0x815

cross-posted from: https://feddit.org/post/3885525

Taiwan is expected to have access to low earth orbit satellite internet service by the end of the month, a step the government says is crucial in case a Chinese attack cripples the island’s communications.

The forthcoming service is via a contract between Taiwan’s main telecoms company, Chunghwa, and a UK-European company, Eutelsat OneWeb, signed last year, and marks a new milestone in Taiwan’s efforts to address technological vulnerabilities, particularly its internet access, after attempts to get access to Elon Musk’s Starlink service collapsed.

Chunghwa co-president Alex Chien said 24-hour coverage was expected by the end of the month, with commercial access as soon as sufficient bandwidth was reached.

Taiwan is under the threat of attack or invasion by China, which claims historical sovereignty over Taiwan and has vowed to annex it, by military force if necessary. In the meantime it is under a near constant barrage of cyber-attacks, and has had some of its 15 undersea cables connecting it and its outer islands to the world cut multiple times, usually by accidental anchor snags from passing ships.

cross-posted from: https://feddit.org/post/3885525

Taiwan is expected to have access to low earth orbit satellite internet service by the end of the month, a step the government says is crucial in case a Chinese attack cripples the island’s communications.

The forthcoming service is via a contract between Taiwan’s main telecoms company, Chunghwa, and a UK-European company, Eutelsat OneWeb, signed last year, and marks a new milestone in Taiwan’s efforts to address technological vulnerabilities, particularly its internet access, after attempts to get access to Elon Musk’s Starlink service collapsed.

Chunghwa co-president Alex Chien said 24-hour coverage was expected by the end of the month, with commercial access as soon as sufficient bandwidth was reached.

Taiwan is under the threat of attack or invasion by China, which claims historical sovereignty over Taiwan and has vowed to annex it, by military force if necessary. In the meantime it is under a near constant barrage of cyber-attacks, and has had some of its 15 undersea cables connecting it and its outer islands to the world cut multiple times, usually by accidental anchor snags from passing ships.

cross-posted from: https://feddit.org/post/3885525

Taiwan is expected to have access to low earth orbit satellite internet service by the end of the month, a step the government says is crucial in case a Chinese attack cripples the island’s communications.

The forthcoming service is via a contract between Taiwan’s main telecoms company, Chunghwa, and a UK-European company, Eutelsat OneWeb, signed last year, and marks a new milestone in Taiwan’s efforts to address technological vulnerabilities, particularly its internet access, after attempts to get access to Elon Musk’s Starlink service collapsed.

Chunghwa co-president Alex Chien said 24-hour coverage was expected by the end of the month, with commercial access as soon as sufficient bandwidth was reached.

Taiwan is under the threat of attack or invasion by China, which claims historical sovereignty over Taiwan and has vowed to annex it, by military force if necessary. In the meantime it is under a near constant barrage of cyber-attacks, and has had some of its 15 undersea cables connecting it and its outer islands to the world cut multiple times, usually by accidental anchor snags from passing ships.

Taiwan is expected to have access to low earth orbit satellite internet service by the end of the month, a step the government says is crucial in case a Chinese attack cripples the island’s communications.

The forthcoming service is via a contract between Taiwan’s main telecoms company, Chunghwa, and a UK-European company, Eutelsat OneWeb, signed last year, and marks a new milestone in Taiwan’s efforts to address technological vulnerabilities, particularly its internet access, after attempts to get access to Elon Musk’s Starlink service collapsed.

Chunghwa co-president Alex Chien said 24-hour coverage was expected by the end of the month, with commercial access as soon as sufficient bandwidth was reached.

Taiwan is under the threat of attack or invasion by China, which claims historical sovereignty over Taiwan and has vowed to annex it, by military force if necessary. In the meantime it is under a near constant barrage of cyber-attacks, and has had some of its 15 undersea cables connecting it and its outer islands to the world cut multiple times, usually by accidental anchor snags from passing ships.

Die Bundesregierung wendete für Werbung im ersten Halbjahr insgesamt 18,7 Millionen Euro auf. Die Bundesregierung sind freilich Ministerien, die unabhängig voneinander agieren und unter anderem auch völlig unterschiedliche Strategien wählen.

