Yes. Yes.

Frum: I sometimes wonder whether—well, Donald Trump Jr. was, like, one of the leading voices on this question. I kind of wonder if there’s something oedipal going on, that at some level he knew this is the story, If I am excited about it in ’21, ’22, I look like a super-Trump loyalist, but actually, I know at some deep level that I’m destroying my father, whom I hate because he doesn’t respect me. Is there something complicated going on there? I wonder.

Torres: Look—I have no insight into the psyche of the Trump family, but here’s what I find strange. You know, MAGA is like a religion that sees Donald Trump as the chosen one, right? Donald Trump was chosen to release the Epstein files as a form of revelation and destroy the deep state and drain the swamp. But there’s a simple problem with the narrative of Donald Trump as the savior, is: How can you drain the swamp when you are part of the swamp? Like, there is literally no one in Washington, D.C., who has closer and longer ties to Jeffrey Epstein than Donald Trump himself. Even if you ignore The Wall Street Journal story, in 2002 in a New York magazine profile of Jeffrey Epstein, Donald Trump went on record praising his longstanding, 15-year relationship with Jeffrey Epstein, and said that Epstein loves beautiful women as much as he does, and “many of them are on the younger side.” He literally said this in 2002. And so the facts just flatly contradict the notion of Donald Trump as the great savior against the Epstein-led deep state.

[Content truncated due to length...]

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From The Atlantic via this RSS feed

About two hours into the Gen Z influencer Andrew Callaghan’s interview with Hunter Biden, I had a moment of piercing clarity: Here is a Democrat you could put on Joe Rogan’s podcast. Joe Biden’s surviving son became MAGA world’s favorite punching bag because of his suspect business dealings in Ukraine, his infamous laptop, and his presidential pardon for tax and gun offenses. But in temperament and vocabulary, Hunter is MAGA to the core.

During last year’s presidential campaign, Donald Trump’s interviews with Rogan, Theo Von, and Logan Paul resonated with many young men. I can imagine that same audience watching Hunter tell Callaghan about his crack addiction and thinking: Give this guy a break*.* One of the most upvoted comments on the YouTube video is from a poster saying that the interview prompted him to go to rehab.

Since their crushing loss in November, Democrats have wondered how they can win the battle for attention and reach voters who find them weak, remote, and passive. Their elected officials have been tiptoeing toward using the occasional cuss word in their public appearances, like teenagers cautiously puffing a joint for the first time and hoping not to cough. Hunter Biden, by contrast, went straight for line after line of the hard stuff. Donald Trump is a “fucking dictator thug,” and Democrats should fight against his deportation agenda because “we fought a fucking revolution against a king, based on two things in particular: habeas corpus and due process. And we’re so willing to give them up?”

Hunter’s cadences and mannerisms are eerily reminiscent of his father’s, except where Joe would say “malarkey,” Hunter says: “I don’t have to be fucking nice.” At times, he sounds like his father’s id, saying the things the ex-president would like to say but cannot.

Clearly, Republicans have not cornered the market in gossipy aggression, although in both their and Hunter’s cases, most of that aggression is directed toward the Democrats and the media. In the Callaghan interview, which was released on Monday, the younger Biden has no time for James Carville (“hasn’t run a race in 40 fucking years”), George Clooney (“not a fucking actor”), or CNN’s Jake Tapper (“completely irrelevant”). His greatest animus is reserved for his party’s anti–Joe Biden faction, such as the men behind Pod Save America, who are “four white millionaires that are dining out on their association with Barack Obama from 16 years ago, living in Beverly fucking Hills.” If you grew up in the pre-Trump media era, your response to this might be: Hunter, you have also made money off of your association with a president. But America has long since passed the point where allegations of hypocrisy are a useful political attack. Most voters now think that all politicians are hypocrites, but at least some of them are open about it.

[Read: Democrats have a man problem]

Everything that was bananas about Hunter’s interview by old media standards—the insults, the frank discussion of drugs, the weird segues, the desire to lean into controversy—had previously been embraced by the Trump campaign. Last year, Trump’s most human moment was talking with Theo Von about his brother’s death from alcoholism, an exchange that also featured Von, who is now sober, joking about the low quality of cocaine these days and Trump nodding solemnly, as if this were something his tariff regime might address. In the interview with Callaghan, Hunter Biden talks about how making crack requires only “a mayonnaise jar, cocaine, and baking soda.”

Then there’s the open shilling for sponsors. In Trump’s preelection interview with Logan Paul, bottles of the YouTuber’s energy drink, Prime, sat prominently on the table in front of the hosts, and Paul did an ad for them right after the section on Gaza. Callaghan pushes the self-promotion even further. He interrupts his Hunter Biden interview with inserted segments in which Callaghan faces the camera and pitches his other work, including a documentary on adult babies. (Don’t make me explain. It’s exactly what you fear.) Even more bizarrely, Callaghan surrounds these ads with questions to Hunter about their subject matter. “Some days I identify as a baby,” Hunter responds, gamely, before suggesting that his host should ask the adult baby-diaper lovers if they vote Democrat or Republican. Then he hints at the conspiracy theory that Trump wears a diaper, a cut so deep that even Callaghan doesn’t get it.

You don’t have to like it, but this is the media world now—podcast chats like this are where elections are won and lost, just as much as at the televised town hall, on the front page of the New York Post, or in the stately sitdown with 60 Minutes. The minimum bar for the next Democratic candidate for president should be the ability to react, live on camera, in a plausibly normal fashion, to the existence of adult baby-diaper lovers.

Hunter Biden is on something of an “I was right” tour. Callaghan recorded the interview last month in Delaware. The former Democratic National Committee Chair Jaime Harrison also released an interview with Hunter on Monday, covering many of the same topics. According to Original Sin, the book by Tapper and Alex Thompson on the last days of the Biden presidency, the president’s son wanted to do an interview tour to promote his 2021 memoir, Beautiful Things, about his grief over the death of his brother, Beau, and his drug relapse. Hunter “planned to do a book tour through South Carolina, stopping at famed Black churches to talk about his crack addiction, but Biden’s advisers pushed back,” Tapper and Thompson write. “Hunter relented.”

I now wonder whether Hunter’s instincts were correct for once. He shows Callaghan the bullish charm of the narcissist. Bad things happen to him. Bad things might also happen to those around him, but, in his telling, he isn’t really their cause.

That portrait is hard to square with the available facts. Many people manage to grieve for their brother without starting an affair with his widow, or introducing that widow to crack. Many presidents’ children have wrestled with the inevitable allegations of nepotism that their careers have created; few have so obviously traded on their father’s power as Hunter did with the Ukrainian company Burisma, for which he lobbied when his father was vice president. (His defense for this is that Burisma wasn’t a big deal, that he also worked for many charitable organizations, and that in any case the Trump sons and Jared Kushner are worse.)

He plays dumb on the criticisms of the inflated sales price of his paintings, feigning disbelief that anyone would buy one to curry favor with the president. And while constantly stressing his status as a son, brother, father, and grandfather, Hunter never mentions his treatment of Navy, the little girl whose conception he cannot remember and whom he initially refused to acknowledge or financially assist. In American Woman, a history of first ladies, the journalist Katie Rogers reports that many staff members in the Biden White House were upset by Joe and Jill Biden’s unquestioned backing of their son when he refused to support Navy without a paternity test. “Their devotion to keeping Hunter safe, people close to them said, was worth enduring the onslaught of criticism from both Republicans and Democrats,” Rogers writes.

[From the January 2025 issue: The ‘mainstream media’ has already lost]

Hunter’s perpetual refusal to be held accountable is clearly a character trait that many people are prepared to overlook. But then, when did a populist ever accept responsibility for anything? He has understood that to succeed in the modern media environment, you should throw out intimate details about your life in a way that looks like total, raw, unfiltered honesty while glossing over the raw, unfiltered details that reflect poorly on you. If you really screw up, then promise to atone in a fashion that does not inhibit your life or career—rehab, not a jail sentence. Just look at Hunter’s interviewer for more evidence that this works: In 2023, Callaghan was accused by multiple women of overstepping their sexual boundaries. He thanked his accusers for speaking out, said he had “always taken no for an answer,” pledged to attend a 12-step program, and carried on with his life.

Americans love someone who has been born again, and the younger Biden is charming enough to attribute all his past behavior to the Bad Old Hunter, while spinning a yarn about how, when he met his second wife, Melissa, she simply told him to stop smoking crack—and because of his love for her, he did.

The long podcast interview works so well for public figures—or at least, the ones able to master its idiosyncrasies—because hearing anyone’s life story usually puts you on their side. When Hunter describes his “public humiliation,” even a minimally empathetic viewer will reflect on how horrifically his privacy was invaded, and how none of us would react well to our worst moments being splashed across the internet. Incredibly, Callaghan manages to turn the laptop saga into yet another ad, cutting away to promote Incogni, a service that removes people’s information from data brokers: “So, obviously Hunter here is somebody who’s dealt with a complete lack of privacy in the past couple years, but you don’t need to be the president’s son to have your data leaked,” he tells viewers. “In fact, it’s most likely happening to you right now.”

Funnily enough, the pioneer of the endless-interview podcast, Joe Rogan, doesn’t do personalized ad reads like this. Maybe that’s because he doesn’t need to—his first Spotify deal was reportedly worth more than $200 million—but maybe it’s also that he’s 57, and remembers a world where content and ads were divided by a holy wall. In almost every other respect, though, Callaghan is one of Rogan’s children. This is not an adversarial interview; at one point, he tells Hunter, “I’m on your team.” In three hours of conversation, Callaghan barely interrupts. When Hunter wants to go off on a digression about the Dred Scott case or the anti-Nazi dissident Dietrich Bonhoeffer, he is allowed to do so.

The most decisive, and probably irreversible, shift in the post-Rogan American political conversation is evident in how both Callaghan and his guest talk in conspiratorial terms: the “Christofascist incel,” in Hunter’s words, who gave the laptop hard drive to Rudy Giuliani; the Mossad’s alleged intelligence about the October 7 attack before it happened. Yet Callaghan also points out how profitable online conspiracies are for everyone involved. He says that he believes that “most mainstream conspiracy theories, flat earth, chemtrails, QAnon, all that stuff is deliberate misinformation to convince dumb people that they’re doing important research and keep them away from the truth.” Callaghan goes on, “So maybe the conspiracy isn’t, you know, Russia telling people what to do and how to think. It’s just profit-incentivized content creators farming outrage through these ridiculous conspiracies.” He’s spinning out a meta–conspiracy theory. But if this argument can’t deradicalize the extremely online, nothing can.

Headlines about the interview have focused on Hunter’s dead-ender defense of his father’s candidacy. He admits that his father underperformed onstage at the catastrophic June debate, but he blames it on Biden’s staff giving him an Ambien the night before. (Oh, look: another Biden with no apparent agency over bad decisions.)

Denial is not just a river in Egypt, but the fluid coursing through Hunter’s veins. “He flew around the world, basically the mileage he could have flown around the world three times,” the younger Biden said of his father in his interview with Callaghan. “He’s 81 years old. He’s tired as shit.” So advanced age does affect someone’s ability to undertake a grueling presidential campaign? Good to know. “We lost the last election because we did not remain loyal to the leader of the party,” Hunter told Jaime Harrison. “That’s my position.” This is a ridiculous position; voters were already worried about Biden’s age, and the debate merely allowed the elites to act on those fears. But who is going to judge a son for refusing to admit his father’s flaws?

[Helen Lewis: Finally, someone said it to Joe Rogan’s face]

So far, more than 2 million people have watched the interview with Callaghan on YouTube, and many more will consume it through extracts on social media. Maybe clips of a president’s son defending habeas corpus and mentioning a crack dealer named Bicycles is what the attention economy demands.

Perhaps the Democrats, instead of spending another $20 million on their “man problem,” should find a candidate who has less baggage than Hunter Biden, but can attack Republican policies with his level of straightforward, pummeling aggression. Maybe someone who was only addicted to one of the more genteel drugs, or only slept with their cousin’s widow. But also someone who can talk about the creepiness of Stephen Miller, and who can attack the greed of the Trump sons (“They’re selling gold telephones and sneakers and $2 billion investments in golf courses, and selling tickets to the White House for investment into their memecoin”) without fretting about being accused of hypocrisy. Maybe even one who can say that they believe in a two-state solution in the Middle East—but also that if Benjamin Netanyahu really did slow-walk the release of hostages for his political gain, that would make him a “monster.”

But don’t just take my word for it—behold the conservative activist Christopher Rufo. “Might be an unpopular opinion, but I find Hunter Biden to be an utterly compelling anti-hero,” he posted on X after watching the interview. “He is honest about his own flaws and sees right through the corruption and artifice of the elite Dem milieu.” Mike Solana, the author of the anti-woke, tech-focused Pirate Wires newsletter, agreed. “If this were a trump son he’d be a MAGA folk hero,” he wrote on X.

This is true. Personally, I would prefer that Hunter Biden show some regret for his actions and how they undermined his father’s presidency, and how that helped return Trump to office. But I would settle for Hunter going on Joe Rogan’s podcast to show MAGA-curious voters that the person at the center of so many conspiracy theories is a real person, not a shadowy villain.

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From The Atlantic via this RSS feed

For months, no Republican in either the House or the Senate spoke out more forcefully, or more consistently, against cutting Medicaid than Josh Hawley. As President Donald Trump’s “big beautiful bill” was weaving its way through Congress, Hawley argued repeatedly that stripping health insurance from the poorest Americans would be “morally wrong and politically suicidal” for a party that, in the Trump era, has relied on millions of votes from people who receive government assistance.

Back home in Missouri, the senator was making the same case in private, according to several people I spoke with who met with him or his staff this year. His deep engagement on the issue impressed advocates representing Missouri’s hospitals, doctors, and rural health centers, all of whom were having trouble getting GOP lawmakers to take their concerns seriously. The changes, these advocates argued, could cost Missouri billions of dollars in federal funding, take away insurance from an estimated 170,000 residents, and force hospitals and rural health centers to close.

“I did believe that he was genuine,” Amy Blouin, the president of the Missouri Budget Project, a nonpartisan think tank, told me. “I do see him as a different type of Republican.”

Yet Hawley ultimately joined almost every other Republican in Congress and voted for the bill, which independent analysts project will cut nearly $1 trillion from Medicaid and leave 10 million Americans newly uninsured. With three Republicans opposing the legislation in the narrowly divided Senate, Hawley’s support proved decisive.

In a statement, Hawley said that the bill’s benefits—chiefly the extension of Trump’s first-term tax cuts—outweighed his concerns. “Gotta take the wins where you can,” the senator told a reporter. Then, last week, Hawley’s Medicaid journey took yet another turn when he introduced legislation that would prevent some of the deepest reductions from taking effect—essentially proposing to repeal a major provision of the legislation he had just voted to enact.

[Read: No one loves the bill (almost) every Republican voted for]

Hawley’s contortions on the bill were perhaps the starkest illustration of how a Republican Party, under pressure to deliver a quick win for the president, ended up slashing a core social-safety-net program much more deeply than many people expected—and more than some of its own members, including Trump himself at times, seemed to want. Republicans are only now beginning to assess the fallout from their enactment of such a far-reaching law. Polls have found that the bill is unpopular, and its Medicaid cuts especially so. But the law puts off its most painful provisions until after the 2026 midterm elections. Trump himself won’t face voters again, so lawmakers like Hawley will be left to deal with the bill’s political and real-world consequences.

