Coordination between the Luftwaffe and the Kriegsmarine was not always as precise as you might have expected. Quoting Gerhard Koop’s & Klaus‐Peter Schmolke’s German Destroyers of World War II: Warships of the Kriegsmarine:
The flagship […] heard, and then sighted, an aircraft at 19:13. As it flew past the squadron the fifth and sixth destroyers in line—Max Schultz and Leberecht Maass—opened fire on it. At 19:21 it was heard again and the air raid alarm was given. As it flew past the squadron, it dropped bombs which exploded with great fountains of water near the third and fourth destroyers, Erich Koellner and Theodor Riedel, according to crewmen from those two ships.
Between 19:22 and 19:27 an ultra short‐wave conversation ensued involving Friedrich Eckholdt, the lead ship, Erich Koellner and Max Schultz as to whether this was a friendly or an enemy aircraft. The explosions at 19:21 were described as ‘bomb explosions’.
At 19:44 or 19:45 the first explosion occurred aboard Leberecht Maass, forward. This time coincides precisely with that of the first attack made by the Heinkel on a ‘fast‐moving ship’. Similarly, the time of the aircraft’s second attack, 19:58–20:00, is very close to the time when the second explosion occurred aboard Leberecht Maass.
The Committee of Inquiry finally came to the conclusion that the reports about submarine sightings, the wild firing of the anti‐aircraft guns and the general excitement all contributed to the air of uncertainty about times and so forth.
It was determined that there had been four bombing attacks: (i) at 19:21 three bombs fell about 400m abeam of Max Schultz; (ii) at approximately 19:44 Leberecht Maass was bombed and hit forward; (iii) at about 19:56 there was a huge explosion on board Leberecht Maass amidships; and (iv) at 20:04 Max Schultz broke up and sank following a massive explosion.
The contradictory evidence of the aircraft crew was that only two bombing runs were flown, at 19:45, apparently scoring a hit on the forecastle, and between 19:58 and 20:00, apparently resulting in two hits amidships.
The reason for the discrepancy between these accounts remains unresolved, as do many questions about what really happened that night. The Heinkel crew was absolved from all blame. They had not been warned of the destroyer movements, no recognition signal had been fired from below, and they had, accordingly, made the justifiable assumption that the target was hostile.
[…]
It is […] certain that Leberecht Maass was damaged by the bomb at 19:45 but that the second explosion, at 20:00, was a [British] mine. Max Schultz also hit a [British] mine, for she turned with the remaining four destroyers to render assistance to Z1 just outside the swept channel. Altogether 286 crewmen from Leberecht Maass and all aboard Max Schultz—over 320 men—were lost.
The [incident] had far‐reaching consequences: there were no more destroyer operations in the North Sea.
The next mission was ‘Weserübung’, the invasion of Norway in April 1940, when ten more were sunk. Of the 22 name‐bearing destroyers in commission before the outbreak of war, only ten would still be afloat on 13 April to patrol a coastline that stretched for thousands of miles around Norway, and from the Westwall to Estonia—to which would soon be added the coastlines of the Low Countries and France. Three new destroyers entered service in 1940, but it would be the second half of 1943 before the number had risen once more to 22.
(Emphasis added.)
I have no comment.