Das zeigt sich etwa, wenn man sich anschaut, an welche Printmedien Inserate vorrangig gingen: Beim Klimaschutzministerium, bei dem „Print“ grundsätzlich eine sehr geringe Rolle spielt, an Standard (111.800 Euro), Presse (77.023 Euro) und Krone (53.883). Beim Verteidigungs- und beim Innenministerium hingegen geht Boulevard eindeutig vor, geht auch ein größerer Teil der gesamten Mittel an einschlägige Zeitungen. Bei beiden am meisten an Österreich – oe24 (265.693 bzw. 168.343 Euro), obwohl das nicht einmal das Blatt mit den meisten Lesern ist. Beim Justizministerium gab es wiederum nur Werbung in einem Printmedium, im „Kuvert“ der Post (30.019 Euro).

Boulevard-Lastigkeit spielt auch bei der Stadt Wien eine große Rolle, die allein elf Millionen Euro für Werbung aufwendete. Bemerkenswert: Auch bei ihr ist Österreich – oe24 an der Spitze; mit rund 550.000 Euro. Laut Media-Analyse hatte die Zeitung in Wien zuletzt eine Reichweite von 14,4 Prozent. Sie war damit deutlich kleiner als jene von Krone und Heute mit jeweils rund 17 Prozent. Trotzdem erhielt die Fellner-Zeitung mehr.

China's National Health Commission (NHC) is surveying 30,000 people to understand factors influencing their attitudes towards childbearing and the "fear surrounding having children", as authorities struggle to boost a flagging birthrate.

The survey will include people from 150 counties in China and 1,500 different communities, the state-backed Global Times said late on Thursday, citing the China Population and Development Research Center, which falls under the NHC [The Global Times framed its story under the headline 'National population survey launched to help optimize fertility support'.]

Beijing is trying to encourage young couples to have children after China posted a second consecutive year of population decline in 2023.

The survey aims to analyse "reluctance and fear surrounding having children" and ultimately provide fertility support and incentive measures, the newspaper said.

The last time a countrywide family and fertility survey was carried out was in 2021. It comes after China's National Bureau of Statistics said it will conduct a nationwide sample survey from Oct. 10-Nov. 30 to monitor population changes.

Population development has often been linked to a strong and rejuvenated China in state media.

Chinese health officials said in September they would focus more efforts on advocating marriage and childbirth at "appropriate ages" and called for shared parenting responsibilities to guide young people towards "positive perspectives on marriage, childbirth and family".

[Edit typo.]

cross-posted from: https://feddit.org/post/3877004

Russia has had to cope with an almost systematic increase in sanctions in scope and scale in order to conduct its invasion of Ukraine. These sanctions aim to hobble Russia’s capacity to procure and produce the necessary products to resupply its military. However, while sanctions have significantly affected Russia’s economy and war effort, Russia has shown adaptability in circumventing these restrictions through various initiatives and engaging with strategic partners, most importantly, the People’s Republic of China and its business entities.

[...]

A study by the KSE Institute utilizing Harmonized System (HS) codes [...] analyses forty-five common high-priority items (i.e., battlefield goods) and 485 HS codes for critical components [...] Between January and October 2023, Russian imports of battlefield goods totalled $8.77 billion, while critical components amounted to $22.23 billion. Within the 2023 KSE Institute compiled dataset, China has exercised a pivotal role in Russia’s efforts to import battlefield goods and critical components for its military and defence industry. This is observed from the immediate aftermath of Western sanctions being imposed to August-December 2022 when imports of battlefield goods and critical components increased by 84% and 42% respectively.

[...]

China was instrumental in all stages of the Russian defence industry’s external supply chain between January and October 2023. For instance, where businesses are headquartered, China accounts for 41% of battlefield goods and 41.2% of critical components. Interestingly, the total non-coalition sanctions accounted for 48%, and of these, China represented 46.7%, making China the most dominant power outside the coalition-sanction countries and the most dominant single entity.

China’s role increases substantially during manufacturing, representing 63.1% of battlefield goods and 58.7% of critical components produced for Russia.

[...]

Data shows that Chinese and Hong Kongese companies’ data combined led the sales of the goods and components in question to Russia, accounting for 68.9% of battlefield goods and 57% of critical components. Finally, China also plays a pivotal role in goods and components shipped directly to Russia, with China representing 53.2% of battlefield goods and 53.8% of critical components, respectively. Again, China is followed by Hong Kong at 22.7% and 12.9, with a combined 75.9% and 66.7%.

[...]