Democrats have roundly mocked Hawley, painting him as one more weak-kneed Republican who talked a big populist game on Medicaid only to fold quickly under pressure from Trump. “It was a performance worthy of a gold medal in political pretzel gymnastics,” Russ Carnahan, a former Missouri representative in Congress who is now chair of the state Democratic Party, told me. Hawley’s effort to immediately restore the cuts, Carnahan said, was a cynical attempt to fool Missourians: “He turned his back on helping people when he had the chance.” A former three-term Republican senator from Missouri, John Danforth, was barely more sympathetic. Danforth was once a political mentor to Hawley but broke with him after he backed Trump’s attempt to overturn the 2020 presidential election. He told me that Hawley’s new legislative proposal is tantamount to a press release. “It has no real consequence,” Danforth said, dismissing the measure as “simply a way of saying ‘whoops.’”

Hawley’s office declined to make him available for an interview. Instead, a spokesperson pointed to victories that the senator had secured in the GOP bill, including additional relief for Missourians living with cancers linked to Manhattan Project work that took place in the state more than 80 years ago. This morning, at an event hosted by Axios, Hawley said he had drawn a “red line” on benefit cuts for individual Medicaid recipients, and that the bill did not contain any.

Hawley had seemed to be an unlikely savior for those looking for a Republican willing to thwart Trump’s agenda. Outside Missouri, he is best known as the senator who held up a fist of support for the Trump faithful storming the Capitol on January 6, 2021, and then, hours later, was seen on video fleeing the same mob. Unlike moderate Senators Susan Collins of Maine and Lisa Murkowski of Alaska, Hawley does not have an extensive record of breaking with Republicans on key votes. Nor does he have an imminent campaign to consider; Hawley won reelection last fall by nearly 14 points.

The Missourians I spoke with presume that Hawley’s populist rhetoric reflects his national ambitions. With an eye toward the 2028 presidential race, he might be trying to stay loyal to Trump—a requirement for political survival in today’s GOP—while separating himself from rivals whose emphasis on fiscal austerity alienates the president’s working-class supporters. Hawley cited Trump’s own past pledges to protect Medicaid in explaining his initial opposition to the cuts, and he was one of a few Senate Republicans who publicly welcomed the idea (which the party ultimately abandoned) of raising taxes on the rich in the GOP megabill.

The bill contains several major changes to Medicaid, and Hawley is trying to prevent only some of them. He continues to support, for example, the work requirements for nondisabled adults that could add administrative burdens to the program and result in millions of people losing insurance. The cuts that Hawley opposes would affect the amount of money that states such as Missouri could receive from the federal government for Medicaid. Hawley has taken credit for the fact that the enacted bill delays the start date of those provisions until at least 2028, and for securing a $50 billion rural health fund in the bill that could partially offset the loss of federal money for states. His new proposal would repeal the Medicaid funding changes altogether and double the rural fund.

Hawley’s attempt at a balancing act has found him few friends so far. Democrats are happy to use his critique of Medicaid cuts as campaign fodder for next year’s midterm elections—the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee hailed him as its “newest surrogate”—while denouncing his vote for the bill. Republicans have mostly ignored him. None have signed on as co-sponsors of his new proposal. When I surveyed the seven other Republicans who represent Missouri in Congress on whether they share Hawley’s concerns about Medicaid or support his new legislation, none responded. (A spokesperson for Missouri’s GOP governor, Mike Kehoe, said that Hawley “is right to be concerned about the long-term sustainability of rural hospitals in Missouri and across the country.”)

[David A. Graham: A Congress that votes yes and hopes no]

Danforth told me he never thought Hawley’s vote on the GOP bill—which the former senator called “terrible”—was in doubt. “It would just be impossible to be a Republican in good standing in this era and vote against it,” Danforth said. “You’re going to be heckled. People are going to abuse you, and you’ll just never come up for air. So you must vote for the ‘big, beautiful bill,’ even though it means voting for elements that are against what you’ve been saying.”

Missouri’s Medicaid advocates haven’t given up on Hawley, however. In some respects, his lonely, politically awkward fight might be their best hope to stave off cuts that Heidi Lucas, the executive director of the Missouri Rural Health Association, described to me as “devastating.” “People are going to die because of these, especially when rural hospitals start closing,” Lucas said. “They were already running on very thin margins, and this is going to put them over the edge.” Lucas said the rural health fund, even if it gets doubled, is “a drop in the bucket” compared with the total loss of federal dollars. “We need stitches to fix the problem, and he’s doing it more like a Band-Aid,” she said of Hawley.

Still, Lucas offered Hawley some praise for introducing his bill. “Whatever we can do to mitigate the damage these cuts are going to have, we need to be supportive of,” she said. “So we’ll support Hawley pushing for these fixes in the hopes that in the long term, these will get into place, and then we can roll back some of the other provisions.” Maybe, Lucas allowed, “this ends up being a great thing.”

Hawley’s bill stands little chance of passing while Republicans control Congress. And Democrats aren’t interested in partnering with Hawley after he voted for the bill that contained the cuts in the first place. “It’s a cynical play, and people see that,” Representative Suzan DelBene of Washington State, the chair of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, told me. “It’s not an honest attempt to address the issue, because this issue wouldn’t exist if he hadn’t voted for it.”

[Jonathan Chait: They didn’t have to do this]

If Democrats can harness voter anger to recapture one or both chambers of Congress next year, Hawley could become more useful to them as a Republican willing to revisit the president’s signature bill. A political backlash to the bill could make Hawley’s critique look prescient. And Trump, who was never that excited about slashing Medicaid to begin with, could use a further delay or repeal of the cuts as a bargaining chip for other legislative priorities. “What we’ve just seen is these election cycles lead to policy decisions, and they do truly have consequences,” Jon Doolittle, the president of the Missouri Hospital Association, told me. “There is time for these laws to change before they take effect.”

Amy Blouin is hoping that’s true. I asked her whether she still thinks that Hawley was “genuine” in his opposition to Medicaid cuts. She said she does, but his vote for the president’s bill stung nonetheless. “I don’t know the right word to describe the feeling. It’s not necessarily betrayed,” Blouin said. She settled on “extremely disappointed.” Like others I spoke with, she had wondered whether Hawley could withstand the intense pressure all Republican lawmakers were facing to back Trump’s bill. A few of them did, most notably Senator Thom Tillis of North Carolina, who voted no, after criticizing the Medicaid cuts. “I was hoping,” Blouin told me with a rueful laugh, “that Senator Hawley would be a Tillis.”

Unlike Hawley, however, Tillis was not voting with his political future in mind: Shortly after declaring his opposition to the bill, he announced his retirement from the Senate.

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From The Atlantic via this RSS feed

Aaron Favila / APNewlyweds Jade Rick Verdillo and Jamaica Aguilar kiss during their wedding in the flooded Barasoain church in Malolos, Bulacan province, Philippines on July 22, 2025.Aaron Favila / APBride Jamaica Aguilar prepares to enter the flooded Barasoain church for her wedding in Malolos on July 22, 2025.Aaron Favila / APWedding guests walk inside the flooded Barasoain church on July 22, 2025.Aaron Favila / APWedding guests leave their shoes on a pew above the high-water mark during the ceremony.Aaron Favila / APThe bride, Jamaica Aguilar, walks down the aisle during her wedding ceremony.Aaron Favila / APGroomsmen and guests with their pant legs rolled up stand in floodwater inside Barasoain church on July 22, 2025.Aaron Favila / APBridesmaids stand among the pews.Aaron Favila / APGuests lean out over the flooded aisle to watch the wedding ceremony.Aaron Favila / APJade Rick Verdillo and Jamaica Aguilar sit together during their wedding ceremony.Aaron Favila / APNewlyweds Jade Rick Verdillo and Jamaica Aguilar walk down the aisle, hand in hand, during their wedding.Aaron Favila / APGuests cheer as the newlywed couple shares a kiss inside the flooded Barasoain church in Malolos, Philippines, on July 22, 2025.

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From The Atlantic via this RSS feed

Donald Trump has so far gotten his way on tariffs and tax cuts, but one economic goal eludes him: lower interest rates. Reduced borrowing costs would in theory make homes and cars cheaper for consumers, help businesses invest in creating jobs, and allow the government to finance its massive debt load at a steep discount. In the president’s mind, only one obstacle stands in the way of this obvious economic win-win: the Federal Reserve.

Trump has mused publicly about replacing Fed Chair Jerome Powell since before he even took office, calling him “Too Late Powell” (as in waiting too long to cut rates) and a “numbskull.” Those threats have gotten more serious recently. In a meeting with House Republicans last Tuesday, the president reportedly showed off the draft of a letter that would have fired the Fed chair. Trump later claimed that it was “highly unlikely” that he would fire Powell, but he left open the possibility that the chair might have to “leave for fraud.” To that end, the administration has launched an investigation into Powell’s management of an expensive renovation of the central bank’s headquarters. (Any wrongdoing would, at least in theory, offer a legal pretext for firing him.)

This plan is unlikely to succeed in the near term. The administration’s legal case against Powell is almost certainly specious, and the Fed sets interest rates by the votes of 12 board members, not according to the chair’s sole discretion. Even if the president eventually does get his way, however, and installs enough pliant board members to slash government interest rates, this could have the paradoxical effect of raising the interest rates paid in the real world. If that happened, mortgages would get more expensive, businesses would have a harder time investing, and government financing would become even less sustainable.

Trump seems to have a simple mental model of monetary policy: The Federal Reserve unilaterally sets all of the interest rates across the entire economy. The reality is more complicated. The central bank controls what is known as the federal-funds rate, the interest rate at which banks loan one another money. A lower federal-funds rate means that banks can charge lower interest on the loans they issue. This generally causes rates on short-term debt, such as credit-card annual percentage rates and small-business loans, to fall.

But the interest rates that people care the most about are on long-term debt, such as mortgages and car loans. These are influenced less by the current federal-funds rate and more by expectations of what the economic environment will look like in the coming years, even decades. The Fed influences these long-term rates not only directly, by changing the federal-funds rate, but also indirectly by sending a signal about where the economy is headed.

[Rogé Karma: The Federal Reserve’s little secret]

What signal would the Fed be sending if it suddenly slashed the federal-funds rate from its current level of about 4.5 percent to Trump’s preferred 1 percent? Typically, an interest-rate cut of this magnitude would be reserved for a calamity in which the Fed drastically needs to increase the money supply to give the labor market a big boost. (This is what happened after the 2008 financial crisis.) Today’s economy has a very different problem: Unemployment is low, but inflation remains above the Fed’s target and has risen in recent months. In this environment, most economists predict that a dramatic increase in the money supply would send prices soaring.

Last week, in response to Trump flirting with the possibility of firing Powell, a key measure of investors’ long-term-inflation expectations spiked dramatically. The mere prospect of higher inflation is “kryptonite” for lenders and bondholders, Mark Zandi, the chief economist at Moody’s Analytics, told me, because it creates the risk that any debt paid back in the future will be worth a lot less than it is today. In such a situation, Zandi explained, banks and investors would likely impose a higher interest rate up front.

Many experts, including former Fed chairs, believe that cutting rates simply because the president demands it could have an even more profound consequence: It would tell the world that the U.S. central bank can no longer be trusted to credibly manage the money supply going forward. Investors would “get really nervous about holding U.S. Treasuries,” the economist Jason Furman told me, and demand a far higher return for buying them to make up for the higher risk—which would, perversely, drive interest rates higher, not lower. As evidence, Furman pointed out that, on several occasions, including last week, the interest rates on 10- and 30-year government bonds have shot up in response to Trump threatening to fire Powell. (In fact, the gap between short- and long-term rates jumped to its highest level since 2021 last week in the less-than-one-hour window between when reports surfaced about Trump planning to fire Powell and the president’s denial of that plan.) Because most long-term interest rates, including those for home mortgages, student loans, and auto loans, are directly pegged to the rate on government bonds—which serves as a sort of base rate for the entire financial system—all of those other rates would rise as well.

[Jonathan Chait: What Trump’s feud with Jerome Powell is really about]

The precise consequences of a move as drastic as what Trump has suggested are impossible to forecast with certainty. And the predictions of economists have been proved wrong many times. (Remember the inevitable recession of 2023?) Still, recent history has not been kind to populist leaders who try to forcibly lower interest rates. Between 2019 and 2022, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan replaced three central-bank governors with loyalists who were willing to slash interest rates even as prices were rising. This caused inflation to spiral even higher, at one point reaching 85 percent. Foreign investors panicked, prompting a fire sale of Turkish government bonds. Long-term interest rates spiked, the Turkish lira crashed in value, and the country appeared on the verge of hyperinflation. The crisis began to abate only when Erdoğan changed course in 2023 and brought in new central-bank leadership who raised interest rates to above 45 percent in a desperate effort to restore credibility. (Inflation has since fallen considerably but remains very high.) “When investors start running for the hills, you get into really dangerous territory,” Zandi told me.

A path exists to persuade the Fed to cut interest rates without such a high risk of backfiring. The problem for Trump is that it would require a complete reversal of the highest-priority economic policies of his second term. Last September, the Fed began cutting interest rates and signaled that it would continue to do so. Then Trump entered office and threatened sky-high tariffs on every country on the planet. In response, the Fed has refrained from cutting rates further, terrified that Trump’s policies will unleash another bout of inflation.

There is some debate, including within the Fed itself, over whether tariff-induced price increases will in fact lead to sustained higher inflation. But for now at least, the central bank doesn’t appear willing to take any chances. “In effect, we went on hold when we saw the size of the tariffs and essentially all inflation forecasts for the United States went up materially as a consequence of the tariffs,” Powell said on July 1. The One Big Beautiful Bill Act, which passed days later and includes trillions of dollars of unpaid-for tax cuts, has only made Powell’s case stronger.

If the president were serious about lowering the cost of borrowing for families and businesses, he would be wise to leave Powell alone and simply stop enacting wildly irresponsible policies. Trump tends to prefer a different approach to people and institutions refusing to do his bidding: force them into submission. But America’s central bank isn’t like most other institutions; it is the central node in a highly complex chain of interactions that undergirds the entire global economy. Even one seemingly small error or misstep can result in disaster. If Trump manages to break the Fed, he will likely regret it.

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From The Atlantic via this RSS feed

This article features spoilers for the ending of Eddington***.***

The director Ari Aster specializes in bringing stress dreams to life: becoming plagued by a demonic curse, as seen in his debut film, Hereditary; joining an evil Scandinavian cult, in his follow-up, Midsommar; realizing a person’s every fear, as occurs in the strange, picaresque Beau Is Afraid.But for his latest movie, Eddington, he turns to a more prosaic topic to get our blood running: the events of 2020. The film initially presents itself as a neo-Western, set in the small, fictional New Mexico town of Eddington at the beginning of the coronavirus pandemic. In true Aster form, the familiar portrait of that period—and the gnarly headspace it trapped many of us in—disintegrates into something disturbingly surreal. The film dramatizes this downward spiral through the experience of a man consumed by anxiety about how his community is shifting around him. Lockdown may have driven some people to question one another’s reality; Eddington’s protagonist, however, seeks control of his—with violent and gory results.

In interviews about his inspirations, Aster has invoked John Ford’s masterpiece My Darling Clementine, a bittersweet retelling of the gunfight at the O.K. Corral. But what I thought of more than anything while watching Eddington was Taxi Driver, a dark fable that’s grounded in the point of view of a delusional maniac similarly defined by his paranoid, even conspiratorial, thinking. In the Martin Scorsese classic, Travis Bickle (played by Robert De Niro) lives out his fantasy of “cleaning up” New York City by murdering a man who prostituted young girls in a brothel; the subsequent press coverage cements him as a folk hero, ending the film on a strange, bloodily triumphal note.

The local sheriff in Eddington, Joe Cross (Joaquin Phoenix), is the film’s Bickle, though his final showdown is a far more absurd spectacle than the one in Taxi Driver. Aster’s film is frightening, yes—but it’s a dark and lacerating comedy first and foremost, playing out the power fantasies that fueled many an online conspiracy theory in the pandemic’s early days (and still do now). And althoughCross may not be as crushingly lonely as Bickle, he does share the character’s escalating sense of paranoia.By plunging the viewer into this chaotic inner world, Aster illustrates the dissonant appeal of being enmeshed in the perspective of, and maybe even rooting for, an individual committed to their belief in justice—even if that commitment can border on sordid.

[Read: A nasty, cynical, and eerily accurate look at all-too-recent history]

Each of Aster’s movies descends into chaos by its third act, but the bloodbath at the end of Eddington is particularly challenging because of what precedes it: a recognizable, if satirical, investigation of life under lockdown. As such, the filmis much more concerned with modern society than the director’s past work, contorting the anxiety and extreme politicization that arose during the early pandemic to fit into Aster’s strange world. Embodying those feelings is Cross, a lonely sheriff who eventually stands up to shadowy, destructive forces.

Eddington introduces its protagonist in much more mundane fashion, however. Cross serves the town of Eddington as a useless figure of authority—a shiftless, asthmatic grump who mumbles complaints at lawbreakers and halfheartedly manages a staff of cops at his office. When the film starts, he is struggling to uphold the state-mandated quarantine regulations, which he rarely follows himself. Eventually, the viewer learns that Cross has a personal connection to the position; his father-in-law once held it, and his tenure is still revered by both his family and his community. But Cross can hardly keep up with his job’s basic tasks, let alone the kind of slick change represented by the person often challenging his control over Eddington: its mayor, Ted Garcia (Pedro Pascal).

Garcia, unlike Cross, is a friendly, tech-focused modernizer; he’s backing the construction of a local data center that has proved divisive. Garcia and Cross’s mutual disdain initially drives the film’s tension: Garcia has some personal animosity with Cross that revolves around a rumored, long-ago dalliancewiththe sheriff’s wife, Louise (Emma Stone). Just as Garcia and Cross become fixated on each other, Louise develops an obsession with a seeming cult leader named Vernon Jefferson Peak (Austin Butler). Peak posts his elliptical wisdom in popular short-form videos that Louise affirms in the comments. Louise’s mother, Dawn (Deirdre O’Connell), who lives with the Crosses, is similarly buying into questionable lines of thinking; she’s constantly spouting misinformation about the origins of the pandemic, and parroting whatever else comes across her Facebook feed.

Eddington makes plenty of satirical sport of all the characters, including a swath of overly sensitive teenage protesters. But the rageful engine driving Cross’s actions is more disquieting than simple family or small-town drama. In the simplest read of what happens next, Cross becomes a local celebrity of sorts. After an altercation with Garcia at a supermarket, instigated when the sheriff supports a customer refusing to wear a mask—and similarly goes without one, pointing to how it affects his asthma—Cross announces his own mayoral run. He campaigns on a vague populist platform of throwing unhoused people out of town and resisting COVID restrictions, posting his progressively more inflammatory screeds to Facebook. The ramblings go viral, pushing Cross into further confrontations with Garcia.

[Read: Beau Is Afraid is your worst nightmare, and it’s wonderful]

The sheriff’s simmering anger, which reaches boiling point as a result of Eddington’s growing air of claustrophobia and his own loosening grip on his life, leads to Cross assassinating Garcia. He kills Garcia’s son too, and tries to cover up both murders by pinning the blame on a fellow cop. But as the sheriff’s tangled web of lies begins to unravel—and his focus is diverted further away from the town—Eddington is besieged by frightening special-ops forces of unknown origin. The attack culminates in a bloody gun battle in the streets, and Cross barely survives; he emerges as a vigilante who has defended his community from, well, somebody. The film ends with Cross, now paralyzed and heavily medicated, functioning as the town’s mayor. Unlike that of Taxi Driver’s Bickle, however, the sheriff’s victory is a hollow one; his mother-in-law appears to have seized the real power behind the throne, rendering him more a puppet than an icon.

This turn of events offers a perfectly grim button to Cross’s ridiculous hallucinations of grandeur. But it’s also a reminder from Aster that for all the thrilling gunplay of Eddington’s final act, there is no real happy ending awaiting Cross. Eddington does not aim to be a simple tale of heroism, and its events are so outlandish that they are hard to take at face value. The movie, in its fullest expression, is a feverish swirl of the charged opinions that drove so many conversations during the pandemic’s height—be they from the right, the left, or all the way on the fringe. The shadowy characters invading Eddington could be interpreted as a fascist hit squad or an antifa battalion; on-screen, they simply represent the nonsensical extremes that our internet-addled brains are capable of reaching. The uncomfortable result is that Aster at times seems to be challenging the audience to root for Cross, despite laying out all his buffoonery very plainly—because even the most composed person may have found the limits of their patience tested at some point during those strange, dark days.

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From The Atlantic via this RSS feed

What should I read next? If only making that decision were simple: Recommendations abound online and off, but when you’re casting about for a new book, especially if you’re coming off the heels of something you adored, the paradox of choice can feel intense. You might turn to loved ones to ask which book would be just right for you. Avid readers frequently face a parallel dilemma; they find themselves bombarded by friends and family members who expect a perfectly tailored recommendation.

Staffers at The Atlantic get these inquiries a lot—often enough to recognize that for many of us, a pattern emerges. We end up suggesting the same book, again and again, no matter who’s asking. Yet each recommender cites a different set of criteria for the work that rises to the top of their list. Some of us pick a read that feels so timeless, and so widely appealing, that it truly does have something for everyone. Others among us evangelize about something so singular that it must be experienced.

The 12 books below have nothing in common except for the fact that their advocates have shared them time after time, and believe in their power to delight or captivate readers who have a variety of tastes and proclivities. One of them will, we hope, be the title you pick up next.

The Seven Moons of Maali Almeida, by Shehan Karunatilaka

Some people turn to books for history, others for lessons on human nature. They might hope to better understand longing, despair, joy, or love—or simply chase the high of genre fiction (ghost stories, political thrillers, tales of redemption). To all of these readers, I invariably advocate for Karunatilaka’s journey into underworlds: both a supernatural realm beyond death and the demimonde of violence and corruption that fueled the Sri Lankan civil war. Seven Moons was the dark-horse winner of the 2022 Booker Prize, beating books by Percival Everett and Elizabeth Strout and rightly claiming its place in the magical-realism canon. The title character is a gay photojournalist with a conscience—which turns out to be a very dangerous combination in 1980s Colombo. In fact, when the novel opens, he’s already dead. Before moving on from Earth, he gets seven days of purgatory—during which he must try to influence his living friends to publicize a trove of damning photographs while fending off literal demons and the dark truths he’d rather avoid. My closing pitch to friends: I’ve rarely read a better ending.  — Boris Kachka

Made for Love, by Alissa Nutting

I love to suggest Nutting’s work to people, even though it’s been called “deviant”—if folks avoid me afterward, then I know they’re not my kind of weirdo. She has a talent for developing outrageous concepts that also reveal earnest truths about what people expect from one another and why. One of the best examples is her novel Made for Love, perhaps better known as an HBO show starring the excellent Cristin Milioti. The book, too, is about a woman whose tech-magnate husband has implanted a chip in her head, but it grows far more absurd. (A subplot, for instance, features a con artist who becomes attracted to dolphins.) Nutting’s scenarios sometimes remind me of the comedian Nathan Fielder’s work: You will probably cringe, but you’ll be laughing—and sometimes even nodding along.  — Serena Dai

These Precious Days, by Ann Patchett

Here’s how I start my recommendation: “Did you know that Tom Hanks’s assistant and Ann Patchett went from total strangers to best friends?” And then, when my target inevitably shows interest in the out-there pairing of a beloved novelist and a Hollywood insider, I put These Precious Days in their hands. The titular essay is about this friendship, but the broader subject of Patchett’s book is death: She contemplates the passing of the men who served as fathers in her life; she thinks about the potential demise of her husband, a small-plane pilot; and she considers the mortality of that assistant, a woman named Sooki. After Sooki, who starts her relationship with the author as a long-distance pen pal, is diagnosed with pancreatic cancer, she moves into Patchett’s Nashville house during the coronavirus pandemic. Much of the writing, funny and sharp, follows the two of them as they work on their art, do yoga, take psychedelics—but the sentences get their power from their awareness of the gulf between life and death that will eventually separate the two women.  — Emma Sarappo

Trust, by Hernan Diaz

In 1955, James Baldwin famously pilloried Uncle Tom’s Cabin for its “virtuous sentimentality,” and called its author, the abolitionist Harriet Beecher Stowe, “not so much a novelist as an impassioned pamphleteer.” For Baldwin, Stowe’s well-intentioned advocacy turned her characters into caricatures who existed only in service of her ideological aims—and as a result, he believed that her novel failed as art. This trap ensnares many fiction writers, and I have spent much time thinking about how they can avoid it when tackling contemporary problems. This is one reason I constantly bring up Díaz’s Trust: It navigates the line between politics and artistry with rare skill. Set in New York City’s late-19th-century financial world, the book is composed of four fictional texts, each focused on the same people but written from a different vantage point. The question is: Which narrator does the reader believe? Trust’s storytelling is impeccable, full of twists and surprises. The book is also a remarkable criticism of unbridled capitalism—but the story does not exist in service of a doctrine. It remains unlike anything else I’ve read.  — Clint Smith

An American Sunrise, by Joy Harjo

Harjo’s poetry collection begins by recounting a horrific event: In 1830, the United States government forced some 100,000 Indigenous people to walk hundreds of miles, at gunpoint, from the southeastern U.S. to lands west of the Mississippi River. Among those on this Trail of Tears were Harjo’s Muscogee ancestors, who left Georgia and Alabama for Oklahoma, and whose memory the writer resurrects through poems that collapse the distance between generations, making history feel present-tense. The book deftly expresses both grief for all of the violence perpetrated on American soil and a profound love for all of the beings that inhabit this continent. Ancestors and descendants dance at the perimeter of Harjo’s poems, and her definition of relative is wide enough to hold every living thing—panthers, raccoons, tobacco plants. Anyone could spend an afternoon with this book and come away with a refreshed, more capacious view of this country. “These lands aren’t our lands,” Harjo notes. “These lands aren’t your lands. We are this land.”  — Valerie Trapp

Eating Stone: Imagination and the Loss of the Wild, by Ellen Meloy

When Meloy, a desert naturalist, felt estranged from nature, she sought to cure it by stalking a band of bighorn sheep for a year in Utah’s Canyonlands wilderness. She begins in winter and feels cold and clumsy. She envies the bighorns’ exquisite balance as she watches them spring quickly up cliff faces. She feels “the power and purity of first wonder.” Meloy’s writing is scientifically learned—beautifully so—but this book does not pretend to be a detached study. When she hikes alongside these animals at dawn, she aches to belong. She fantasizes about being a feral child they raised. At first, the band is indifferent to her project. But animal by animal, they begin to let her into their world. To follow her there is to experience one of the sublime pleasures of contemporary American nature writing. Meloy gives an account of their culture, their affections for one another, even their conflicts. All these years after my first read, I can still hear the crack of the rams’ colliding horns echoing off the red rock.  — Ross Andersen

Will and Testament, by Vigdis Hjorth

When I picked up this novel some years ago, I’d never heard of Hjorth, and I was drawn to the book simply because of the quiet mood evoked by the cover of the English-language edition—a serene picture of a lonely cabin in the woods at twilight. What I found inside was a story that reads at once as a juicy diary and as a chillingly astute psychological portrait of a dysfunctional family. The story is narrated by Bergljot, a Norwegian theater critic who is estranged from much of her family because they refused to acknowledge the abuse that her father had inflicted on her. A dispute over inheritance brings the whole distant family back into painful contact. The novel was deeply controversial in Norway after Hjorth’s family claimed that its contents were too close to reality. Later, Hjorth’s sister published her own novelization of their family strife. But the scandal shouldn’t detract from the novel itself, which is utterly specific yet universal: The author captures the pettiness of the family’s drama and the damage they do to one another with equal fidelity.  — Maya Chung

Alanna: The First Adventure, by Tamora Pierce

The kingdom of Tortall has many of the classic features of a fantasy world: strapping lords, tender ladies, charming rogues, mysterious magical forces that can be used for good or for evil. But what makes Pierce’s Song of the Lioness series so timeless and reliable is its heroine, Alanna, who poses as a boy in order to train as a knight. The First Adventure, which introduced her to readers in 1983,serves as an excellent gateway to the fantasy genre. The book covers Alanna’s years as a page in Tortall’s royal palace, where, from the ages of 10 to 13, she must contend with her girlhood—which means navigating periods and growth spurts—while keeping her identity a secret. Pierce never devalues Alanna’s feelings and experiences, and the author isn’t didactic about the choices Alanna makes; readers will feel they’re being taken seriously, no matter their age.  — Elise Hannum

Careless People: A Cautionary Tale of Love, Power, Greed, and Lost Idealism, by Sarah Wynn-Williams

This book’s summary sounds like something out of Black Mirror:An idealist embraces a new form of technology, convinced that it has the potential to change the world, only to become trapped in a hell of her own making. Wynn-Williams, a former director of public policy at Facebook, describes her experiences working at the social-networking giant with dark humor and a sense of mounting panic. I gasped a few times as Wynn-Williams recounted being commanded to sleep in bed next to Sheryl Sandberg, and being harassed by a higher-up while she was recovering from a traumatic childbirth that nearly killed her. But the real shock comes from seeing how Facebook, a site most people associate with college friends and benign memes, helped to amplify and exacerbate hate speech. This is exactly why I keep pressing it on people. The corporation, now Meta, has described some of the book’s allegations as “false”; regardless, Careless People makes a powerful case for why no single company or boss should have this kind of reckless, untrammeled power.  — Sophie Gilbert