Specific Chinese exports of dual-use components and materials related to Russia’s defence industry and equipment that is being utilized by Russia’s military, including construction equipment, comprises:

• Computer Numerical Control (CNC) machines
• Semiconductors
• Microelectronics and Electronic Components
• Ball Bearings
• Nitrocellulose
• Drones and Electronic Warfare systems
• Body armour and Helmets

[...]

China’s continued support for Russia amid its invasion of Ukraine poses significant risks and challenges that far outweigh any short-term benefits. By aiding Russia, China jeopardizes its international reputation as a responsible global power, becoming a complicit actor in the conflict, violating international law and the core principles of sovereignty.

Moreover, Chinese entities supporting Russia and the Chinese government’s lackadaisical response to Western complaints will eventually lead to secondary sanctions, deepening economic strains and retaliation from Western nations.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://feddit.org/post/3877004

Russia has had to cope with an almost systematic increase in sanctions in scope and scale in order to conduct its invasion of Ukraine. These sanctions aim to hobble Russia’s capacity to procure and produce the necessary products to resupply its military. However, while sanctions have significantly affected Russia’s economy and war effort, Russia has shown adaptability in circumventing these restrictions through various initiatives and engaging with strategic partners, most importantly, the People’s Republic of China and its business entities.

[...]

A study by the KSE Institute utilizing Harmonized System (HS) codes [...] analyses forty-five common high-priority items (i.e., battlefield goods) and 485 HS codes for critical components [...] Between January and October 2023, Russian imports of battlefield goods totalled $8.77 billion, while critical components amounted to $22.23 billion. Within the 2023 KSE Institute compiled dataset, China has exercised a pivotal role in Russia’s efforts to import battlefield goods and critical components for its military and defence industry. This is observed from the immediate aftermath of Western sanctions being imposed to August-December 2022 when imports of battlefield goods and critical components increased by 84% and 42% respectively.

[...]

China was instrumental in all stages of the Russian defence industry’s external supply chain between January and October 2023. For instance, where businesses are headquartered, China accounts for 41% of battlefield goods and 41.2% of critical components. Interestingly, the total non-coalition sanctions accounted for 48%, and of these, China represented 46.7%, making China the most dominant power outside the coalition-sanction countries and the most dominant single entity.

China’s role increases substantially during manufacturing, representing 63.1% of battlefield goods and 58.7% of critical components produced for Russia.

[...]

Data shows that Chinese and Hong Kongese companies’ data combined led the sales of the goods and components in question to Russia, accounting for 68.9% of battlefield goods and 57% of critical components. Finally, China also plays a pivotal role in goods and components shipped directly to Russia, with China representing 53.2% of battlefield goods and 53.8% of critical components, respectively. Again, China is followed by Hong Kong at 22.7% and 12.9, with a combined 75.9% and 66.7%.

[...]

Specific Chinese exports of dual-use components and materials related to Russia’s defence industry and equipment that is being utilized by Russia’s military, including construction equipment, comprises:

• Computer Numerical Control (CNC) machines
• Semiconductors
• Microelectronics and Electronic Components
• Ball Bearings
• Nitrocellulose
• Drones and Electronic Warfare systems
• Body armour and Helmets

[...]

China’s continued support for Russia amid its invasion of Ukraine poses significant risks and challenges that far outweigh any short-term benefits. By aiding Russia, China jeopardizes its international reputation as a responsible global power, becoming a complicit actor in the conflict, violating international law and the core principles of sovereignty.

Moreover, Chinese entities supporting Russia and the Chinese government’s lackadaisical response to Western complaints will eventually lead to secondary sanctions, deepening economic strains and retaliation from Western nations.

[...]

Das Podium auf der Frankfurter Buchmesse war in blaues Licht getaucht, hinter dem Redner zeichnete sich eine zarte Hügellandschaft ab, durch die ein chinesischer Tempel lugte. Vorn stand Wu Ken, damals noch Botschafter der Volksrepublik China. Der Diplomat war im Oktober 2023 nach Frankfurt gekommen, um für Staats- und Parteichef Xi Jinping zu werben. Erst wenige Tage zuvor hatte die deutsche Außenministerin Annalena Baerbock ihn als "Diktator" bezeichnet. Nun stellte Wu in einem eigens angemieteten Raum auf der weltgrößten Buchmesse das Buch "Stories of Xi Jinping" vor, ein Propaganda-Werk über den kommunistischen Alleinherrscher.