A Floating Chinaman: Fantasy and Failure Across the Pacific, by Hua Hsu

The first thing I like to tell people about Hsu’s debut book is that he took its title from a novel that had been lost, or maybe never even existed. The second thing is that it is about America, not China. A Floating Chinaman’s subject, broadly, is Asian American literature between the First and Second World Wars, but its main character is the eccentric novelist and immigrant H. T. Tsiang. Tsiang wrote prolifically at the same time as Pearl S. Buck, the white writer who won a Pulitzer for The Good Earth, her novel about Chinese farmers. Tsiang had high ambitions to combat Buck’s rosy portrait of his birth country, but his manuscripts were dismissed again and again, partly for their political radicalism, their criticism of the U.S. and China, and their sheer weirdness. Tsiang had sketched a novel about a Chinese laborer who travels widely—but as far as Hsu can tell, Tsiang’s book never materialized. Hsu honors the writer’s obsession and perseverance while asking a more pointed question: Were Americans unready to accept an immigrant writer who called out weaknesses in their own country?  — Shan Wang

The Index of Self-Destructive Acts, by Christopher Beha

Beha’s big-swing novel, set in the late 2000s, follows Sam, a young data-crunching blogger from the Midwest who gets hired to work at a legacy New York magazine. He arrives in the city certain that when one has the right information, the world is “a knowable place”—but he is soon forced to reconsider his rational worldview. Sam encounters an apocalyptic preacher, falls for the daughter of a profile subject (though he’s married), and cranks out a near-constant stream of articles while struggling with unexpected doubts. The novel takes on heady themes, but it never feels dull or brainy, and all the people I’ve shared it with over the years love it too. My New Yorker father told me how well it portrayed the city after the 2008 financial crisis; my friends in journalism affirm its perceptiveness about the industry’s “content farm” days; my church friends appreciate how it takes religious belief seriously. I push it upon pretty much everyone I know.  — Eleanor Barkhorn

Black Swans, by Eve Babitz

Reading Babitz’s early work is like being whisked from one glamorous party to another. A fixture of the 1970s Hollywood scene, Babitz transcribed dozens of her own libertine experiences with diaristic recall in autofictional works such as Eve’s Hollywood. But by the time she released this 1993 short-story collection, the parties had fizzled out and the scene was over. Retreating from the zeitgeist didn’t rob her of inspiration, though. As an older writer, Babitz possessed a new clarity about the meaning of all those youthful nights, and the stories in Black Swans—about former bohemians inching toward the staid life, and romantics bumping up against the limits of love—are told with tenderness that is unusual in her other work. Babitz is often contrasted with her frenemy Joan Didion—Babitz was cast in the popular imagination as the fun, ditzy sexpot, as opposed to Didion’s cool, cold-blooded stenographer—but the maturity and thoughtfulness of these stories dispel any lazy stereotypes. Her early work is what made her reputation, but this later collection, in which she’s looking back and making sense of it all, is simply better—a trajectory I wish for all writers.  — Jeremy Gordon

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From The Atlantic via this RSS feed

Mark and David Geier were a father-and-son team of researchers who operated on the fringes of the scientific establishment. They were known for promoting a controversial treatment for autism, and for publishing papers on the purported harms of vaccines that experts dismissed as junk science. In 2004, the CDC accused them of violating research protocols. In 2012, the state of Maryland sanctioned them. And in 2025, Health and Human Services Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr. tapped one of them to investigate alleged wrongdoing in a crucial CDC database.

For years, Kennedy has claimed that the database, which tracks adverse reactions to immunizations and is known as the Vaccine Safety Datalink, once contained vital information about vaccine safety—and that this information has been withheld from the public, scrubbed from the record, or otherwise manipulated. He wants David Geier to investigate it because he and his late father, a physician, studied it in the early 2000s, after they applied through a CDC program that allows researchers outside the government to access certain data sets.

When the Geiers were first allowed into this trove of millions of anonymized health records, they were supposed to be carrying out a safety study of the DTaP vaccine. But the CDC found that they were instead conducting unauthorized analyses to hunt for a link between the vaccine and autism, and risked breaching patients’ confidentiality in the process; the agency revoked their access. (At the time, the Geiers disputed the charge that they had endangered anyone’s personal information, writing in a 2004 letter to an institutional-review-board administrator that they held the “utmost regard” for patient confidentiality.) Even after they were ousted, the Geiers used information they’d apparently held on to from that database to publish a series of scientific papers advancing the widely discredited theory that thimerosal, a mercury-based preservative once common in childhood vaccines, is linked to autism, among other conditions.

[Read: The U.S. is going backwards on vaccines, very fast]

Researchers in the field have long criticized the Geiers’ methodology as sloppy, and noted that their conclusions are at odds with those of numerous higher-quality studies. Since March, when The Washington Post reported that David Geier had been brought into the Department of Health and Human Services, his and his father’s work has come under renewed scrutiny. One scientist found that several of their papers—based on information from the very CDC database that Kennedy has tasked Geier with investigating—contain a statistical error so fundamental that it casts doubt on Geier’s abilities and intentions in assessing data. That scientist and another I spoke with couldn’t believe that some of Geier’s work had ever been published in the first place.

David Geier is currently listed as a senior data analyst in HHS’s staff directory, though what exactly he’s doing for the department is unclear. The Wall Street Journal has reported that Geier is using his new position to continue his search for a link between thimerosal-containing vaccines and autism. New York magazine floated the possibility that he will attempt to repeat a study from the early 2000s that anti-vaccine activists cite as proof that inoculations harm developing brains. Kennedy has denied that Geier is running the agency’s project to find out what causes autism, and testified that he has instead been hired by a contractor to determine whether information disappeared from the database. (Mark Geier died in March, and David Geier did not respond to interview requests. Reached for comment, an HHS spokesperson pointed to a lengthy X post by Kennedy in which he defends Geier’s record and notes his “extensive background as a research scientist.”)

Under any other administration, Geier’s history would almost certainly have disqualified him from any role at HHS. In the mid-2000s, after Mark Geier had established a profitable sideline of testifying as an expert witness in lawsuits that alleged injury from vaccines, the father and son claimed to have discovered a method of treating autism. What they touted as a miracle drug was Lupron, a testosterone-suppressing medication used in many cases of premature puberty. They ran a laboratory out of the basement of their Maryland home and administered the drug to children based on their unfounded theory, advertising their supposed breakthrough on the autism-conference circuit. In 2012, Mark, a physician, was stripped of his license, and David was sanctioned for practicing medicine without one. (The Geiers sued the Maryland Board of Physicians in 2012 for releasing information about medications Mark Geier had prescribed to family members. They were awarded a total of nearly $5 million for the invasion of their privacy and attorneys’ fees, but that judgment was reversed after a different court ruled that Maryland Board of Physicians members were immune from such claims.)

[Read: RFK Jr.’s autism time machine]

The Geiers’ work is well known among autism researchers, though not well respected. “They were seen as not representing the best of autism science,” Craig Newschaffer, a Penn State scientist who has studied how genetics and environmental factors contribute to autism, told me, putting it more gently than others I spoke with. Marie McCormick met the Geiers when she chaired a 2004 review of immunization safety by the Institute of Medicine (now known as the National Academy of Medicine), a nonprofit group that advises the federal government. McCormick, now an emeritus professor at Harvard’s School of Public Health, recalled that the Geiers’ presentation had “really made no sense”: It was a slideshow of vaccine vials with labels indicating that they contained mercury, but it didn’t have much else in the way of evidence. The committee’s report identified a host of “serious methodological flaws” in the Geiers’ research, such as a failure to explain how they had sorted their subjects into groups.

The Geiers’ work from the 2010s likewise has such glaring flaws that the experts I spoke with were baffled as to how the studies had been published at all. Jeffrey Morris, a biostatistics professor at the University of Pennsylvania, recently examined a series of papers on which the Geiers were authors that used data from the Vaccine Safety Datalink. One representative 2017 study purportedly showed that the hepatitis B vaccine was associated with an increased risk of autism.

Morris quickly noticed that the paper’s approach rendered its findings meaningless. It compared a group of children with autism to a control group of children without the diagnosis, to see how vaccination rates differed between the two. But these groups of children also differed in another crucial way: The children diagnosed with autism were born during the eight-year span from 1991 to 1998, whereas the control group—children not diagnosed with autism—were born in 1991 or 1992.

That’s more than a minor inconsistency. In 1991, the CDC’s vaccine-advisory committee recommended that all infants in the United States receive the hepatitis B vaccine, and so the percentage of vaccinated children rose steadily throughout the decade, from fewer than 10 percent to approximately 90 percent. That meant that babies born later in the ’90s (who were overrepresented in the autism group) were very likely to have gotten the shot, whereas those born earlier in the decade (who were overrepresented in the control group) were not. By picking a control group in which relatively few kids would have been vaccinated, and an autistic population in which most were, the Geiers made finding a connection between immunization and autism inevitable.

[Read: The conversations doctors are having about vaccination now]

Using this approach, you could blame the vaccine for all manner of maladies. According to Morris, the Geiers did exactly that in at least nine papers, published from 2015 to 2018, that used data from the vaccine-safety database. One of their studies linked hep-B vaccination to childhood obesity. Others showed an association with tic disorders, emotional disturbance, and premature puberty, among other conditions, some of which rose during the ’90s and early 2000s at least in part because of new diagnostic criteria and increased awareness. That likely also explains why autism rates began to climb significantly in the ’90s.

Many flawed scientific papers include a regrettable but understandable oversight, Morris told me, but the Geiers employed “an absolutely invalid design that biases things so enormously that you could throw out the results of all these papers.” Newschaffer reviewed Morris’s critique and told me he doesn’t believe that a study with such a serious problem should have been published in the first place. “I would characterize that as a ‘miss’ in the peer review,” he said. (I also contacted Dirk Schaumlöffel, the editor in chief of the Journal of Trace Elements in Medicine and Biology, which published the Geiers’ paper connecting the hep-B vaccine to autism. He took issue with Morris’s “polemical allegations” and defended the paper, noting that it “does not argue against vaccination, but merely questions the role of thimerosal.” He told me that he would prefer that the matter be debated in the pages of his journal.)

If David Geier were merely an independent researcher publishing in lesser-known journals, his errors, although egregious, would be of little more than academic concern. But his influence on Kennedy runs deep. In 2005, Kennedy highlighted the Geiers’ research in an essay outlining how he’d come to believe that thimerosal-containing vaccines could cause autism. He wrote about them again that year in “Deadly Immunity,” an article—eventually retracted by both Salon and Rolling Stone after multiple corrections and intense criticism—that alleged that government health agencies had covered up evidence indicating that thimerosal in vaccines was to blame for the rise in autism rates. In his 2014 book, Thimerosal: Let the Science Speak, Kennedy cites the Geiers dozens of times, portraying them as determined truth-tellers battling uncooperative government agencies—the very ones Kennedy has now been appointed to oversee.

[Read: The neo-anti-vaxxers are in power now]

Thanks to Kennedy, Geier seemingly is being handed the keys to the same database he’s proved himself unfit to study. People who are familiar with Geier’s history worry that he’ll use his position on the inside not to defend the truth but to resurrect thoroughly debunked claims, twisting the data to support what he and Kennedy have long believed.

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From The Atlantic via this RSS feed

In this first year of his second term, President Donald Trump has claimed broad powers to unilaterally restructure much of how the U.S. government functions. Some of these assertions have gone completely unchallenged. Others have been litigated, and although lower courts have been skeptical of many of these efforts, the Supreme Court has been more approving. Trump has taken as much advantage of his new powers as he plausibly can, prosecuting his political enemies, firing independent agency heads, and dismantling federal agencies almost at a whim.

One salient question now is: When and if the Democrats return to power, how much of Trump’s damage can they undo? Let’s assume, for the moment, that the Supreme Court acts in good faith—that its views on presidential power are without partisan favor, and that it doesn’t arbitrarily invent carve-outs to rein in a Democratic president. What then?

Even with such (unlikely) parameters, the outcomes of this thought experiment suggest few opportunities for a Democratic president to make positive use of these novel presidential powers. Most of the powers that Trump asserts are either preclusive (preventing something from happening) or negating (ending something that is already in process). Few of them are positive powers, allowing the creation of something new, and even those are not permanent—the next Republican president could likely reverse most Democratic initiatives, sending the country into a retaliatory spiral.

Consider, as a first point of examination, the president’s newly established power to restructure the federal workforce, as in the layoffs of more than 1,300 State Department employees, the dismissal of inspectors general, and the firing of independent agency members. Most recently, the Supreme Court authorized Trump to continue with his plan to dismantle the Department of Education, despite a statute mandating its creation.

A future Democratic president, if so inclined, could seek to use that same authority to reverse some of what Trump has done. He could, for example, remove all of the Trump-appointed commissioners from the formerly independent agencies (such as the Securities and Exchange Commission and the National Labor Relations Board) and replace them with Democratic appointees whose views are more consistent with the president’s.

[Peter M. Shane: This is the presidency John Roberts has built]

This new president could also attempt to reconstitute institutions that have been decimated, such as Voice of America, and restore the many State Department bureaus and functions that have been terminated. He could, presumably, re-create the Department of Education and restore the workforce at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and NASA.

Even if attempted restorations are legal, however, they may not succeed in practice. Firing experts is much easier than hiring them. And given the uncertainties that Trump has created, our best and brightest might not willingly take positions in the federal government. Who wants a job that might last only four years?

Meanwhile, across the government, a Democratic president could fire all of the employees who were hired by Trump and agreed to his loyalty requirements. The president could also use the same authority to significantly diminish the workforce at agencies whose functions he is less warm to. Many of the soon-to-be-hired ICE employees, for instance, might find themselves subject to a reduction in force under a new Democratic administration.

To be sure, the Supreme Court, as it is currently constituted, might find a rationale to block the dismantling of the TSA or the Department of Homeland Security. But very few functions at DHS are statutorily mandated at the current level of activity, and there is no legal distinction between presidential authority over DHS and, say, the Department of Education.

Likewise, a Democratic president could reinstate funding to several grant-making agencies that Trump has defunded. He could restore international-aid funding to USAID and authorize the Institute of Museum and Library Sciences to resume distributing grants to American recipients. All of the National Science Foundation and National Institutes of Health funding that has been pulled from basic research at major universities could be restored. Again, however, this is easier said than done—interrupted funding has likely permanently terminated some scientific inquiry and driven U.S.-based scientists overseas. International-aid programs that were suspended will be hard to rebuild.

Some recent policy changes are more readily reversible. Transgender soldiers could be welcomed back into the military, for example. Forts can be renamed, and the U.S. can rejoin international organizations. Here, too, the harmful effects can be mitigated, but the prospect of a return of Trumpism down the line will resonate for a long time in terms of substantial losses of expertise, stability, and trust.

Trump has also been aggressive in using federal funding as a means of encouraging his policy priorities in the private sector. Even when his efforts are resisted by the courts (such as his attempt to defund Harvard), his threats to federal funding have caused other institutions, such as the University of Pennsylvania, to change their policies or, in the case of the University of Virginia, dismiss their leaders. The same is true of his assault on big law firms; although his efforts have been legally stymied, their impact on major firms has already been significant.

What could a Democratic president do with this power? Most obviously, the president could flip Trump’s agenda on its head—denying federal funding to universities that lack DEI policies, for example, or ousting from federal contracts any conservative law firms that have provided pro bono services to disfavored causes, or whose partners played significant roles in the Trump administration.

Perhaps most dangerous, a Democrat could reverse the changes at the Department of Justice, not in an effort to make it apolitical but in the hopes of serving friends on the left and punishing the Trump-affiliated right. The president could dismiss any pending cases against allies (as Attorney General Pam Bondi recently did for a Utah doctor who issued fake COVID-vaccination cards) and use their power to punish opponents—White House Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller, the former Trump adviser Steve Bannon, and others could face the expense of criminal investigation. Conservative states such as Alabama and Texas could be investigated for civil-rights violations. Likewise, corporate officials who have caved to Trump, such as Shari Redstone of Paramount, have already been suggested as investigative targets. And the president could unilaterally issue subpoenas to almost any conservative-supporting institution—say, political consultants for evangelical-church organizations. A president could, perhaps, even attempt to end the nonprofit status of all religious organizations—though one suspects that this Supreme Court would not permit that step on religious-liberty grounds.

One of the most significant assertions of presidential power Trump has made is that he can nullify a law—that is, that he can dispense with enforcing it based on his authority as chief executive. The prime example of this is his refusal to enforce the congressionally mandated ban on TikTok on the specious ground that he has national-security power to do so. Under this theory, almost any regulatory requirement could be suspended for being inconsistent with national security. A future Democratic president might, for example, dispense with limits on labor-union organizing on the grounds that the workforce is essential to national competitiveness. Export or import licenses could be manipulated to fund military activities. Or, to parallel Trump as much as possible, penalties against favored European enterprises could be waived as part of “diplomatic negotiations,” and existing exemptions for disfavored nations could be ignored. The possibilities are almost as endless as a president’s imagination.

Ultimately, a Democratic president with the political will to use the levers of power left by Trump could at least partially restore the status quo ante and unilaterally impose certain changes as well—which a subsequent Republican president could then undo.

What lies ahead, then, is a new era of pendulum swings, replacing the stability of the postwar governing consensus. Ahead is a cycle of retributive prosecutions and whipsaw funding decisions. America may see entire Cabinet departments alternatively created and closed every four years while the presidency goes from policy to anti-policy—enforcing DEI in one administration, perhaps, and prohibiting it in the next. The country would, in effect, return to the time before the Pendleton Act, when the entire federal workforce turned over with each successive administration, rewarding cronyism at the expense of expertise.

[Aziz Huq: The Court’s liberals are trying to tell Americans something]

But in this new power arrangement, the Trump-aligned presidents will have the advantage.

It takes only 20 minutes to dismiss 1,300 State Department employees; their expertise cannot be replaced in 20 years, much less a single presidential term. Other departments and agencies can never be fully restored. To cite a mundane example, in the first six months of Trump’s second term, the DOJ has lost two-thirds of the experienced attorneys in the Federal Programs branch (which defends the government in civil court). Many resigned rather than have to defend Trump’s initiatives. That level of destruction cannot be quickly fixed.

What Trump and the Supreme Court have created is a ratchet of destruction. They have discovered that knocking things down is far easier than building them. And because the overall conservative project is to reduce the size of government, the structural advantage of destruction over creation is ineradicable. Even the most effective possible responses from a Democratic president (such as scaling down ICE to a bare minimum) come with their own set of problems.

All of this might have been different had the Supreme Court stepped in to diminish or negate these new assertions of presidential power, but it has not. And so the pendulum will swing back and forth, but the long-term trend is toward an ever-diminishing federal government that does whatever a conservative Court will permit it to do. The prospect is not just sad—it is terrifying.

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From The Atlantic via this RSS feed

Finding love is hard. For a while, dating apps seemed to make it easier, putting a city’s worth of single people in the palm of your hand. But AI has cast a paranoid pall over what can already be a suboptimal experience. If you get a message that feels a little off, it is hard to know whether you are flirting with a bot—or just someone insecure enough to use ChatGPT as their own Cyrano de Bergerac. In frustration, my friend Lonni has started picking up women at the nail salon like it’s 1997.

Or, in the midst of an emotionally fraught conversation with a friend or family member, a text might read strangely. Is the person on the other end using AI to compose their messages about the fairness of Aunt Beryl’s will or the future of your relationship? The only way to find out is to call them or, better yet, meet them for a coffee.

Or maybe you want to learn something. Many of the internet’s best resources for getting everyday answers are quickly being inundated with the dubious wisdom of AI. YouTube, long a destination for real people who know how to repair toilets, make omelets, or deliver engaging cultural criticism, is getting less human by the day: The newsletter Garbage Day reports that four of May’s top 10 YouTube channels were devoted to AI-generated content. Recently, the fastest-growing channel featured AI babies in dangerous situations, for some reason. Reddit is currently overrun with AI-generated posts. Even if you never use ChatGPT or other large language models directly, the rest of the internet is sodden with their output and with real people parroting their hallucinations. Remember: LLMs are still often wrong about basic facts. It is enough to make a person crack a book.

The internet’s slide toward AI happened quickly and deliberately. Most major platforms have integrated the technology whether users want it or not, just at the moment that some AI photos and videos have become indistinguishable from reality, making it that much harder to trust anything online. Over time, LLMs might get more accurate, or people might simply get better at spotting their tells. In the meantime, a real possibility is that people will turn to the real world as a more trustworthy alternative. We’ve been telling one another to “touch grass” for years now, all while downloading app- and website-blocking software and lockable phone safes to try to wean ourselves off constant internet use. Maybe the AI-slop era will actually help us log off.

Even before AI started taking over, the internet had been getting less and less fun for a while. Users have been complaining about Google Search degrading for years. Opening an app to get a ride, order takeout, or find a vacation house can be just as expensive and effortful as taking a taxi, calling in a delivery order, or booking a hotel once was. Social media is a grotesque, tragedy-exploiting, MechaHitler-riddled inferno. Where going online once evoked a wide-eyed sense that the world was at our fingertips, now it requires wading into the slop like weary, hardened detectives, attempting to parse the real from the fake.

Nevertheless, as AI companies build browsers and devices that keep users tidily contained in an endless conversation with their own personalized AIs, some people may spend more time online than ever. Its accuracy aside, AI is already valued by many for entertainment, practical help, and emotional support. In some extreme cases, users are falling in love with chatbots or drifting into all-consuming spiritual delusions, but many more are simply becoming thoroughly addicted. The internet’s new era may push AI skeptics to spend less time online, while another group ramps up their AI-mediated screen time. That split might have implications for the internet’s culture—and the culture at large.

Even for those who run from the slop, the internet is already so woven into every part of our lives that going cold turkey is pretty much impossible. But as it gets worse, the real world starts to look pretty good in comparison, with its flesh-and-blood people with whom we can establish trust, less overwhelming number of consumer options, slower pace, and occasional moments of unpredictable delight that do not create financial profit for anyone.

I have been experimenting with being less online since 2022, when I quit Twitter. As soon as I got through withdrawal, I could feel my attention span start to expand. I started reading books again. Like a lot of people who left social media, more of my socializing moved over to group chats with people I actually know and in-person get-togethers: quick coffees and camping trips and dinner parties. Remember dinner parties?

Later, I quit shopping online, and soon realized that I didn’t need most of what I had been buying. The majority of the stuff I actually did need, I could get at the grocery store and my local hardware store, which, like most hardware stores, carries tons of things besides wrenches and bolts.

Online shopping might have once been more convenient than schlepping to a store, but I think that’s no longer true in many cases. Last winter, when my feet were chronically cold under my desk, I could have spent hours researching space heaters online, trying to guess which reviews were real and which were fake; placed an order online; possibly received a broken or substandard unit; and then had to package it back up and take it to some random third-party store in a return process designed to be annoying. Instead, I walked to the hardware store. “We have one that oscillates and one that doesn’t,” the guy in the vest told me. I took the one that oscillates. It works fine.

I am not, I hasten to say, completely offline. Like most people, my job requires me to use the internet. But I am online less. And I am happier for it. I get outside more. I garden and read more books. I still follow the news, but less compulsively. Spending some parts of my day without my attention being monetized or my data being harvested is a nice bonus. It makes me feel kind of like a line-dried bedsheet smells.

I find myself dreaming about additional returns to offline existence. I live in Portland, Oregon, where we still have lots of movie theaters and even a video-rental place. I could—I might—cancel all my streaming services and just rent stuff and watch movies at the theater. I could even finally assuage my guilt over the lousy way music-streaming services pay musicians and avoid being fooled by AI bands by going back to CDs and records—and by seeing more artists play live. I don’t think I’ll be the only one reorienting toward physical media and physical presence: books and records, live theater and music, brick-and-mortar stores with knowledgeable salespeople, one long conversation with one real person instead of 300 short interactions with internet strangers who might be robots.

Tech companies may assume that the public is so habituated—or even addicted—to doing everything online that people will put up with any amount of risk or unpleasantness to continue to transact business and amuse themselves on the internet. But there is a limit to what at least some of us will take, especially when the alternative has real appeal. One recent study shows that disconnecting your phone from the internet creates a mood boost on par with pharmaceutical antidepressants. And if more people explore offline alternatives—at least until this whole generative-AI explosion works itself out—it could create a feedback loop, livening up cities and communities, which then become a more tempting alternative to screens. What the internet will become in a post-AI world is anybody’s guess. Maybe it’ll finally become something transcendent. Or maybe, as the conspiracy theory goes, it is already dead.

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From The Atlantic via this RSS feed

Donald Trump has been bullying Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell—calling him “too late,” insulting his intelligence, and trying to gin up a case that Powell spent too much on renovations of the agency’s headquarters as a pretext for firing him. The New York Times recently observed that the two men have a “toxic relationship,” which is true, as far as it goes.

But the actual reason for the president’s hostility is neither alleged cost overruns nor Powell’s ability to manage the business cycle. Trump doesn’t think Powell is bad at his job. He objects to the job itself.

The Federal Reserve’s assignment is to steward the long-term interests of the U.S. economy—even at the occasional expense of short-term pain—by balancing the twin objectives of suppressing inflation and managing the unemployment rate. Trump, however, believes that the Fed’s objective should be to speed up the economy under Republican administrations and slow it down under Democratic ones. To the extent that the central bank balances unemployment and inflation, he would like to see the pain of high unemployment shifted onto Democratic administrations so that Republican ones can benefit from rapid economic growth.

Trump’s philosophy on monetary policy is easy to define because he has been publicly vilifying the Fed for at least a decade and a half. His opinions shift, but they shift predictably between two forms, with no relationship to economic circumstances. If the president is a Democrat, Trump complains that interest rates are too low. If the president is a Republican, he complains that they’re too high.

[David Frum: Trump needs someone to blame]

During the Obama years, the U.S. economy featured low inflation and elevated unemployment as it recovered from the Great Recession. Trump nonetheless spent that time complaining about low interest rates. “The Fed’s reckless monetary policies will cause problems in the years to come,” he tweeted in 2011. “The Fed has to be reined in or we will soon be Greece.” Five years later, with inflation still below target and the job market still recovering, he was still at it. “They’re keeping the rates down so that everything else doesn’t go down,” Trump complained in 2016. “We have a very false economy.”

Then Trump became president, and abruptly reversed his position. “I do like a low-interest-rate policy, I must be honest with you,” he told The Wall Street Journal in April 2017. As the Federal Reserve began raising rates, which it generally does when the economy is running hot, Trump denounced those moves. He pushed repeatedly for lower rates, even when the economy was at its peak. “I think they should drop rates and get rid of quantitative tightening,” he said in 2019. “You would see a rocket ship.”

At that time, rates were historically low. That changed after the pandemic sent prices soaring in 2021. Did Trump push back on the Fed’s decision to raise rates to combat inflation? Of course not, because Joe Biden was now president. Last October, Trump denounced Powell for easing interest rates by half a percentage point. “It was too big a cut, and everyone knows that was a political maneuver that they tried to do before the election,” he claimed. Almost immediately after winning his second term, however, he resumed his public drumbeat for cheaper money, a demand he has now backed with the threat of firing Powell.

Whether Trump will follow through on that threat remains unclear, as does whether the courts would allow him to. Even if Trump eventually installs a more pliant figure in Powell’s place (his term as Fed chair expires next year), experts question whether that would actually lead to reduced interest rates. If the Fed loses credibility in the market, borrowing costs could paradoxically get even higher.

[Annie Lowrey: Trump is flirting with economic disaster]

Trump does not appear to have any master plan for how the Fed should function in a world in which he has compromised its independence. For one thing, he doesn’t believe that independence is possible. Laced through his commentary about the Fed over the years is a belief that its commitment to apolitical economic stewardship is a facade hiding naked partisanship. “Janet Yellen is highly political, and she’s not raising rates for a very specific reason,” he said a decade ago: “because Obama told her not to, because he wants to be out playing golf in a year from now and he wants to be doing other things, and he doesn’t want to see a big bubble burst during his administration.”

Trump offered the same diagnosis when Powell was preparing to cut rates last year. “I think he’s political,” he told Fox News. “I think he’s going to do something to probably help the Democrats, I think, if he lowers interest rates.”

Just as Trump is convinced that every president has secretly deployed the Justice Department for their own partisan ends, he believes that monetary policy is nothing but a way to win elections. Trying to advance the national interest, rather than some venal end goal, is a foreign concept. Economic analysts are now trying to predict what would happen under a regime in which the Fed chair is merely following the president’s short-term whims. Trump’s convictions begin with the premise that this is the world that has always existed.

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Updated at 7.44 p.m. ET

President Donald Trump and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth seem to be on a mission to erase women from the top ranks of the U.S. armed forces. Last week, they took another step along this path by removing the first female head of the United States Naval Academy, in Annapolis, Maryland.

The Naval Academy was founded in 1845, but didn’t admit its first class of women until 1976. The head of the school is known as the superintendent, and Annapolis would not get its first female admiral in that position until 2024. Now the first woman to serve as the “supe” has been reassigned and replaced by a man, and for the first time in the academy’s history, the role went to a Marine. Last week, the Navy removed Vice Admiral Yvette Davids from her post and replaced her with Lieutenant General Michael Borgschulte. (Maybe Hegseth thinks Marines are more lethal, to use his favorite Pentagon worship word.) Davids has been sent to the Pentagon, where she will be a deputy chief of naval operations, a senior—but relatively invisible—position.

No reason was given for reassigning Davids. Superintendents typically serve for three to five years, but Davids was pulled from the job after 18 months. (A short tenure can be a sign of some sort of problem; for what it’s worth, the secretary of the Navy, John Phelan—who has never served in the Navy and has no background in national-defense issues—offered rote praise when announcing her de facto firing as the supe.)

Trump and Hegseth have been on a firing spree throughout the military, especially when it comes to removing women from senior positions. This past winter, the administration fired Admiral Lisa Franchetti, the first female chief of naval operations; Admiral Linda Fagan, the first female Coast Guard commandant; and Lieutenant General Jennifer Short, who was serving as the senior military assistant to the secretary of defense, all within weeks of one another. I taught for many years at the U.S. Naval War College, where I worked under its first female president, Vice Admiral Shoshana Chatfield. In 2023, she became the U.S. military representative to the NATO Military Committee—and then she was fired in April, apparently in part because of a presentation she gave on Women’s Equality Day 10 years ago.

At this point, women have been cleared out of all of the military’s top jobs. They are not likely to be replaced by other women: Of the three dozen four-star officers on active duty in the U.S. armed forces, none is female, and none of the administration’s pending appointments for senior jobs even at the three-star level is a woman.