Wu ist ein diplomatischer Scharfmacher. In China nennen sie seinesgleichen "Wolfskrieger". Der Botschafter leitete seinen Vortrag unter dem Titel "Die Kraft der Gedanken" mit einem Zitat von Johann Wolfgang von Goethe ein. "Denken und Tun, Tun und Denken, das ist die Summe aller Weisheit", sagte Wu, bevor er geschickt eine Verbindung zwischen dem deutschen Vorzeigedichter und der kommunistischen Parteiführung seines Landes schlug. "Dieses Zitat aus dem klassischen deutschen Bildungsroman Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre ist nicht nur Ausdruck der Philosophie, die dem persönlichen Reifeprozess eines jeden Einzelnen zugrunde liegt", so Wu, "sondern entspricht auch der Logik und Weisheit, mit der ein Land regiert und geführt wird."

Diktator Xi als Menschenfreund

Danach präsentierte er die "Stories of Xi Jinping", eine zwölfteilige Podcastreihe, in der der Chef der Kommunistischen Partei Chinas (KPCh) Bauern auf dem Land, Kohlekumpels, Schüler oder Fabrikarbeiter trifft. "Sie zeigen, wie er den Menschen zuhört und sich ihrer Anliegen annimmt", jubilierte Wu über die einzelnen Episoden. "Sie machen den am Menschen orientierten Regierungsansatz von Staatspräsident Xi Jinping deutlich." In den Ohren von Uiguren, Tibetern, Hongkongern und chinesischen Regimekritikern, die seit Xis Amtsantritt zu Tausenden in Gefängnisse und Arbeitslager gesperrt werden, mussten die Worte des Diplomaten wie Hohn klingen.

"Die chinesische Regierung versucht alle möglichen Plattformen für ihre Propaganda zu nutzen, auch wenn das alles mit der Realität nichts zu tun hat", sagt Tenzyn Zöchbauer, die Vorsitzende der Tibet-Initiative. "Tibetische Schriftstel­ler und Intellektuelle werden für ihre Werke zu jahrelangen Haftstrafen verurteilt, während die Kommunistische Partei Chinas ihre Propaganda auf den Bühnen der Frankfurter Buchmesse frei verbreiten darf."

[...]

cross-posted from: https://feddit.org/post/3877004

Russia has had to cope with an almost systematic increase in sanctions in scope and scale in order to conduct its invasion of Ukraine. These sanctions aim to hobble Russia’s capacity to procure and produce the necessary products to resupply its military. However, while sanctions have significantly affected Russia’s economy and war effort, Russia has shown adaptability in circumventing these restrictions through various initiatives and engaging with strategic partners, most importantly, the People’s Republic of China and its business entities.

[...]

A study by the KSE Institute utilizing Harmonized System (HS) codes [...] analyses forty-five common high-priority items (i.e., battlefield goods) and 485 HS codes for critical components [...] Between January and October 2023, Russian imports of battlefield goods totalled $8.77 billion, while critical components amounted to $22.23 billion. Within the 2023 KSE Institute compiled dataset, China has exercised a pivotal role in Russia’s efforts to import battlefield goods and critical components for its military and defence industry. This is observed from the immediate aftermath of Western sanctions being imposed to August-December 2022 when imports of battlefield goods and critical components increased by 84% and 42% respectively.

[...]

China was instrumental in all stages of the Russian defence industry’s external supply chain between January and October 2023. For instance, where businesses are headquartered, China accounts for 41% of battlefield goods and 41.2% of critical components. Interestingly, the total non-coalition sanctions accounted for 48%, and of these, China represented 46.7%, making China the most dominant power outside the coalition-sanction countries and the most dominant single entity.

China’s role increases substantially during manufacturing, representing 63.1% of battlefield goods and 58.7% of critical components produced for Russia.

[...]

Data shows that Chinese and Hong Kongese companies’ data combined led the sales of the goods and components in question to Russia, accounting for 68.9% of battlefield goods and 57% of critical components. Finally, China also plays a pivotal role in goods and components shipped directly to Russia, with China representing 53.2% of battlefield goods and 53.8% of critical components, respectively. Again, China is followed by Hong Kong at 22.7% and 12.9, with a combined 75.9% and 66.7%.

[...]

Specific Chinese exports of dual-use components and materials related to Russia’s defence industry and equipment that is being utilized by Russia’s military, including construction equipment, comprises:

• Computer Numerical Control (CNC) machines
• Semiconductors
• Microelectronics and Electronic Components
• Ball Bearings
• Nitrocellulose
• Drones and Electronic Warfare systems
• Body armour and Helmets

[...]