Some observers might see a pattern here.

Discerning this pattern does not exactly require Columbo-level sleuthing. Hegseth’s antipathy toward women in the armed forces was well documented back in 2024 by none other than Hegseth himself. In his book The War on Warriors, Hegseth decried what he believed was “social engineering” by the American left: “While the American people had always rejected the radical-feminist so-called ‘Equal Rights Amendment,’ Team Obama could fast-track their social engineering through the military’s top-down chain of command.” (This is probably why Hegseth also fired the chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General C. Q. Brown, who is a Black man; Brown was let go for ostensibly being too interested in promoting diversity in the armed forces.)

Not that the secretary hates women, you should understand. Some of his best friends … well, as he put it in his book last year: “It’s not that individual women can’t be courageous, ambitious, and honorable. I know many phenomenal female soldiers. The problem is that the Left needs every woman to be as successful as every man, so they’ve redefined success in a counterproductive way.”

I’m sure that the more than 225,000 American women who serve their country in uniform are relieved to know that they, too, can be courageous, and all that other great stuff. But Hegseth seems to be implying that many women in today’s military might have had their fitness reports massaged “in a counterproductive way” to meet some sort of “woke” quota. And that, you see, is why the U.S. military’s most-senior female officers had to be removed: They were clearly part of some affirmative-action scheme. Thank you for your service, ladies, but let’s remember that the Pentagon’s E-Ring is for the men.

Oddly, Hegseth has no problem with “social engineering” as long as it’s engineering something closer to 1955 than 2025. Indeed, he writes, the military “has always been about social engineering—forging young men (mostly) with skills, discipline, pride, and a brotherhood.” One might think that the goal is also to instill respect for one’s comrades, regardless of gender, and to defend the country and honor the Constitution, but Hegseth is more worried about what he fears is the distracting influence of women in the military. “Men and women are different,” he writes, “with men being more aggressive.” (I read this in Cliff Clavin’s voice: “Yes, Diane … hold on to your hat, too, because the very letters DNA are an acronym for the words Dames are Not Aggressive.”) Hegseth goes on: “Men act differently toward women than they do other men. Men like women and are distracted by women. They also want to impress, and protect, women.”

In other words, after forging these neo-Spartans with some of the finest training from the most powerful military the world has ever known, Americans still must worry that these carbon-steel warriors, ready to do battle with any number of global menaces, might have their “lethality” sabotaged by the fluttering eyelashes and shapely gams of their sisters in arms.

I was teaching senior officers, male and female, from all branches of the armed forces when Hegseth was still in high school. His view of women in the U.S. military would be beneath serious comment were he not, through the malpractice of the Republican majority in the U.S. Senate, the sitting secretary of defense. Instead of defending the nation—or keeping track of the security of his own communications—he is trying to make the American military inhospitable to half of the nation’s population.

As Nora Bensahel, a scholar of civil-military relations at Johns Hopkins University, told me, the firing of Davids and other women “is deliberately sending a chilling message to the women who are already serving in uniform, and to girls who may be thinking about doing so, that they are not welcome—even though the military would not be able to meet its recruiting numbers without those very same women.”

Today is my late mother’s birthday. She enlisted in the Air Force and served during the Korean War. She came from a poor family, and had to leave the military when her father was dying. But she was deeply proud of her service in America’s armed forces; I remember watching her march in uniform in hometown parades. She would be heartbroken—and furious—to know that more than a half century after her service, the message to the women of the United States from the current commander in chief and his secretary of defense amounts to a sexist warning: Feel free to join the military and serve your country—but know your place.

Related:

The backdoor way that Pete Hegseth could keep women out of combatTrump’s new favorite general

Here are three new stories from The Atlantic:

What Trump’s feud with Jerome Powell is really aboutTrump’s social-media habit is getting weirder.The hype man of Trump’s mass deportations

Today’s News

House Speaker Mike Johnson blocked a potential floor vote on the release of additional files in the Jeffrey Epstein case until at least September.The Trump administration released more than 240,000 pages of long-sealed FBI files on Martin Luther King Jr. last night, prompting warnings from his family about the potential misuse of surveillance records to distort his legacy.President Donald Trump met with Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. at the White House and agreed to a trade deal that imposes a 19 percent tariff on goods from the Philippines.

Evening Read

A narrow street in Corfu’s Old Town Alice Zoo for The Atlantic

Chasing le Carré in Corfu

By Honor Jones

Black dress, pink coat, thick beige stockings. This is the third time I’ve seen her. She walks down the middle of the street outside my window, her head bent forward under its helmet of grandmother hair. She carries her handbag like a briefcase with a bomb in it. She has the look of someone whose friends are all dead.

I saw her first outside Saint Spyridon Church, lighting a candle. And then again in Spianada Square, among the scootering children. I lean out the window to watch her disappear around the corner. Maybe there’s nothing suspicious about it. Corfu is a small city, on a small island in Greece. From my hotel room I can see the green edge of the cricket pitch where, in John le Carré’s A Perfect Spy, the Czech agent, Axel, chased Magnus Pym in slow, limping circles.

Read the full article.

More From The Atlantic

Medicaid cuts will be a disaster for ERs.Democracy upside downTrump is stringing Ukraine along.AI slop might finally cure our internet addiction.Like AC for the outdoorsAlexandra Petri: Are you laughing yet?

Culture Break

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Watch. Stephanie Bai asked The Atlantic’s writers and editors to name the rare movies that are actually better than the books they’re based on, and their picks might surprise you.

Read. Stephanie Wambugu’s novel, Lonely Crowds, explores the emotional complexity of a childhood friendship as it stretches into adulthood, Bekah Waalkes writes.

Play our daily crossword.

P.S.

Courtesy of Tom Nichols

I hope that readers of the Daily won’t mind a personal reminiscence. My mother used to tell me, when I was a boy in the 1960s, that if any other kid used the old insult “Your mother wears Army boots,” I should always correct them: “Air Force boots.” Here’s a picture of my mother, barely an adult, in her uniform. She joined alongside her sister, and both of them went to basic training in Texas—at that time, the farthest from home my mother had ever been. She later was assigned to do office work at an Air Force base in Massachusetts. Like other poor kids from rough backgrounds, she found order and a home, however briefly, in the military, and was proud of her service ’til the end of her life.

— Tom

Courtesy of Tom Nichols

This article originally misidentified who was responsible for firing Admiral Linda Fagan.

Rafaela Jinich contributed to this newsletter.

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Summer weekends in America are good for lots of things: baseball games, cookouts, farmers’ markets, sipping a bev next to a lake. Or, if you’re President Donald Trump: crashing out on social media in hopes of distracting the nation from nonstop coverage of his long friendship with Jeffrey Epstein.

Trump is an inveterate poster, known for his erratic style and late-night tirades. But over the weekend, as the world refused to move on from his administration’s bizarre handling of the Epstein files—which has led segments of his base to completely melt down—Trump went on a posting spree that was alarming, even by his own standards.

On Sunday alone, Trump posted 33 times on Truth Social, sending off 20 posts between 6:46 and 8:53 p.m. eastern. He demanded that the Washington Commanders and Cleveland Guardians revert to their original names (the Redskins and Indians, respectively), and posted an AI-generated video of Barack Obama being arrested in the Oval Office set to the song “Y.M.C.A.,” by the Village People. Trump also shared a contextless, grainy video that looks like it was scraped from some viral social-media post. It includes no captions and features 25 stitched-together clips, set to music, of people doing wild or dangerous stunts: A woman appears to catch a charging cobra with her bare hands, a man does a forward flip from one moving skateboard to another, various people contort their bodies in strange ways, a dude stands on the footrests of a moving dirt bike.

Even some of Trump’s die-hard fans on Truth Social seemed caught off guard by the video, struggling to draw a connection between it and Trump’s politics. “Was expecting a video of you at the end!” one top commenter wrote. (A spokesperson for the White House did not answer my questions about why the commander in chief was posting an extreme-sports highlight reel on Sunday night.)

The bizarre video was immediately recognizable to me as the type of garbage that clogs the feeds of many people who still use Facebook, a platform that is filled with inscrutable slop posted by spammers and content farmers. By the early 2020s—before generative-AI images took over—Facebook had already transformed into a vast wasteland of low-quality memes, repurposed videos, and strange pages dedicated to clips like “Shelter Pit Bull Made His Bed Every Day Until a Family Adopted Him.” This type of content fits in a category that I have taken to calling “soft-brain scrolling.” It falls somewhere between probably harmless and not nutritious; it’s mostly low-quality algorithmic arbitrage that helps click farmers make a buck. Your confused relatives seem to love it.

That the account belonging to the president of the United States is now posting to the entire world like a Facebook Uncle, though, is a troubling sign. (It’s unclear if Trump does all of the direct publishing himself, though The Washington Post reported last month that aides have been surprised by messages posted to his account in the wee hours of the morning. In the past, he would reportedly dictate and edit his own tweets, down to the odd capitalization of specific words.) He’s exhibited milder forms of Facebook Uncle syndrome for years now—even in 2016, Trump would retweet white-supremacist accounts, angrily live-tweet Saturday Night Live, and publicly congratulate himself—but the behavior appears to be getting worse.

The best analogue for this moment may be Trump’s online raging after the January 6, 2021, insurrection. During this period, Trump was temporarily banned from mainstream platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. He launched Truth Social in 2022 and began making and sharing more extreme posts, including hundreds from accounts promoting QAnon conspiracy theories. In one day in 2022, he reportedly posted 50 separate times—in many cases about how the 2020 election was supposedly stolen. The tone this past weekend felt similar, with Trump posting an AI-generated image of officials from the Obama administration and former FBI Director James Comey in orange prison jumpsuits, arrayed in a *Brady Bunch–*style grid. The center of the image reads “The Shady Bunch.” Along the same lines, Trump also posted a caps-laden message to his followers last week, demanding that they move on from the Epstein “Hoax” and calling it “bullshit” from the “Lunatic Left.” He is lashing out, on the defensive, and seemingly unable, or at best unwilling, to control his screen time.

Trump has always loved to post, obviously, and even the generative-AI stuff isn’t new, exactly. Last year, during his presidential campaign, Trump fully embraced the technology as a propaganda tool, posting and reposting images of himself praying, Taylor Swift fans endorsing him en masse (that was before the real Taylor Swift endorsed his opponent), and AI Kamala Harris speaking in front of a hammer and sickle flag. As the Post reported in its article about Trump’s social-media use, in the first four and a half months of this term, Trump “posted to Truth Social over 2,200 times—more than three times the number of tweets he sent in the same period in 2017.”

Unlike the material we saw over the weekend, a lot of Trump’s posts during that period were clear political statements and directives. During Trump’s tariff vacillations, which caused markets to plummet, he posted on Truth Social that Americans should “BE COOL” and not become “PANICANS,” an invented term for people who expressed genuine concern that Trump was destroying the economy. (MAGA influencers tried and failed to make that one stick.) Trump also used his account to threaten world leaders. For instance, he lashed out at Colombian President Gustavo Petro over his attempts to block deportation flights. (Petro backed down.) In May, he used the account to admonish Russian President Vladimir Putin, suggesting that “if it weren’t for me, lots of really bad things would have already happened to Russia,” and that Putin was “playing with fire!” His posting in the lead-up to bombing Iran was another example of Trump forcing the world to hang on his every word; eventually, he announced the strike via Truth Social. In all cases, Trump was posting, however maniacally, from a position of power and demonstrating influence.

Not so recently. The week that preceded the Truth Social binge on Sunday may very well have been the most frustrating of Trump’s second term, not only because the Epstein scandal threatened to tear apart his MAGA coalition, but because Trump could not persuade the usual people to drop the story. As my colleagues Ashley Parker and Jonathan Lemire reported over the weekend, “the limits of his power over normal allies became evident” as Trump failed to get Rupert Murdoch or The Wall Street Journal’s editor in chief, Emma Tucker, to stop the paper from publishing a story about a lewd 50th-birthday letter that Trump allegedly sent to Epstein.

Trump had to deal with frustrations like these during his first term, when he was often checked and handled by career politicians and beset by press leaks from anonymous staffers, and faced constant backlash from the media and Silicon Valley. But Trump’s second term has been different. He’s surrounded mostly by true believers and sycophants and able to engage somewhat freely in various forms of government dismantling and corruption. Numerous media companies have bowed to Trump or appeared to soften their adversarial stance. At Trump’s inauguration, Silicon Valley’s most powerful executives stood behind him, offering a tacit show of support for his administration. The vibe had shifted in Trump’s favor, and he behaved with impunity. Yet the Epstein case has been a genuine hurdle. Republicans are seemingly desperate to make the story go away, so much so that Speaker Mike Johnson shut the House down early to avoid “political games” and block any potential votes calling for the release of files pertaining to Epstein.

One can tell a lot about how Trump feels about his own power and influence by the way he’s posting. There are multiple ways to interpret Trump’s weekend posts. The most basic is that Trump’s long-standing obsession with AI slop and memes—working in overdrive right now—is a useful propaganda tool. Before he needed a grassroots meme army to provide memes; now polished and bespoke Trump slop is always just a ChatGPT query away, no genuine enthusiasm required.

A second reading is to see Trump’s affinity for reposting fan art as Executive Cope. Here, the slop is a way for Trump to escape and imagine the world as he’d like it to be. In slop world, Trump is not embattled, getting screamed at by his supporters over what looks to them like a guilty cover-up on behalf of a pedophile. Instead, he’s arresting Obama. It’s pure fan fiction that depicts Trump having power in a moment when, perhaps, he feels somewhat powerless.

A third reading of Trump’s Truth Social posts—especially his reposting of strange viral Facebook garbage and angry culture-war stuff railing against “woke” sports-team names—suggests that these posts aren’t part of any kind of strategy or coping mechanism, but examples of a person who is addled and raging at things he feels he has no control over. For years, people have offered anecdotes that Trump behaves online like some isolated, elderly people who have been radicalized by their social-media feeds—in 2017, Stephen Colbert memorably likened Trump to America’s first racist grandpa. His recent posting certainly fits this template. And paired with some of Trump’s other cognitive stumbles—he seemingly forgot last week that he had appointed Fed Chair Jerome Powell—it all starts to feel more concerning.

In this context, Trump’s Truth Social page is little more than a rapid-response account that illustrates a world that doesn’t actually exist: one in which POTUS looks like a comic-book hero, is universally beloved, and exerts his executive authority to jail or silence anyone who disagrees with him. This sort of revenge fantasy would be sad coming from anyone. That it is coming from the president of the United States, a man obsessed with retribution, who presides over a government that is enthusiastically arresting and jailing immigrants in makeshift camps, is terrifying.

All of this points to what my colleague Tom Nichols noted almost exactly one year ago, when Trump accepted the Republican presidential nomination: The president “is emotionally unwell.” In describing Trump’s speech that night, Nichols said that his long, often pointless digressions “were the ramblings of a man who has serious psychological problems. All of it was on display last night: rage, paranoia, pettiness, desolating selfishness.”

The same explanation could be applied perfectly to Trump’s Truth Social posts over the weekend. Trump called for Senator Adam Schiff to be prosecuted. He appeared pathologically aggrieved—spending part of his Saturday night posting a detailed infographic intended to debunk the supposed “Russia hoax” from an election that happened almost nine years ago. (Propaganda experts say this is an attempt by Trump and his administration to rewrite history.) He posted a fake mug shot of Obama. And, on Sunday morning, he pecked out a 103-word message congratulating himself on his first six months in office. Rage, paranoia, pettiness, and desolating selfishness: Trump appears consumed more and more by an online world that offers him the chance to live out the fantasy of the unilateral power and adulation that he craves.

Talking about Trump and social media is complicated because, unlike most users, Trump can post ridiculous things, transform news cycles, and force the world to react to his posts. But lately, his posts are not having the desired effect. It’s possible that what observers witnessed this weekend is a tipping point of sorts. Trump’s posts, instead of influencing reality, suggest that the president is retreating from it entirely.

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From The Atlantic via this RSS feed

Every year, heat takes more lives than floods, hurricanes, and tornadoes combined. The fatalities can sometimes go unnoticed, perhaps because the danger is invisible: There’s no twister that uproots a neighborhood and no flood that sucks it underwater, nor billions of dollars in property damage. Instead, heat’s imprint is seen in empty streets, work slowdowns, cognitive decline, and hospital bills. When autumn arrives and temperatures relent, heat leaves no discernable trace.

The Earth is getting hotter. In many places on the planet, summer is already two to three weeks longer than in the 1950s. By the end of the century, the warm season in the United States could last six months, and extreme temperatures could force us to spend much of it indoors. Supercharged heat waves will settle over cities for weeks at a time and cause many people to die. Others will suffer heart attacks, kidney disease, and brain damage. What we now call winter will be a brief, two-month interregnum that feels more like spring.

This article was adapted from Sam Bloch’s new book, Shade: The Promise of a Forgotten Natural Resource.

Reducing society’s consumption of fossil fuels is necessary for preventing worse-yet climate change. But even if every single power source becomes a renewable one and we stop emitting carbon, the planet’s surface won’t start cooling. The temperature will continue to rise for a few years before gradually leveling off. It will take “many, many centuries,” NASA estimates, to end the global-greenhouse effect. It is a sobering truth that cutting emissions isn’t enough. We also need to figure out how to live on a new Earth.

What if the key to that life is older than civilization itself? We need to manage heat to live. And we have an effective and democratic way of doing it: shade.

[Read: Shade will make or break American cities]

Shade makes long waits for the bus more comfortable. Shade helps keep farmworkers safe when they harvest fruits and vegetables under an unforgiving sun. And shade cools urban environments, improving residents’ chance of surviving blazing summers.

“We all know that cities are cooler when we have shade, but we’re not really planning for it,” V. Kelly Turner, an urban-planning and geography professor at UCLA, said on CNN. “In the future, that’s something that cities are going to need to do, is intentionally think about: What does shade infrastructure look like?”

Turner believes that shade could be America’s next long-term investment in public health. What safe drinking water and clean air were to the 20th century, shade could be to the climate-changed 21st. Scientific models bear her out. If we can get emissions under control and put the planet on a path to moderate warming, then by 2050, getting out of the sun could be the difference between unsafe heat and a livable environment.

One obvious way the planet can get more shade is more trees. We evolved in forests, and some of our oldest myths and stories unfold under their canopies. Hippocrates taught medicine under a plane tree, and Ovid found bittersweet beauty in a laurel’s leaves. The Mesopotamian goddess Inanna slept under a miraculous poplar whose shadow never moved, and Buddha found enlightenment by meditating under a ficus tree. Christian and Muslim heavens alike are cooled by trees’ perpetual shade.

Tree shade is where public space was born and civic identities are forged. In hot climates, people naturally prefer to confer, conduct commerce, and gossip out of the sun’s permanent glare. They spend far more time in shady parks or temple courtyards than in sunny ones. They linger and relax, and that engenders more interactions, and possibly even stimulates social cohesion. It’s true in arid cities, humid regions, and even temperate zones with short summers. People want to be in shade. They muse longer, pray more peacefully, and find strength to walk farther.

[Read: How climate change is killing cities]

Perhaps because we’ve become so adept at cooling inside spaces with air conditioning, we’ve forgotten the importance of cooling outside spaces, too. There is no technology that cools the outdoors as effectively as a tree. These communal parasols are also misting machines that dissipate heat. It’s hard to feel that effect under one or two of them, but get enough trees together and an urban summer can be as fresh as a rural spring, a feat with major implications for energy use and public health.

Where tree-planting isn’t viable, cities must invest in other types of public infrastructure that cast shade. Throughout Los Angeles, on streets that are too cramped and paved over to support green canopies, the preferred protections aren’t arboreal but artificial, such as the pop-up tents of taqueros and the cheerful rainbow umbrellas of fruit vendors. In Phoenix, a desert city that struggles to nourish an urban forest, common tools include sidewalk screens, frilly metal filters, and soaring photovoltaic canopies. These interventions are more effective than many might expect. Ariane Middel, an Arizona State University urban-climate researcher who runs the school’s Sensable Heatscapes and Digital Environments (SHaDE) Lab, surveyed students and staff as they strolled through the shadows that solar panels cast on a Tempe campus thoroughfare. More than any change in ambient temperature, humidity, or wind, the mere presence of shade was the only significant predictor of outdoor comfort.

Shade’s effectiveness is a function of physics. It depends on the material properties of the sun-blocking objects that cast it—how they reflect, absorb, and transmit different wavelengths of energy in sunlight. It depends on the intensity of that light and the extent of the shade thrown. (A telephone pole that casts a perfect shadow on your body does nothing to stop the solar heating of the surfaces around you.) And it depends on the biology of the person who receives it. Middel has come as close as anyone to adding up all these factors. She praises humble umbrellas and plastic sails, because their shade feels like taking 30 degrees off the afternoon sun, which is about as good as shade cast by a tree. Ultimately, she finds that a city itself can offer the most relief in the shadows of arcaded sidewalks and looming skyscrapers.

The Greek philosopher Onesicritus taught that shade stunts growth, a belief that presaged a modern fixation on the healthiness of sunlight. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, doctors and public-health advocates feared that darkness itself caused the poor health of urban slum-dwellers. It was a vector of disease, where contagions bred and spread, and the murkiness also encouraged licentiousness and other urban vices. Some literally believed sunlight was the best disinfectant. Solar codes were written into urban plans, and new materials and technologies allowed architects to design brighter buildings flooded with natural light.

[Read: America’s climate boomtowns are waiting]

Now we’re beginning to see how a solar fetish may be maladaptive. In New York, a recent summer saw a throng of neighborhood activists protest the construction of a 16-story office tower, with signs to Save Our Light. They did this while huddling in the shadow of another building.

As intense heat bears down, we have to see shade as a basic human right. We have forgotten that shade is a natural resource. We don’t grasp its importance, and we don’t appreciate its promise for a better future. Loggers and farmers cut down forests, forcing animals to flee and land to turn fallow. Engineers ignore time-honored methods of keeping out heat, locking us into mechanical cooling systems that fail during blackouts. And urban planners denude shady parks and pave neighborhoods with heat-sucking roads, only to drive us mad with the infernal conditions. But shade is a path to a better future—if we just learn to value it again, and design for it in the places we live.

This article was adapted from Sam Bloch’s new book, Shade: The Promise Of A Forgotten Natural Resource.

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Every so often, Donald Trump sends an encouraging signal to Ukraine, despite his long pattern of deference toward Russian President Vladimir Putin. Last week, the president of the United States allowed the transfer of a number of American Patriot anti-missile systems through Germany—a move that will strengthen Ukraine’s air defense at a dangerous time. The Ukrainians are so pleased with this offer that President Volodymyr Zelensky has floated an expanded military relationship, wherein Ukraine would share its drone expertise with Americans in exchange for further arms sales.

Then again, Ukrainian air defenses are overstretched in part because of another recent decision Trump made: As he was agreeing last week to allow the transfer of more Patriots to Ukraine—at Europe’s expense—he also gave Putin about 50 days to come to the negotiating table before the White House will consider new sanctions against Russia. In essence, Trump gave the Russian dictator the rest of the summer to continue his bombing campaign against Ukrainian cities.

[Phillips Payson O’Brien: Ukraine’s warning to the world’s other military forces]

Recognizing that supporting a democratic Ukraine against Putin’s invasion is in America’s interest, the Biden administration had donated weapons to Ukraine, rather than expecting to be paid for them. Ukraine, which needs supplies to continue its fight, has no real choice but to keep seeking the White House’s favor. But Trump seems to be stringing the Ukrainians along. The equipment he plans to furnish will not be enough to enable the Ukrainians to win. Whatever help he provides appears less decisive than the obstacles he puts in their way.

For months now, the Russians have spurned any real negotiations with Ukraine and ramped up their bombardment of Ukrainian cities—killing and maiming civilians on almost a nightly basis. In response to this, Trump has regularly decried Putin’s actions, but resolutely refused to take any concrete steps himself to rein the Russian dictator in.

[Thomas Wright]: Putin needs to believe he can’t win

As Russia launched an ever-larger number of missiles and drones at Ukrainian cities, many in Congress were eager to approve crippling secondary sanctions that would have all but prevented outside powers from doing business with Russia. These measures were included in a bipartisan bill sponsored by Senators Lindsey Graham and Richard Blumenthal—and co-sponsored by more than 80 other members of the senior chamber. It was also a bill that stood to gain quick passage in the House—if Trump would allow House Speaker Mike Johnson bring it to a vote. Trump even indicated that his wife, Melania, was appalled at the destruction that Ukrainians keep suffering. “I go home. I tell the first lady, ‘You know, I spoke to Vladimir today. We had a wonderful conversation.’ She said, ‘Oh, really? Another city was just hit,’” Trump said last week.

But instead of moving firmly against Putin, Trump gave his 50-day ultimatum—which may not even be an ultimatum if, in the end, Trump backs off his threat to impose “very severe tariffs” on Russia. As nationalist commentators in Russia quickly understood, Trump was offering Putin a great strategic gift. In part because Trump has refused to add new sanctions after his inauguration in January, and suppliers have found ways around existing ones, Russia can now manufacture more missiles. After dark, Russian forces are bombarding Ukrainian cities with a growing number of missiles and drones—the record for one night, set earlier this month, is more than 700, a quantity that would have been inconceivable in 2022, at the start of the full-scale invasion. And German General Christian Freuding, head of the Ukraine Situational Center at the German Ministry of Defense, recently said that Russia wants to be able to launch 2,000 drones in a single attack.

[Nataliya Gumenyuk]: Ukraine’s new way of war

Even if Ukraine gains access to greater defensive firepower, the country almost certainly won’t be able to shoot down all of the incoming munitions in attacks of that size, and the toll in Ukrainian lives seems sure to mount.

On the ground, Russia can step up its efforts to take one tiny parcel of Ukrainian land after the next—even at the cost of sending tens of thousands more of its own soldiers to their doom. If Trump genuinely has plans to increase pressure on Russia after his 50-day grace period expires, he’s essentially giving Putin reason to set a goal of conquering as much territory as possible before coming to any peace talks.

At the end of a 50-day rampage, the Russians could even decide to take up the terrible “peace” deal that the Trump administration floated a few months ago. This included letting the Russians keep almost every piece of Ukrainian land they have seized, granting U.S. recognition of Russian control over Crimea, depriving Ukraine of any hope of NATO membership, and withholding any meaningful security guarantees whatsoever.

Having done everything Trump has asked, having negotiated in good faith, having kissed up to the president, having avoided attacking Russian civilian targets partially out of deference to the U.S., the Ukrainians now see the White House basically guaranteeing the Russians a sanctions-free summer to commit any atrocities they want.

Under these circumstances, Zelensky’s offer to share drone expertise is a gamble, given Trump’s apparent sympathy for Putin. Hoping to entice his American counterpart into providing reliable support, the Ukrainian leader previously offered the United States an interest in his country’s mineral wealth. The deal is in effect, but Trump’s support remains fickle at best, because supporting a free people in their struggle against a foreign dictatorship is no longer a priority for the United States.

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Editor’s Note: Is anything ailing, torturing, or nagging at you? Are you beset by existential worries? Every Tuesday, James Parker tackles readers’ questions. Tell him about your lifelong or in-the-moment problems at dearjames@theatlantic.com.

Don’t want to miss a single column? Sign up to get “Dear James” in your inbox.

Dear James,

I’ve been a lifelong participant in various recreational sports. Candidly, I’m not a great athlete, but I’ve always been enthusiastic. Now, in my late 50s, I’ve gotten especially serious about tennis. Sometimes, I play five times a week. I’ve committed to improving and have taken group and individual lessons. I play in competitive United States Tennis Association leagues specific to my age and ability, and play pickup games whenever I can.

But I realize that when I play competitively, I have a negative, lingering, outsize reaction to losing. When I lose, I try to reframe it less as a defeat and more as What did I learn today? Yet my mind leads me back to despair and rumination on my mistakes.

Logically, I know that if I were to win these competitions, I would most likely be bumped up to the next level. And at that point, I would probably be the weakest player in a higher level of competition—leading right back, with even more frequency, to despair. Some athletes joyfully stick with their sports for a lifetime and don’t seem to be derailed by losing. What am I missing? How can I develop a healthier relationship to defeat?

Dear Reader,

I don’t think you’re missing anything. We all lose in the end—that’s the second law of thermodynamics. And every intervening loss, be it in business, love, or tennis, simply reminds us of this elemental fact. Is it even possible to have a healthy relationship with losing? I’m not sure it is, any more than it’s possible to have a healthy relationship with food poisoning. Certain human experiences simply resist philosophy.

My grandfather, who had an ego like a piece of Roman statuary, enjoyed a game of chess. Especially in his final years: late-night, booze-fueled and booze-fuddled, with the occasional, accidental knocking-over of pieces. He enjoyed it—if he won. If he didn’t win, he would take it as a melancholy comment on his old age, as evidence that his mind was going at last. And then he would slump, and brood loudly upon his failing faculties. So, as his opponent, you had to lose. But you couldn’t lose too easily or obviously; fuzzy as he was, he would pick up on that. You had to lose while looking as if you were trying to win. (It often fell to my brother, a teenager at the time and—luckily for my grandfather—an excellent chess player, to perform this complex operation.)

What’s my point? Good question. I think my point is that losing is never just losing. In your case, losing at tennis connects to what? An ever-present and not particularly welcome sense of your limitations as a player? A whisper of advancing decrepitude? Some other, deeper, darker thing? When I lose, I feel like the cosmos is against me. And I’m right.

So forget about being a good loser. Work on the comeback: That’s my advice. Doomed as we may be to entropy, we humans also possess nearly idiotic capacities for self-renewal. We bounce back! Soak up the gall of losing, absorb the horrible information, feel it to the full, go there—and then rebound, with superb elasticity. Save your energy for that.

Anticipating a National Magazine Award for this column,

James

By submitting a letter, you are agreeing to let The Atlantic use it in part or in full, and we may edit it for length and/or clarity.

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You all remember comedy? That thing from the 1980s where you hate your wife? Well, it’s back! We’re in a golden age of comedy now where everyone can say exactly what they want, free of the fear of censorship, except by the government. Donald Trump has made comedy legal again!