China’s continued support for Russia amid its invasion of Ukraine poses significant risks and challenges that far outweigh any short-term benefits. By aiding Russia, China jeopardizes its international reputation as a responsible global power, becoming a complicit actor in the conflict, violating international law and the core principles of sovereignty.

Moreover, Chinese entities supporting Russia and the Chinese government’s lackadaisical response to Western complaints will eventually lead to secondary sanctions, deepening economic strains and retaliation from Western nations.

[...]

Russia has had to cope with an almost systematic increase in sanctions in scope and scale in order to conduct its invasion of Ukraine. These sanctions aim to hobble Russia’s capacity to procure and produce the necessary products to resupply its military. However, while sanctions have significantly affected Russia’s economy and war effort, Russia has shown adaptability in circumventing these restrictions through various initiatives and engaging with strategic partners, most importantly, the People’s Republic of China and its business entities.

[...]

A study by the KSE Institute utilizing Harmonized System (HS) codes [...] analyses forty-five common high-priority items (i.e., battlefield goods) and 485 HS codes for critical components [...] Between January and October 2023, Russian imports of battlefield goods totalled $8.77 billion, while critical components amounted to $22.23 billion. Within the 2023 KSE Institute compiled dataset, China has exercised a pivotal role in Russia’s efforts to import battlefield goods and critical components for its military and defence industry. This is observed from the immediate aftermath of Western sanctions being imposed to August-December 2022 when imports of battlefield goods and critical components increased by 84% and 42% respectively.

[...]

China was instrumental in all stages of the Russian defence industry’s external supply chain between January and October 2023. For instance, where businesses are headquartered, China accounts for 41% of battlefield goods and 41.2% of critical components. Interestingly, the total non-coalition sanctions accounted for 48%, and of these, China represented 46.7%, making China the most dominant power outside the coalition-sanction countries and the most dominant single entity.

China’s role increases substantially during manufacturing, representing 63.1% of battlefield goods and 58.7% of critical components produced for Russia.

[...]

Data shows that Chinese and Hong Kongese companies’ data combined led the sales of the goods and components in question to Russia, accounting for 68.9% of battlefield goods and 57% of critical components. Finally, China also plays a pivotal role in goods and components shipped directly to Russia, with China representing 53.2% of battlefield goods and 53.8% of critical components, respectively. Again, China is followed by Hong Kong at 22.7% and 12.9, with a combined 75.9% and 66.7%.

[...]

Specific Chinese exports of dual-use components and materials related to Russia’s defence industry and equipment that is being utilized by Russia’s military, including construction equipment, comprises:

• Computer Numerical Control (CNC) machines
• Semiconductors
• Microelectronics and Electronic Components
• Ball Bearings
• Nitrocellulose
• Drones and Electronic Warfare systems
• Body armour and Helmets

[...]

China’s continued support for Russia amid its invasion of Ukraine poses significant risks and challenges that far outweigh any short-term benefits. By aiding Russia, China jeopardizes its international reputation as a responsible global power, becoming a complicit actor in the conflict, violating international law and the core principles of sovereignty.

Moreover, Chinese entities supporting Russia and the Chinese government’s lackadaisical response to Western complaints will eventually lead to secondary sanctions, deepening economic strains and retaliation from Western nations.

[...]

Die Schikanen der chinesischen Regierung gegenüber Menschen aus China, darunter Menschen aus Xinjiang, Tibet und der Inneren Mongolei, sowie deren Familienangehörigen in der Heimat zielen offenbar darauf ab, die Mitglieder der Diaspora davon abzuhalten, gegen die Regierung zu protestieren oder an entsprechenden politischen Veranstaltungen teilzunehmen. Die chinesischen Behörden versuchen zudem, von Diaspora-Mitgliedern Informationen über weitere Personen in Japan zu erhalten.

„Die chinesischen Behörden scheinen wenig Skrupel zu haben, in Japan lebende Chines*innen, welche die Missstände in China kritisieren, zum Schweigen zu bringen“, sagte Teppei Kasai, Asien-Programmbeauftragter bei Human Rights Watch. „Die japanische Regierung sollte Peking klarmachen, dass sie den langen Arm von Chinas transnationaler Repression in Japan nicht dulden wird.“