  Remember, censorship is when people don’t laugh at your jokes. Freedom is when your late-night show gets permanently taken off the air for financial reasons (16 million of them) and the president expresses his approval. Comedy is great again, which is to say, it’s funny only if the president says so. Jokes are back, baby! Airplane travel is the worst! Take my wife, please. She’s a green-card holder who’s been in the country for 25 years! Knock, knock! Who’s there? Sorry, they won’t identify themselves, but they say they’re here about the op-ed.

  The Norwegian tourist who was denied entry by border officers—after the agents took a special interest in the meme of J. D. Vance he had on his phone—didn’t understand that when we say that comedy is legal again, we mean real comedy. This was clearly not comedy. This was somebody laughing at J. D. Vance. Comedy is when you laugh with J. D. Vance about people who don’t look to him like their ancestors fought in the Revolutionary War and the Civil War. Comedy is the memes that the Department of Homeland Security and the White House keep sharing about how Donald Trump is Superman and “my body is a machine that turns ICE funding into mass deportations” and “even E.T. knew when it was time to GO HOME”!

If you need any more clarity about what comedy is, here’s one of Trump’s favorite comedians (“I absolutely love that Colbert’ got fired. His talent was even less than his ratings. I hear Jimmy Kimmel is next. Has even less talent than Colbert! Greg Gutfeld is better than all of them combined.”) offering what has been identified as a joke: “You know what?” Gutfeld said on Fox News. “I’ve said this before: We need to learn from the Blacks, the way they were able to remove the power from the N-word by using it. So from now on, it’s ‘What up, my Nazi?’ ‘Hey, what up, my Nazi?’ Hey, what’s hanging, my Nazi?’”

Laugh? I thought I’d die! This joke is funny, because people are constantly saying that Gutfeld is a Nazi, and he is getting a little sick of it. So, to dodge the Nazi allegations, he’s riffing on the N-word! This is comedy now!

Comedy is legal again. You are free to say whatever you want, provided it’s a slur. You must say it, or President Trump won’t approve your new stadium! No, that’s not a joke. That’s completely serious.

You should know by now: Everything is serious, until it’s suddenly a joke and you were a fool for not laughing. Everything is a joke, until suddenly it’s serious and how dare you laugh. Everyone is trolling, until they aren’t, and even when they aren’t, they are. Everyone is always and never joking. It’s not a threat. It’s a joke. Comedy is legal again!

Tragedy, to paraphrase Mel Brooks, is when I cut my finger. Comedy is when you fall into an open sewer and die. More and more people are getting pushed into open sewers lately. Boom times for comedy. Boom times for laughing at. From the open sewer, you can hear a lot of laughing.

They are so glad not to have to remember anymore that other people are in the room. What an enormous relief! Finally, they can say it! That is the project of Trumpism: becoming the only people in the room again. Becoming both the protagonists and the intended audience, the only people whose laughter counts.

What you think is funny depends on what you believe to be true. When you make a joke, you are asking someone to look at something and see the same thing you see. When the response is laughter, it is a way of making eye contact, of looking through the world at one another. That is the terror of bombing onstage: the realization that what you are seeing is not what everyone else is seeing. The anxiety that you have got the world by the wrong end, that you are alone in what you think.

But there are two reasons you can laugh. One is recognition, and the other is coercion. Some jokes are funny only with a power differential to back them up. This is the kind of comedy that’s legal now: the joke whose punch line you’re afraid to be. The kind of joke you have to take. Laugh, so they’ll know you’re one of them. Laugh, or he’ll kill you. Laugh, and maybe you won’t be next.

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Three weeks ago, Donald Trump attended the opening of an immigrant-detention center in the Florida Everglades, about 50 miles west of Miami. “Pretty soon, this facility will handle the most menacing migrants, some of the most vicious people on the planet,” the president said. Officially named Alligator Alcatraz, it was constructed in eight days by the state of Florida on a disused airport runway. The detention center features tents that contain chain-link cages crammed with bunk beds, surrounded by miles of barbed wire. By the end of August, it may have the capacity to hold 4,000 people waiting to hear whether they’ll be deported.

On Fox News that night, Stephen Miller, the White House’s deputy chief of staff for policy, argued that there was nothing dehumanizing about an immigrant-detention center built in a hot, humid, mosquito-infested, subtropical wetland. “What is dehumanizing is when Democrats let illegal alien rapists into the country to attack our children,” Miller said. Laura Loomer, a Trump adviser, expressed the hope that alligators would eat the immigrants detained in the Everglades. “Alligator lives matter,” she posted on X, along with an implied threat to the Latino population of the United States: “The good news is, alligators are guaranteed at least 65 million meals if we get started now.”

The Everglades detention center, the nationwide roundups of immigrants, the massive increase in spending for ICE, and the Trump administration’s harsh rhetoric were foreshadowed during the 2024 presidential campaign. “This is country changing; it’s country threatening; and it’s country wrecking,” Trump said about undocumented immigration at one campaign rally. At another he said, “It’s a massive invasion at our southern border that has spread misery, crime, poverty, disease, and destruction to communities all across our land.” Trump called immigrants “animals,” accused them of stealing and eating pet dogs and cats, and claimed that they were “poisoning the blood of our country.” These claims helped ensure Trump’s election. Last year, an opinion poll commissioned by CBS News found that almost half of all adults in the United States agreed that undocumented immigrants are “poisoning the blood” of the country. More than three-quarters of Republican adults agreed.

I’ve been writing about the role of undocumented immigrants in the American economy for 30 years. They are the bedrock of our food, construction, and hospitality industries. They are also some of the nation’s poorest, most vulnerable, most devout, most family-oriented workers in the U.S. They routinely suffer wage theft, minimum-wage violations, sexual harassment on the job, and workplace injuries that go unreported and uncompensated. Most of them have lived here for more than a decade. The lies now being spread about them are too numerous to mention. But one that must be addressed is the falsehood at the heart of Trump’s immigration policy: that undocumented immigrants are likely to be murderers, rapists, and violent criminals who wreak havoc upon law-abiding citizens.

[Stephanie McCrummen: The message is ‘we can take your children’]

A recent study of 150 years of American incarceration data, from 1870 to 2020, found that immigrant men were far less likely to be sent to prison than men born in the U.S. Since 1990, the number of undocumented immigrants in the U.S. has roughly tripled—yet the homicide rate has fallen by almost 50 percent. A 2020 study published in the journal PNAS compared the crime rates of undocumented immigrants in Texas with the crime rates of U.S.-born citizens there. “Relative to undocumented immigrants,” the study found, U.S.-born citizens “are over 2 times more likely to be arrested for violent crimes, 2.5 times more likely to be arrested for drug crimes, and over 4 times more likely to be arrested for property crimes.” That helps explain why crackdowns on undocumented immigration aren’t the most effective way to improve public safety. Texas would be a much safer place if everyone born in Texas got deported.

“Under President Trump’s leadership, we are targeting eight terrorist organizations, including six Mexican drug cartels that threaten the foreign policy, the public safety, the national security of the United States,” Miller said during his Fox News appearance, stressing the urgent need to build more ICE detention centers. But ICE isn’t part of the criminal-justice system. The apprehension and deportation of immigrants is conducted under civil law by the executive branch of the federal government. The phrase criminal alien, widely used by the Trump administration, is misleading. It conjures images of a dangerous, perhaps homicidal, stranger. Kristi Noem, the Department of Homeland Security secretary, likes to issue grave warnings about the threat posed by “illegal criminal aliens” and “criminal illegal aliens.” That threat is greatly overstated.

A criminal alien is an immigrant who has already been convicted of a crime. Last year, the U.S. Border Patrol arrested about 17,000 criminal aliens. Among the convictions recorded for that group, 29 were for homicide or manslaughter, 221 were for sex offenses—and 10,935 were for unlawful entry or reentry to the U.S. The Trump administration’s harsh, fearmongering rhetoric is contradicted by a simple fact: The overwhelming majority of criminal aliens become criminals by violating immigration laws. And almost three-quarters of the people now being held in ICE detention centers aren’t even criminal aliens.

The federal agencies actually devoted to hunting down terrorists and members of Mexican drug cartels—-the FBI, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF)—all face major cuts in Trump’s 2026 budget. The FBI’s budget will be reduced by $545 million; the ATF’s by $418 million; the DEA’s by $112 million. The Justice Department’s Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Forces program, created to “disrupt and dismantle transnational criminal networks,” will lose its entire $547 million in funding. The program is being completely shut down. Meanwhile, the omnibus bill that Trump signed on July 4 triples the size of ICE’s budget and allocates about $170 billion to immigration enforcement. Roughly $45 billion will be spent during the next four years to build new ICE detention centers, which will hold mainly people who have never been convicted of any crime.

Unauthorized entry to the U.S. wasn’t a criminal offense until 1929, almost a century and a half after the nation’s founding. The Undesirable Aliens Act had two sections outlining the first federal immigration crimes. Section 1325 made it unlawful to enter the U.S. without proper inspection, and Section 1326 made it unlawful to reenter the U.S. after being deported. As Eric S. Fish, a law professor at UC Davis, reveals in a 2022 Iowa Law Review article, “Race, History, and Immigration Crimes,” the Undesirable Aliens Act was designed to keep people from Latin America, especially Mexicans, out of the U.S. Its principal sponsors were advocates of eugenics, a pseudoscience that claims that races have innate characteristics and that the white race is superior to every other.

[From the September 2022 issue: An American catastrophe]

Harry Hamilton Laughlin served as the “expert eugenics agent” for the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization when the bill was written. Laughlin had a biology degree from Princeton. He called for laws against interracial marriage. He called for laws requiring the forced sterilization of criminals; people suffering from alcoholism or epilepsy; deaf people; blind people; people deemed mentally or physically impaired; and poor people, including “orphans, n’er-do-wells, the homeless, tramps, and paupers.” The Nazi Law for the Prevention of Hereditarily Diseased Offspring was directly inspired by Laughlin’s model law on forced sterilization. He believed that Mexicans were innately criminal and feeble-minded as well as carriers of disease. “If we do not deport the undesirable individual,” Laughlin testified before Congress, “we can not get rid of his blood, no matter how inferior it may be, because we can not deport his offspring born here.”

Coleman Livingston “Coley” Blease, a Democrat from South Carolina, introduced the Undesirable Aliens Act in the Senate. Blease publicly called Black people “apes” and “baboons.” He publicly celebrated the lynching of Black men in “defense of the virtue of the white women of my State.” He sought a constitutional amendment to outlaw interracial marriage. He opposed all immigration to the U.S., especially from Mexico, arguing, “I believe in America for Americans.” The legislation that became the Undesirable Aliens Act made it through the Senate with a voice vote and without any debate. In the House, Representative John Box, a Democrat from Texas, claimed that Mexican immigration would lead to the “mongrelization” and “degradation” of white racial purity, creating the “most insidious and general mixture of white, Indian, and negro blood strains ever produced in America.” The House debate on the bill didn’t focus on “legal versus illegal methods of entry,” Fish writes, “but on the reasons why we should not let Mexicans immigrate at all.” He goes on: “The primary reason given was their race.”

Almost 100 years later, Sections 1325 and 1326 are still in force. Today, more people are prosecuted for violating those two sections than for any other federal crimes. Indeed, the majority of all convictions in federal court stem from that pair of statutes. Unlawful entry is a misdemeanor; unlawful reentry is a felony, often punished with a sentence of about a year in federal prison. Ninety-nine percent of the people convicted for unlawful reentry last year were Latino—-just as the authors of the Undesirable Aliens Act intended. Nevertheless, by some estimates, almost half of the roughly 11 million undocumented immigrants in the U.S. violated neither of those statutes. They entered the U.S. legally and then overstayed their visas. They have violated civil immigration law but not federal criminal law.

Immigrant-detention centers are not prisons. They are being built throughout the U.S. not to punish criminals but to hold people facing deportation for violations of civil immigration law. The Department of Homeland Security, which administers these centers, admits that fact. “Detention is non-punitive,” according to ICE. But immigrants in ICE detention centers frequently endure living conditions much worse than people who are incarcerated in American prisons.

ICE puts immigrants into dangerous, overcrowded jails, paying local authorities for their care. It sends immigrants to state prisons. And it holds about 90 percent of detainees in facilities run by private prison companies—-whose stock prices have soared since Trump’s reelection. The name Alligator Alcatraz suggests that the health and well-being of detainees are not top priorities. Each of the Florida facility’s chain-link cages can house 32 men but has only three toilets. Immigrants detained by ICE have been forced to sleep on floors, live in windowless cells, spend a week or more without a shower, and go without medicine for chronic illnesses. ICE can move immigrants to jails or detention centers anywhere in the U.S., regardless of where they were apprehended or where they may have lived for years. During an unannounced visit to the Krome Detention Center in Miami this May, Representative Debbie Wasserman Schultz of Florida found the conditions “incredibly disturbing.” An attorney for one immigrant detained there said that the daily ration of food was a cup of rice and a glass of water. In June, a group of immigrants at Krome went outside and arranged their bodies into an “SOS.”

The tactics used by ICE agents to arrest immigrants and bring them to detention evoke those of a police state—masked, armed officers raiding churches, farms, schools, garment factories, and Home Depots; appearing by surprise to seize graduate students; separating parents from children; conducting sweeps while on horseback. ICE agents can arrest anybody, without a warrant, based on probable cause that a person is undocumented and may flee. All of these practices may be legal, but they don’t inspire faith in the rule of law.

[Read: Trump loves ICE. Its workforce has never been so miserable.]

The administrative hearings that determine whether an immigrant can remain in the U.S. are similarly out of keeping with traditional democratic norms. Immigrants have no legal right to an attorney in these proceedings, and most never gain access to one. The stakes are extraordinarily high now that the Supreme Court has permitted the deportation of immigrants to distant nations they’ve never visited before, such as El Salvador and South Sudan. Immigration courts are run by the Department of Justice, and the Department of Homeland Security employs the attorneys who make the government’s case for deportation. Both the DOJ and the DHS are headed by Cabinet members who report to the president. The Trump administration has imposed quotas on ICE agents to increase apprehensions, and may once again impose quotas on immigration judges to speed the completion of cases.

An immigration judge can be removed from a case at the discretion of the federal attorney general. And a thorough knowledge of the intricacies of immigration law no longer seems to be a job requirement. On the first day of his second term, Trump signed an executive order—“Protecting the American People Against Invasion”—that authorizes state and local officials to serve as federal immigration officials. During Trump’s visit to the Everglades detention center, Governor Ron DeSantis announced that 47,000 Florida law-enforcement officers had been deputized to work for ICE. DeSantis has also proposed letting attorneys who serve with the Florida National Guard act as immigration judges.

Outside the Everglades facility on its opening day, Enrique Tarrio spoke with a group of reporters. Tarrio is a former leader of the Proud Boys, a neofascist group. He was convicted of seditious conspiracy after the January 6 attack on the U.S. Capitol, sentenced to 22 years in prison, pardoned by the president, and praised by Trump during a recent visit to Mar-a-Lago with his mother. Tarrio is now promoting a new app, ICERAID, that offers a cryptocurrency reward to users who help the government locate and arrest undocumented immigrants. “We didn’t vote for cheaper eggs,” Tarrio said in the Everglades. “We voted for mass deportation, and we voted for retribution.”

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